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ABSTRACT
THE CORPORATE EFFECTS OF R&D and PATENT-GRANTS:
EVIDENCE FROM INTRA-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS.
Steven Lifland 
Old Dominion University, 1996 
Director Dr. John Doukas
This study examines the intra-industry effect of announcements of technological 
advancement on the market valuation of both the announcing firm and the announcing firm’s relative 
industry competitors. This paper consists of two parts. Essay I discusses firm specific and intra­
industry valuation effects of a firm’s Research and Development (R&D) expenditures, while Essay II 
concentrates on the firm-specific and intra-industry valuation effects of a firm’s patent-grant 
announcement. Specifically, this study examines the validity of the competitive and free-rider 
hypotheses to explain the market response to announcements of R&D spending and the granting of 
patents.
While the evidence shows that the market reaction to the firm’s announcement of R&D and 
patent grants is insignificant, the effect of the R&D and patent-grant announcement on the announcing 
firm's industry is significantly positive. These results imply that there is a significant technological 
spillover effect at the expense of the announcing firm. In addition, the results suggest that the nature 
of competitor interaction has a significant influence on the announcing firm and its overall industry. In 
order to examine this industry interaction effect, the industry competitors of the announcing firm are 
categorized as either close or distant rivals. This distinction is based upon firm competition at the R&D 
level and the firm’s relative technological strength as evidenced by their patent grants. In the case of 
the R&D announcement, the close competitors of the announcing firm appear to be the driving force 
within the industry as the market reaction is positive and significant. It may suggest that close 
competitors have the proper R&D infrastructure to take advantage of the announcing firm’s R&D 
announcement. The market evaluates their ability to compete in R&D and rewards them. In the case 
of patent-grant announcements, it is the distant rivals of the announcing firm which incur significant
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positive market abnormal returns. The results seem to suggest that while the distant rivals may not 
have the comparative technological strength of the announcer or close competitors, they may posses 
some intangible asset (i.e., management skill or a ‘generic product’ strategy) which enhances their 
ability to free-ride.
Second, for both R&D and patent-grant announcements, not all the announcing firms 
experience negative abnormal returns. However, the technological spillover differences seem to 
depend on whether the announcing firm incurs positive or negative abnormal market returns. 
Specifically, the spillover appears to be strongly associated with those announcing firms who earn 
negative abnormal returns as the market is aware that R&D intensity and patent technological strength 
varies across firms. Further, in an attempt to determine whether or not the spillover wipes out all 
benefits to the announcing firm, post-announcement performance tests are used. The results indicate 
that both R&D and patent-grant announcing firms tend to improve their profitability.
Overall, the results suggest that the market valuation of R&D and patent-grant announcing 
firms depends on the interaction of the announcer's close and distant industry competitors. In 
addition, it is the varying degree of successful R&D competition among firms and the technological 
strength of a firm’s granted patents which ultimately lead to advancement within the industry.
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Introduction
In an effort to maintain long-term competitiveness in an industry, managers adopt investment 
policies which promote invention and innovation. Schumpeter (1934) states that technological 
innovation is the leading determinant of economic development for an individual firm. Lieberman and 
Montgomery (1988) assert that advances in product technology are a function of research and 
development (R&D) expenditures. A trait of research and development activity, which differentiates 
itself from other types of corporate capital expenditures, is the virtual necessity for it to be internally 
funded from a firm's current operations or retained earnings.1 The implication of this internal funding 
aspect, is that the market and industry competitors only become aware of such activity upon the 
voluntary disclosures by management. Griliches (1979) asserts that the level of knowledge in a firm is 
not only derived from its own R&D investment, but is also influenced by the knowledge borrowed or 
stolen from other firms within the same industry. Spence (1984), in a theoretical study, examines the 
implications of R&D spillovers in terms of a dynamic model of industry competition. He finds that an 
increase in spillovers may weaken the incentive to invest in own R&D, as such investment activity 
may reduce the production costs of competitors. Spence contends that R&D spillovers are free and 
perfect substitutes for own R&D.
One of the first papers to investigate the relationship between investment announcements 
and the value of the firm, is the capital expenditures study by McConnell and Muscarella (1985). 
Analyzing finms which publicly announce their future capital expenditure plans, they find that market 
participants respond positively (negatively) to capital expenditure increases (decreases). However, 
upon dividing their sample by intended use, specifically research and development expenditures, no 
statistically significant change in firm value is found. In an event-study by Chan, Martin, and 
Kensinger (1990), the announcements of plans to increase R&D expenditures are met, on average, 
with significant positive market reactions. Doukas and Switzer (1992) find significant abnormal returns
1 1n a study on the self-financing of an R&D project, Kamien and Schwartz (1978) find that a frequently offered reason for this 
self-financing, is that a firm is reluctant to reveal detailed information about a project, which would make it attractive to outside lenders, 
for fear of disclosure to potential rivals.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
in the case of multi-year R&D announcements. The basis for this is that the firm's commitment to 
future investment opportunities is regarded as encouraging by the market. Their results further 
enhance the belief that the response by the market is dependent upon the information content of the 
research and development announcements. John, John and Sundaram (1995) find results consistent 
with that of Doukas and Switzer, but also suggest that the stock price reaction of firms that announce 
changes in their R&D expenditures is dependent upon the degree of the R&D change and the nature 
of the strategic competition in the industry.
An overlooked area in the R&D literature is the transfer of private information by a firm and 
the potential impact on its industry counterparts. Doukas and Switzer 1992) explore one case of an 
intra-industry transfer. The returns to the high-concentration firm, Pfizer, reflect a positive market 
reaction when it announces an increase in research spending. After identifying twelve industry 
competitors of Pfizer, 75% of the rivals' abnormal returns were found to be negative at the 
announcement date. This finding may implicate the existence of spillover effects. A firm which 
announces an increase in its R&D expenditures, may adversely affect the competitive stature of its 
industry rivals. This may manifest itself as negative abnormal returns on the equity value of 
competitor firms. In their study on strategic interaction in R&D, John, John and Sundaram suggest 
that the market valuation of the announcing firm depended on the nature of strategic industry 
interaction. The distinction among competitors was based on a firm’s marginal profitability and its 
product market strategy. When the announcing film’s abnormal returns were positive, the firm which 
competed on the basis of product complements (i.e., not a competing product) benefited along with 
the announcing firm. In the case where the announcing firm’s abnormal performance was negative, 
the firm which used a strategy of product substitutes benefited more than the announcer and those 
firms engaging in product complements. The spillover benefits those who can produce close 
substitutes. It has been argued by Arrow (1962) and Schumpeter (1950) that the incentive to invest in 
R&D is weakened when the knowledge generated from this activity cannot be fully protected from 
competitors. The empirical works of Levin and Reiss (1984), Jaffe (1986) and Bernstein and Nadiri 
(1989) further maintain that competitors of the announcing firm can benefit through a spillover effect.
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An objective of this essay is to investigate the firm-specific and intra-industry valuation effects 
of a firm’s Research and Development (R&D) expenditure announcement.2 Specifically, this study 
examines the validity of the competitive and free-rider hypotheses to explain the market reaction to 
announcements of R&D spending. While the evidence reveals that the market response to the firm’s 
announcement of R&D is not significant, the impact of the R&D announcement on the announcing 
firm’s industry is significantly positive. The implication is that there is a strong R&D spillover effect at 
the expense of the announcing firm.3 In addition, the nature of competitor interaction appears to 
have a significant influence on the announcing firm and its overall industry. A distinction is made 
between rival firms based upon their competition at the R&D level. The results suggest that the close 
rivals of the R&D announcing firm are the driving force within the industry as the market reaction is 
significant and positive. It may suggest that the firms with the strongest R&D infrastructure are the 
ones who can gain the most. In addition, while not all announcing firms experience negative abnormal 
returns, the R&D spillover seems to depend on whether the R&D announcing firm incurs positive or 
negative abnormal returns. Specifically, the spillover appears to be strongly associated with those 
announcing firms who earn negative abnormal returns, as the market is aware that R&D intensity 
varies across firms. Finally, to determine if the spillover has eaten away all benefits to the 
announcing firm, a post-announcement performance test is utilized. The results indicate that R&D 
announcing firms tend to improve their profitability.
The organization of this essay is as follows. The next section examines the literature 
pertaining to the effect of R&D on economic performance and firm market value. Section III discusses 
the intra-industry R&D information transfer effects. Section IV provides a description of the data and 
intra-industry sample design. The methodology and empirical evidence for the R&D announcement 
abnormal returns, the cross-sectional regression variables, and the measure of post-R&D
2 Following the genera! intra-industry information transfer model of Foster (1961), the R&D announcements of other firms within the 
industry can be regarded as one source of information transfer as they convey a change in the relative competitive advantage among 
firms.
3 Previous studies find mixed results for rival stock price effects associated with various types of announcements. Hertzel (1991) finds 
that rival stock prices are largely unaffected by repurchase agreements. Positive rival stock price effects have been documented around 
the announcement of earnings announcements (Han and Wild (1990), Clinch and Sinclair (1966), and Foster (1961). In an intnafndustry 
study of bank failures in Hong Kong, Gay, Timme, and Yung (1991) find negative stock price reactions among rivals.
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are found in section VI.




Numerous studies find that, in many industries, firms invest in research and development 
(R&D) in order to develop new products or processes.4 Schumpeter (1950) posits that a firm's 
innovation may generate market power but that this market control may be eroded by rival imitation. 
Arrow (1962) observes that the incentive to invest in R&D is weakened when the knowledge 
generated from this activity cannot be kept from competitors.5 A characteristic of R&D expenditures is 
that the firm engaged in such activity may not be able to appropriate all the benefits for itself. The end 
result is that the technological knowledge of the innovator may spill over to rival firms who virtually 
incur no cost for the information. In a theoretical paper, Spence (1984) examines the implications of 
R&D spillovers in terms of a dynamic model of industry competition and performance. A key result is 
that an increase in spillovers may weaken the incentive to invest in own R&D as such investment 
activity may reduce the production costs of competitors. In essence, R&D spillovers are free and 
perfect substitutes for own R&D. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue, in contrast to Spence (1984), that 
R&D spillover effects are compliments and not substitutes. In order for firms to take advantage of 
R&D spillovers, they must have their own labs, engineers, and be prepared to spend more on existing 
programs (Nelson, 1982, Rosenberg, 1974, and Allen, 1977). The empirical works of Levin (1988) 
and Levin and Reiss (1988) support the view that there are differences in the technological 
opportunities facing finms and these differences affect R&D expenditures. They argue that own and 
rival R&D are imperfect substitutes.
In an empirical test of a Schumpterian model of R&D and market structures, Levin and Reiss 
(1984) find that while the R&D expenditures of a firm will reduce its own cost, it also diminishes the 
cost of all other firms in the industry through a spillover effect. Bernstein and Nadiri (1989), in a study
4 Refer to Grifiches (1980,1966), Mansfield (1965,1980,1981), and Terteckyi (1980). A major factor in the long-term profitability of 
U.S. firms is due to their ability to present the latest products and processes. Any market introduction depends on the current research 
and development activity of the firm (Mansfield 1961). Additionally, R&D earns a relatively high rate of return (Griliches, 1960 and 
Tetlecky, 1960).
5 In contrast, the theoretical model of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1960) assumes that the R&D actions of one firm will not impact on the 
research actions of another firm.
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of intra-industiy spillovers, assume that a fiim minimizes the present value of expected production 
costs subject to technology, which includes an adjustment for spillovers from the R&D expenditures of 
competitors. Examining 48 firms across several industries over the time period 1965 to 1978, they 
find that an increase in intra-industry R&D spillovers decreases both the R&D capital stock and the unit 
cost in each industry. It appears that spillovers are a substitute for own R&D capital. A one percent 
increase in intra-industry spillover caused average costs to other firms to decline around .1% to .2%. 
Jaffe (1986) finds that when spillovers increase by 1%, the profits of rivals increase .3%.
B. R&D and Market Valuation
Receiving less attention in the financial literature is the relationship between R&D investment 
and the value of the firm. A general hypothesis is that an unanticipated announcement of a R&D 
expenditure increase will result in a positive stock price movement. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) 
use an event-time study approach to examine the common stock prices of a sample of 357 
corporations, during the interval 1975-1981, on which they publicly announce their future capital 
expenditure plans. This approach is consistent with the notion of rational capital market behavior, for it 
stresses the "timeliness" of the capital market's reaction to the actions of the firm.6 If markets are 
efficient, the investment policy followed by managers will impact incrementally on firm value, but only 
to the extent that the action is unanticipated by the capital market. The implication is that an 
announcement effect is a case where the investment opportunities are made more clear. McConnell 
and Muscarella investigate if the announcement effects are consistent with the predictions of either 
the market value maximization hypothesis or the traditional model of corporate valuation.7 The former 
hypothesis states that managers invest up to a point where the marginal rate of return of a project just 
equals the required rate of return by the market. The empirical prediction is that unexpected increases
6 Cockbum and Griliches (1968) examine the impact of R&D on a firm's value using the Tobin q framework. Their sample is composed 
of annual observations. Due to the timing, it may be difficult to attribute their results to the behavior of a rational capital market
7 The traditional valuation model as developed by Miller and Modigliani (1961) states that the market value of a firm is determined by discounting a 
firm's expected future cash flows (i.e., earnings) created by its existing assets in place. In addition, value is determined by adding to this, the 
discounted net present value (NPV) of a firm's investment projects anticipated to become a reality in the future.
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(decreases) will be associated with increases (decreases) in the market value of the firm. The 
traditional valuation theory asserts that the market value of a firm is equal to the discounted value of 
future earnings generated from assets-in-p!ace plus the discounted net present values of future 
potential investment projects. The overall results are that market participants respond positively 
(negatively) to capital expenditure increases (decreases). However, when McConnell and Muscarella 
divide their sample by the intended use of funds, there are contrary results. Specifically, where the 
industrial firms (sample size of eight) announce that the intended use of the capital expenditure is 
research and development (R&D), no statistically significant change in firm value is found.
John and Mishra (1990) focus on corporate announcements of capital expenditure where, in 
an efficient signaling equilibrium, insiders use their own net trading and announced capital expenditure 
activity to convey private information to the market at a minimum cost. The corporate announcement 
and concurrent insider trading are modeled as joint signals. The price response to unexpected 
changes in investment has different predictions depending on whether the firm is a growth or declining 
firm.8
Chan, Martin and Kensinger (1990) note that hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts may 
limit a firm’s research and development (R&D) activity. This concern with the effects of restructuring 
is rooted in the belief that capital markets are myopic. In other words, investors do not look beyond 
current earnings. Management fears that any funds diverted to projects with long-term payoffs as 
opposed to those that generate short-term positive cash flows, will result in declining stock prices. 
These depressed values may then make the firm a target for takeover. The implication is that a R&D 
investment with its long-term payoff will be avoided. Over the interval 1979 -1985, ninety-five 
announcements of increased R&D spending are found. Forty-two percent of the R&D 
announcements are made concurrently with news of earnings forecast, reported earnings and plans 
to increase other capital expenditures. Upon dividing their sample into high-growth and low-growth 
groups, on average, the own-firm effect is significantly positive. A long-term view of R&D is taken by
8 McConnell and Muscarella (1965) find that announcements of increasing exploration and development costs, in a declining oil industry, are 
associated with decreases in stock prices.
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the market.9
In an event study of R&D announcements and the related market value of the firm, Doukas 
and Switzer (1992) make use of a feedback effect equilibrium model,10 where they examine a sample 
of 87 R&D announcements by 45 companies for the period 1965-1984. Their aggregate sample of 
annual R&D budget announcements is associated with statistically insignificant returns. The results 
are consistent with those reported by McConnell and Muscarella (1985). However, in the case of 
multiyear R&D announcements, they find significant abnormal returns. In their cross sectional 
regression, firms in concentrated industries which announce an increase in R&D activity, experience 
positive reactions. Those firms operating in industries with low concentration ratios, experience 
negative abnormal returns. The results are consistent with Schumpeter (1950), where he predicts a 
high market response to R&D when a firm operates in a highly concentrated industry. The main 
point of Schumpeter was that if a product market was controlled by a small number of fimns (i.e., a 
highly-concentrated industry), the ability to take advantage of the value enhancing R&D investment, at 
the expense of other firms, is augmented. A firm in a low concentrated industry should be identified 
with a relatively low market response to R&D activity. An important result from the Doukas and 
Switzer study is that the response to R&D expenditures by the market is dependent on the information 
content of R&D announcements and the market structure of the announcing firm. They also look at 
the reaction of one industry. Nine of the rival firms have negative returns, while three show 
positive reactions. This is the first result to be reported in the literature regarding intra-industry R&D 
effects. While the results are consistent with their model, it is only one case and suggests a broader 
study is needed.
John, John and Sundaram (1995), empirically test the wealth effects of R&D announcing 
firms, as well as the wealth effects of their competitors in order to study strategic competition in R&D
9 In another test pursued on the fact that the late 1960's was characterized by slow growth in R&D spending and that restructuring 
occurred in industries where R&D investment was iess important, their sample was split into high-tech and Icw-tech groups. The former 
shows a significant positive stock price response, while a significant negative reaction forthehwwtech firms results.
10 Bhattacharya and Ritter (1963) introduce a feedback effect equilibrium model for a firm pursuing R&D activity. In their model, a firm can tell the 
market about its activity by disclosing its private technological information. While this technology is valuable to a firm's own research activity, it may 
also prove to be useful in the research of its competitors. The disclosing firm bees a tradeoff between weakening its technological advantage and 
being able to take advantage of a lower cost of capital due to its innovation prospects. The loss of an informational advantage is a signaling cost of 
disclosure, but the disclosure also facilitates research activity for the industry as a whole.
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and firm values. Over the time interval of 1985 to 1991, a sample of 125 R&D announcements is 
analyzed. Out of these observations, twenty one consist of pure R&D announcements. The 
remaining mix reveals thirty-seven percent of the R&D announcements are made concurrently with 
news of earnings, twenty-three percent are made concurrently with capital expenditure 
announcements, and twenty-three percent of the R&D announcements are made concurrently with 
both earnings and capital expenditure announcements. They find that the average announcement 
effect is not significant, which is consistent with the evidence listed by Doukas and Switzer (1992). 
However, while the average announcement effect is not significant, their objective is to examine how 
the announcement effect depends on the extent of the announced R&D spending and the nature 
of strategic interaction in the industry. Their model predicts that the announcement effect on the 
announcing firm’s value should be a function of whether competitors adopt a strategy to compete in 
product complements ( i.e., produce a product which does not compete with the announcer’s product) 
or follow a competition strategy of product substitution (i-©-. produce a product which is a close 
substitute to the announcing firm's product). In order to operationalize this concept, they make a 
product-market distinction between competitors by developing the market structure based variable 
(CORR). This is measured as the correlation coefficient between the ratio of percentage change in a 
firm’s net income to the percentage change in the firm’s net sales and percentage change in the 
industry’s net sales fit is the firm’s marginal profitability in that industry). The distinction between a 
strategy of product substitutes and product compliments is determined by the fact that the actions of 
one firm can affect a competing firm’s marginal profitability in that market. In their empirical work, the 
two-day announcement effect on the CORR variable indicated that the abnormal returns of the 
announcing firm are affected by the CORR variable (their proxy for substitute-complement industry 
interaction). The coefficient was negative and significant (-0.046 with a t-value of 2.044). As CORR 
rises, the competitor is doing better than the industry with respect to product market revenues. To 
examine the CORR effect, they split the sample based on the CORR value11 into substitutes and
11 If a firm has a CORR > 0  then it is considered to compete as a complement. When CORR <0, the firm is considered to compete as 
a substitute.
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complements. The two-day announcement effect for firms following a product substitution strategy 
was positive and significant with a coefficient of 0.006 and a t-value of 1.74. The strategic 
complements had an insignificant negative coefficient o f-0.0008 and t-value of .14. In order to further 
analyze the relationship between the announcing firm and its industry interaction, they looked at the 
average announcement effect on the industry competing firms. They had found the two-day average 
abnormal returns for the sample of R&O announcing firms to be positive and insignificant. The 
average effect on the industry firms was negative and significant. They argue that the negative 
industry abnormal returns (-0.0016, t-value = 3.26) were due to their sample being comprised of 67 
cases of substitutes who tend to suffer when the announcing firm gains. Their final step was to look at 
the relationship of the competitive return to their interaction variable. They suggest that the impact on 
the announcing firm depends on whether firms adopt competition in product substitutes or product 
complements. When the announcing firm's abnormal returns were positive, the close substitutes had 
significant negative abnormal returns as R&D spillover was not present. When the abnormal returns 
of the R&D announcing firm were negative, both strategies of product substitution and product 
complements generated insignificant negative abnormal returns. The competitors were not able to 
free-ride on the R&D announcement.
The results of John, John and Sundaram (1995) are subject to several limitations and need 
to be addressed. One major concern is with the set of chosen observations. In (John et al) only 17% 
of their sample consists of pure R&D announcements, while the remaining 83% of the R&D 
announcements are made concurrently with earnings and other capital expenditure announcements. 
The CORR variable, which is based on the correlation of the ratio of a firm’s profits to its net sales and 
the change in the industry net sales, may pick up the noise from the concurrent earnings 
announcements. A bias in the relationship between own-firm effects and the effect on competitors 
may result. The sample in this current study includes only pure R&D announcements. In a further 
attempt to strengthen the integrity of the data set, if an earnings report or capital expenditure 
announcement is made either five days before or five days after the R&D announcement, the 
announcement is not included in the sample. The time interval of 1985 to 1991 utilized by (John et al) 
is lengthened to encompass the years 1979 through 1992. An interesting variable in (John et al) is
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the interactive term which they claim is of consequence in explaining the reactions by the market 
regarding announcements of R&D expenditures. However, they fail to include the R&D intensity of 
the announcing firm in the same regression, which tests for the significance of the CORR variable. 
This paper posits that the R&D intensity of firms is a critical factor in determining the interaction 
between the announcing firm and its industry competitors. The distinction between industry 
competitors is based on the competition at the R&D level. The probability of a firm benefiting from a 
competitor’s R&D depends on how these firms compete against each other with respect to R&D. 
Successful R&D may be more critical to intra-industry competition than a firm’s marginal profitability 
and its product market. The industry challengers of the R&D announcing firm are categorized as 
being either close or distant competitors as the R&D intensities vary across firms. Other differentiating 
factors in this paper’s configuration are the hypotheses of the competitive effect and the free-rider 
effect to explain the market response to announcements of research and development spending. Due 
to competition within industries, it may be more likely that these two effects exist with one offsetting 
the other. Finally, does the existence of a spillover mean that the R&D announcing firm will only 
encounter insignificant abnormal returns, or is there a lag in time that the market requires to evaluate 
the announcing firm? In order to answer this question, this paper is the first to examine the industry- 
adjusted post R&D announcement earnings performance of the R&D announcing firm.
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III. Intra-Industry Effects of R&D Expenditure Announcements
A. Competitive Effect
The conceptual frameworks of business strategy treat the role of technology as one of many 
possible influences upon the competitive strategy of a firm (Porter,1980). In contrast, Schumpeter 
(1934) examines economic growth and states that technological innovation (by extension, investment 
in R&D) is the leading determinant of economic development for an individual firm. In assessing the 
changes in world market shares for American firms over the period 1960-1986, Franko (1989) asserts 
that the principal indicator of sales growth performance relative to competition is commercially 
oriented R&D. Where managers possess private information regarding a firm's lesser known (by 
outsiders) investment opportunity set, an announcement of an increase in R&D expenditures may be 
taken as a signal12 concerning the firm's future technological opportunities. More important, in 
addition to the market making inferences about the announcing firm's own competitive advantage, 
inferences about the technological status of the announcing firm’s industry competitors may also be 
formulated.
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) assert that advances in product or process technology 
are a function of R&D expenditures. Hence, the announcement of an increase in the R&D 
expenditure of one firm may convey important information to stockholders of rival industrial firms. 
This intra-industry information transfer may communicate that the announcing firm is advancing in its 
technology and innovation efforts and, accordingly, may recast the competitive composition of the 
industry to its own advantage. The work of Harris and Vickers (1987) posits that only the competitive 
threat acts as the significant force driving a firm's R&D effort. They conclude that only incumbents 
secure some kind of competitive advantage over their industry rivals.13 The likelihood of a decline in 
the competitive position of industry competitors, due to an announcing firm's commitment to 
innovation, constitutes the competitive effect of R&D announcements and leads the hypothesis to 
predict negative abnormal stock returns for industry competitors, while resulting in positive abnormal
12 The foundation for this interpretation is but on the works of Miller and Rock (1965) (dividend announcements), Myers and Majluf 
(1984), Ross (1977) (security issue announcements), Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1963) (equity issues), Dennis 
and McConnell (1966) (mergers), and Vermaelen (1984) (stock repurchases).
13 Mascarenhas (1992) suggests that first-entrants in the semi-submersible oil-drilling industry maintain a higher market share. Tufano 
(1990), in a study of financial innovation, finds that banks capture a larger share of underwriting with innovations than with imitative 
products. Innovators enjoy lower costs of trading, underwriting, and marketing.
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returns for the R&D announcing firm.
B. Free-Rider Effect
As implied from the competitive literature above, industrial firms develop new products and 
enhance their relative competitive positions through R&D investments. Arrow (1962), however, 
observes that a firm’s incentive to invest in innovation is weakened when the technical know-how 
generated by the investment is transmitted to competitors. A feature of R&D expenditures, which 
makes it distinctive from other firm-related investments, is that the announcing firm may not be able to 
bar competitors from freely acquiring the benefits from its own R&D investment. In essence, the gains 
from the innovator's R&D activity may spill over to its industry counterparts even though there has 
been no compensation paid by the rival firm (Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989). Spence (1984) models the 
effect of imperfect R&D appropriability on industry competition. He argues that even though 
innovators may enjoy an initial period of market control, the ability of rival firms to free-ride on an 
innovator's R&D investment may reduce the magnitude and durability of the announcing firm’s 
benefits.14 In a study of intra-industry spillovers, Bernstein and Nadiri (1989) assume that a firm 
minimizes the present value of expected production costs subject to a technology which includes an 
adjustment for spillovers from the R&D expenditures made by the other challenging firms in the 
industry. Their sample considers 48 firms across 4 industries over the time interval 1965 to 1978. 
Their results are consistent with Spence (1984) in the sense that spillovers appear to be substitutes for 
own R&D capital. They find that a one percent increase in intra-industry spillover causes average 
costs to other firms to decline by .1% to .2%. Jaffe (1986) finds that when spillovers increase by 1%, 
the profits of rivals increase by .3%. Assessing free-rider effects operating in the labor market,
Guasch and Weiss (1980) argue that while one firm may invest in employee training, the benefits may 
be enjoyed by a competitor-firm which may be able to hire away the technically trained and skilled 
personnel. The potential for technological spillovers and more specifically, the ability of industry
14 Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Nelson (1984), and Rosenberg (1974) contend that the spillover effect may not be as strong as Spence 
assumes. In order for a firm to be a free-rider, it must have its own labs and engineers to be able to assimilate the knowledge which 
spills over. However, while rivals may have to possess their own labs or equipment, their expenditures are stall relatively less than that of 
the innovator’s costs.
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competitors to benefit from an announcing firm's innovative investment, comprises the free-rider 
effect of R&D announcements. The free-rider hypothesis predicts positive abnormal returns for the 
R&D announcing firm’s industry competitors.
C. Valuation Effects of R&D Announcements
In general, from the two competing hypotheses described earlier, the expectation would be 
that the competitive effect will result in positive returns for the R&D announcing firm and negative 
returns for its industry competitors. The free-rider effect is expected to generate positive returns for 
the competitor firm. The evidence from the stock market response to R&D expenditure 
announcements indicates that the market values R&D investments positively, on average, for the 
announcing firm. Woolridge and Snow (1990) find positive cumulative abnormal returns for 52 
strategic investment announcements concerning R&D projects. Chan et al., (1990) find stock 
responses to 95 announcements of increased R&D spending to be significantly positive on average. 
McConnell and Muscarella (1985), for a small sample of R&D announcing firms, find no significant 
response. Doukas and Switzer (1992) also find no significant shareholder wealth effects in their 
aggregate sample. However, they do examine the reactions of rivals to one announcing firm in their 
sample. There was a positive market reaction to the one firm's announced spending increase, while 
in 9 of 12 rival companies, their abnormal returns were negative. Consistent with Doukas and Switzer, 
John, John and Sundaram (1995) find, on average, insignificant R&D announcement effects.
However, they report that the R&D announcement effect on the announcing firm’s value should be a 
function of whether the firms adopt a strategy to compete in product complements (i.e., produce a 
product which does not compete with the announcing firm’s product) or follow a competitive strategy 
of product substitution (i.e., produce a product which is a close substitute of the R&D announcing 
firm’s product).
In contrast to the product market classification, this paper makes the distinction between 
industry competitors of the announcing firm on the basis of competition at the R&D level. When the 
R&D announcing firm and its industry rivals have similar R&D infrastructures, they are considered to 
be close competitors, while those firms with dissimilar research intensities are considered to be distant
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rivals. This paper suggests that the market evaluates a firm’s ability to compete at the R&D level and 
to take advantage of R&D announcements. The essence of analyzing intra-industry effects is that, in 
addition to assessing the performance of a single firm, the market may simultaneously infer how other 
companies in the same industry of the announcing firm may be affected. If a firm's market value is 
influenced by signals sent by its industry rivals, then, the R&D expenditure announcement may 
concurrently impart two such signals. The first may convey the competitive position and relative 
technological advantage of the announcing firm. The second signal may impart that the industiy 
competitor may be able to benefit from the intra-industry technological spillover. Upon the R&D 
expenditure announcement, the market's response to both the R&D announcing firm and its industry 
competitors, should reflect the net influence of the competitive and free-rider effects.
Several possible market valuation effects for the R&D announcing firm and its industry rivals 
might be observed. When the stock price of the R&D announcing firm increases, on average, while 
the share prices of its industry competitors are unchanged or decrease, this may reflect that the 
competitive effect is greater than the free-rider effect. Similarly, when the shareholders of industry 
competing firms find their stock values decrease, on average, while the R&D announcing firm's value 
remains constant or increase, this may indicate that the competitive effect dominates the free-rider 
effect. In both cases, the perception of the market may be that the R&D announcing firm is relatively 
more technologically advanced. As such, the announcing firm may have a decisive competitive 
advantage in an industrial innovation race, despite the potential ability of rivals to benefit from such 
technology (Harris and Vickers,1987).
When the R&D announcing firm encounters negative abnormal returns, on average, while 
constant or positive abnormal returns are associated with its industry rivals, the free-rider effect may 
have offset the competitive effect. McConnell and Muscarella (1985), using an event-study 
approach, examine the reactions of the common stock returns to a small sample of R&D expenditure 
announcements by industrial firms from 1975 to 1981. They report an insignificant market response to 
corporate R&D expenditures. Chan et al (1990), however, find the own-firm effect to be significantly 
positive. Their finding may be due to splitting their sample into high growth tech versus low growth 
tech groups and the use of R&D announcements made concurrently with news of earnings. For the
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entire sample of 87 multiyear R&D expenditure announcements by 45 companies for the period 1965- 
1984, Doukas and Switzer (1992) also report insignificant shareholder gains. Utilizing a sample of 125 
announced R&D expenditure changes, John, John and Sundaram (1995) find that the average 
announcement effect is not significant. They attribute this result to the interaction of strategic 
complements and strategic substitutes in the industry. Their finding may be influenced by their 
sample of observations as approximately 83%15 of the R&D announcements are made concurrently 
with earnings and other capital expenditure announcements. Their interaction variable, which is 
similar to a return on sales ratio, may pick up the noise from the concurrent earnings announcements. 
This work posits that these mixed findings reported in the literature may be due to a potentially strong 
free-rider effect in place.16
When positive abnormal returns are associated with the industry competitor firms, on 
average, while the shareholders of the R&D announcing firm receive constant or negative abnormal 
returns, the free-rider effect may dominate the competitive effect. Baldwin and Childs' (1969) model, 
an extension of the duopoly model of Scherer (1967), derives conditions under which the imitator 
profits more than the innovator. Specifically, they show that imitation is sometimes the firm's R&D 
strategy selected by choice. The conditions, under which the imitator is likely to outperform the 
innovator, may be superior production facilities, a more skilled work-force, greater economies of scale, 
access to better raw materials, or better quality control. The strategy of the industry challenger may be 
that it allows the announcing firm to do the innovating, and then attempts to benefit from the actions of 
the innovator-firm by investing a significantly smaller portion of its capital budget on research and 
development.
This essay investigates the intra-industry R&D expenditure effects on the shareholders of the 
R&D announcing firm, as well as the stock price reaction of its industry competitors, as free-riding may 
exist within the announcing firm’s industry. The sample observations only include pure R&D 
announcements. In a further attempt to strengthen the integrity of the data set, if an earnings report or
15 The sample used was not made up completely of 'pure' R&D announcements. Specifically, the distribution is pure R&D 
announcements (17%), R&D and Earnings (37%), R&D and Capital Expenditures (23%) and R&D, Earnings, and Capital 
Expenditures (23%).
16 Theoretically, it could be that neither effect is present. However, due to competition within industries, it may be more likely that the two 
effects exist with one offsetting the other.
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capital expenditure announcement is made either five days before or five days after the R&D 
announcement, the announcement is not included in the sample set of observations. Major 
differentiating factors in this paper’s configuration are the hypotheses of the competitive effect and the 
free-rider effect to explain the market response to announcements of research and development 
spending. Further, the industry challengers of the R&D announcing firm are categorized as being 
either close or distant competitors based on relative R&D intensities with the announcing firm. While 
the evidence shows the market response to the R&D announcing firm is insignificant, there appears to 
be a subsequent significant R&D spillover effect at the expense of the R&D announcing firm. In order 
to determine if the spillover completely eats away all of the benefits to the R&D announcing firm, this 
is the first paper to utilize a post-announcement performance test to determine if the R&D announcing 
firm improves its profitability after the announcement.
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IV. Data Description and Intra-Industry Sample Design
A. Data Description
Tfie data sample consists of public announcements of company sponsored R&D 
expenditures made over the period 1979 to 1992. Each firm announcement date is matched with its 
common stock daily return from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tape files over the 
1979 -1992 period. The firms included in the sample are listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX).
Announcement dates are obtained from the Dow Jones News/Retrieval Service (DJNRS) 
database. The sources for this news retrieval service are Dow Jones News Wire (DJNW). the Broad 
Tape. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and Barron’s. Thompson et al. (1987) point out that some 
announcements reflected in DJNW and WSJ are not included in The Wall Street Journal Index 
(WSJI) and hence, the retrieval service is a more comprehensive database. Even so, to augment the 
DJNRS, announcements were obtained from the annual editions of the Wall Street Journal Index 
(WSJI1) and the Predicasts F&S Index (PFSI) for the 820 firms of the BusinessWeek annual R&D 
scoreboard. PFSI indexes the financial news for over 750 financial publications, business and trade 
journals, and special reports.17 Additionally, both the WSJ index and the PFSI can confirm 
announcement dates appearing in the DJNRS.
This essay makes use of a more stringent screening process regarding the inclusion of R&D 
announcements into the sample than prior studies. The works of McConnell and Muscarella (1985) 
and Chan et al., (1990), follow a naive investor expectation model which assumes that investors 
expect no change in R&D expenditures from the previous fiscal year. Accordingly, any increase in 
R&D spending is considered the unexpected portion of the announcement.
Critical to the selection criteria regarding R&D expenditure announcements is that reactions to 
the sample's investment events are not tainted by other informative declarations.18 The sample data
17 McConnell and Muscarella (1965) use as their main source, the Wall Street Journal (75%), with the remaining sources being 
distributed among American Metal Market (11 %), New York Times (3.8%), Journal of Commerce (3.1 %), Oil and Gas Journal (2.4%), 
Chemical Week (2.4%), Chemical Market Review (.5%), Chemical and Engineering News (.5%), Metal Bulletin (.2%), Aviation Week 
(.2%) and the Oil and Gas Journal. The main source of the announcements in the sample of Doukas and Switzer (1992) is the Wall 
Street Journal (70%), with the remaining being distributed fairly evenly among the New York Times, Chemical and Engineering News, 
Chemical Week, Journal of Commerce, Chemical Marketing Review, Forbes, American Marketing Monthly, Daily News, Aviation Week, 
Globe and Mail, IMS Pharmaceutical News, SCRIP, Chemical Engineer, Electronics News, Barrens, NR, Medical Market and 
Electronics.
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satisfies the following criteria:
•  Consider only R&D expenditure announcements that constitute at least a 6 percent change in 
real terms from prior firm disclosures.
•  There is an unambiguous initial announcement date. This is verified through reference to 
DJNRS and WSJI.
•  There is no other announcement made on this initial date nor during the five trading days 
before or after the announcement date.
•  Announcements are of plans to increase or decrease corporate R&D expenditures.
•  Firms involved in joint-venture R&D activity are excluded from the sample.
•  The sample is limited to firms whose CRSP daily stock return data are available over the 
1979-1992 time interval.
The following is an example of a R&D announcement included in the data sample:
Schering-Plough to Boost 1980 R&D Budget by 20%; 02/20/80,The Wall Street Journal. The 
Schering-Plough Corp. told health care analysts that it increased its research and development 
budget this year by 20%. The company plans to spend $90 million this year, compared with 
$74.8 million last year for research and development.
Table 1 summarizes some descriptive statistics of the 65 firms included in the final sample. 
Average net sales for the firms in the sample were $13.7 billion (in the year of announcement) and 
assets were $18.0 billion. These figures are taken from the annual Standard and Poor's Compustat 
Services. The industry R&D intensity ratios are obtained from the ‘R&D Scoreboard’ published each 
year by Business Week. Companies included in the scoreboard are limited to those reporting sales of 
$58 million or more and R&D expenses of at least $1 million. This data is also updated annually by 
Standard & Poor’s Compustat Services. The average annual R&D expenditure On the year of 
announcement) was $855 million. The average firm in the sample is 1.4 times more R&D intensive 
than the average firm in the industry.
18 There is a possibility of parts! aTticipation of the event as a firm’s announcement of capital expenditures can happen with some 
regularity (McConnell and Muscarella, 1965). However, Doukas and Switzer (1992) point out that the situation may be less severe for 
events surrounding R&D because innovators would rather keep the new product or process out of the hands of rival imitators.
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Statistics Describing the Sample of N YS E and A M EX Firms Making R&D 
Announcements. The Time Period Covers 1979 to 1992 and there are 
Sixty-five Firms Announcing Their R&D Activity.
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Median
Deviation Value Value
Net Sales ($mn.) 13706 .0 20694.0 134.0 132429.0 7606.0
Net Income ($mn.) 4 9 0 .5 1455.2 -6865.0 4725.0 345.0
Total Assets ($mn.) 18007 .0 37604.0 115.0 192876.0 7509.0
Annual R&D  
Expenditure ($mn) 855 .37 1101.6 1.40 5619.90 521.50
R D lR rm 3 0 .078 0.078 0.010 0.544 0.061
RD Itndustiy 0.061 0.028 0.008 0.097 0.060
RDlFirm/lndustry 1.414 1.390 0.119 7.752 1.017
Total Employees 86910 139180 129 750000 45644
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.76 1.70 0.88 7.84 2 .32
Price-Earnings Ratio 18.62 9.534 7.00 56.00 16.50
* Firm's R&D expenditures divided by its annual net sales figure. 
b Aggregate R&D expenditures by all firms in the industry divided by industry net sales. 
c Ratio of Firm R&D Intensity divided by Industry R&D Intensity.
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B. Intra-industry Sample Design
The intra-industry R&D information transfer analysis demands that the sample be further 
refined in order to ascertain the impact of R&D 'news' on both the announcing firm and its industry 
competitors. Initially, the R&D announcing firm's industry will be defined as all other firms with the 
same primary 4-digit SIC code in the CRSP tape file. In order to compute the stockholder wealth 
effect of a R&D expenditure announcement on the announcing firm's competitors, a value-weighted 
portfolio of all firms with stock returns available from the CRSP file, over the 1979-1992 period, will be 
formed. These industry portfolios are then sorted into a set of industry groups as presented in the 
1992 Business Week R&D Scoreboard. Each industry group has at least two member firms, ensuring 
the matching of a R&D announcing firm with its industry counterparts.
Additionally, in analyzing possible intra-industry R&D announcement effects, the sample of 
industry competitors is further classified into close and distant competitors of the R&D announcing 
firm. The distinction between industry competitors is based on the competition at the R&D level. A 
justification for this distinction between close and distant industry players is that the commitment to 
research and development, both 'tangible and intangible, may not be the same across all firms. There 
may be competitor firms characterized as possessing certain technical know-how and research-tools 
which permit them to significantly benefit from the research activities of the R&D announcing firm. On 
the other hand, distant competitors may lack the R&D infrastructure needed to keep pace in a 
demanding innovation race. Successful R&D may be critical to intra-industry competition.
The method chosen to distinguish between the announcing firm and its close and distant 
competitors is based on competiton at the R&D level as measured by a firm’s relative R&D intensity. 
For each firm within an industry, its R&D intensity ratio (RDInrm) is computed. It is measured as the
R8lDf
firm’s total R&D dollar expenditure divided by its total net sales ((RDIrto) = ---------— ). Next, the
TNSF
median of all the firm R&D intensities witihin the industry is calculated and is used as the industry 
benchmark. This is labled as the median (RDImdus&y). When the announcing firm and its competitor
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experience the same relative R&D intensity ((RDIf™) > median (RDIindustry) or (RDIRm) < median 
(RDIindustry)) they are considered to be close rivals with respect to competiton in the level of R&D. If 
the announcing firm and its competitor have different relative R&D intensities, they are considered to 
be distant rivals, as one firm has a relative intensity above the median industry and the other has a 
R&D intensity below the median industry level.
When both the R&D announcing firm and its competitor experience a relatively high R&D 
intensity (the RDIRrm > median RDIindustry). the close competitors may sustain less stringent 
innovation costs than those encountered by distant competitors. The close rivals face similar dollar 
and managerial commitments to the research process. On the other hand, distant competitors may 
lack the R&D infrastructure and technical know-how to keep in step with the innovating firm. It is the 
differences across firms, with respect to their level of R&D, which makes it possible for some 
companies to better compete than others.
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V. Methodology: Estimation of Abnormal Stock Returns of R&D 
Announcing Firms And Their Competitors
A. Computing Abnormal Stock Returns
The standard event study method is applied to measure the effects of the 
announcements of plans to increase R&D expenditure on the stock price of the announcing firms 
and their industry competitors.19 The initial announcement date is designated as Day 0 in event 
time and is verified in both the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service (DJNRS) and the Wall Street 
Journal Index (WSJI). The abnormal return for a R&D announcing firm is the differential 
between the actual return on its own equity and the contemporaneous expected return generated 
by the market model. The market model, following Fama (1976) is used and is specified as:
R Jt =  a s + P i R m + Ej,
where
R Jt = the rate of return on security j for event day t,
Rmt = the rate of return on the CRSP equally weighted index on event day t,
Sj  = the error term of security j on event day t.
Following the Mikkelson and Partch (1986) common event study methodology, the 
abnormal common stock return (AR) of firm j on day t is obtained:
ARj t = R Jt - ( a J + P j Rm)
18 If markets are efficient, a change in security prices represents an unbiased reflection of changes in the expected future cash 
flows of a firm. When analyzing stock price behavior around the announcement of a significant event (i.e., R&D expenditure 
increase) which is assumed to affect the firm’s future value, one is explicitly testing any change in the unbiased market 
forecast concerning the future cash flows of the firm. As with all capital market tests, this is a test of the hypothesis of market 
efficiency as well as the hypothesis under consideration.
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where
A R j' = abnormal return for firm j on event day t,
R j  = daily return of firm j common stock on day t,
R mt = daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted index for all common stock
on the NYSE and the AMEX (used as a proxy of the market 
portfolio of risky assets) on event day t, 
a  j  = ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the regression model
intercept term, and 
P j  = OLS estimate of firm j ’s market model parameter.
Daily abnormal returns are calculated for each firm in the sample over the time interval t 
= -5 to t = +5.20 The equally-weighted Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) index is 
used as the market proxy. The estimation period is from t = -120 to t = -30 relative to the first 
date of a R&D announcement in the DJNRS, day t = o.
For a sample of (N) R&D announcing firms,21 a daily average abnormal return (AAR) for 
each day t is measured by:
1 N
A R  = — Y A R ,
' N j l  "
In the case of no abnormal performance, AR, has an expected value of zero. The 
average standardized abnormal return ( ASAR, )  is calculated next, in order to determine whether
20 Equity prices are naturally noisy, implying that an event must be significant before it will be seen above the normal 
background noise. Even though a public announcement may exist, it is not always clearly evident when information has been 
incorporated in the price of the stock. It is not uncommon, at times, to find abnormal returns prior to public announcements 
(Chaney, Devinney and Winer, 1991).
The procedure which follows applies to both announcing firms and their industry competitors.
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1 *  ARj
the average daily abnormal return is statistically different from zero. It is ASAR, =  —  V -------
N  M  SJ,
where
Sj = the square root of firm j’s estimated forecast variance. 
It is computed by:
L
- K ) 2
where
S 2 = the residual variance for security j from the market model regression,
L the number of observations during the estimation period,
Rmk = the return on the market portfolio for the kth day of the estimation period,
Rmt -  the return on the market portfolio for day t,
R„, = the average return of the market portfolio for the estimation period.
It is assumed that each of the abnormal return terms are normal and independent across 
t and across securities. This allows the use of the Z , statistic to test the hypothesis that the 
average standardized abnormal return equals zero. Dodd and Warner (1983) find that the Z- 
statistic follows a unit-normal distribution. It is calculated as: Z , =  J~N ASARt 22
To test for possible nonlinearity between the announcing firm and its industry, ordinary 
least squares (OLS) is used to estimate the quadratic functional coefficients in the cross- 
sectional regression. The three day announcement window standardized cumulative abnormal 
returns for firms with pure R&D expenditure announcements (SCARann) are regressed on the 
standardized cumulative abnormal return of the industry of the R&D announcing firm (SCARIND)
22 This standardization procedure makes it possible, in principle, that the daily average abnormal return (AR t) and the average 
standardized cumulative abnormal return (ASARt) will be of different signs. This implies that different signs between the 
(ARt) and (Zt) statistics are possible.
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and the latter expressed as a second-degree polynomial (SCAR1®)2 . The t-value of (SCARIND)2 
is +1.23, implying that there is significant evidence against nonlinearity.23 24
23 A.H. Studenmund. Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide. Second Edition, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 1992, 
pps. 662.
Refer to the Appendix for the Polynomial Regression Test for Linearity.
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Empirical Resuits:
A.1 R&D Announcement Abnormal Returns
Table 2 presents the average daily (AARs) and cumulative (CAARs) abnormal returns 
for the sample of R&D announcing firms, the announcing firm’s industry, and the announcing 
firm’s close and distant industry competitors. The percentage of positive average abnormal 
returns and the Z-values for the mean difference of (AARs) between the R&D announcing firm 
and its industry, and its close and distant industry competitors are presented, too. The (AARs) 
and (CAARs) are for the complete sample of 65 R&D announcing firms for the period -5 to +5 
days surrounding the announcement day (t=0). The lower panel, Panel B, presents the window 
cumulative average abnormal returns and the related percentage of positive (CAARs) and the Z- 
values for the mean difference of (CAARs) between the R&D announcing firm and its industry, 
and its close and distant industry competitors over seven unique window intervals.
Within the (-2,2) interval, the R&D announcing firm is met with positive but insignificant 
market valuation reactions (abnormal returns of .96% with a Z-vaiue of 1.61).25 2s However, the 
industry, as a whole, appears to enjoy the benefits of firm-specific R&D announcements 
revealing abnormal returns of 0.44% and a Z-value of 2.01. The results imply that there may be 
a significant R&D spillover effect at the expense of the announcing firm. The market valuation 
of the close competitors of the announcing firm is significantly positive with abnormal returns 
of .33% and a Z-value of 1.95. The distant rivals of the R&D announcing firm earn positive 
but insignificant abnormal returns of .48% with a Z-value of 1.71. It is the close rivals of the 
R&D announcing firm that the market appears to recognize as being a significant influence within 
the industry. The R&D announcing firms, as well as their industries, are diverse groups with 
respect to the intensity of R&D activity. In order to reach any conclusions about firm-specific 
R&D announcement effects and subsequent industry-wide effects, the sample of R&D
25 The abnormal performance for the R&D announcing firm in the (-1,1) interval is 1.32% (Z-value = 1.57) and the announcing 
firm’s industry has an abnormal performance of 0.15% (Z-value = 2.04). These results are similar to the window interval (-2,2) 
and suggest, on average, that no benefits accrue to the announcing firm, yet industry-wide benefits exist. Within the industry, 
however, it is not evident that the R&D announcing firm's close competitors benefit more than distant industry competitors.
Both the close and distant rivals register positive abnormal returns of .22% with Z-values of 1.67 and 1.79, respectively.
26 The abnormal performance for the R&D announcing firm's industry in the interval (0,5) is 0.85% (Z-value = 2.26), while the 
industry close competitors have abnormal returns of 0.65% with a Z-value of 2.17. Only three industries had significant 
returns in this (0,5) interval, while the intervals of (-1,1) and (-2,2) have more common results to better analyze the results.




Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of R&D announcing firms and the announcing Arm's 
Industry and its close and distant Industry competitors, the percentage of positive AARs for the 
announcing Arm, As Industry and As close and distant Industry competAors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing Ami and the announcing Arm's industiy and As close and distant 
industiy competAors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the Initial announcement 
(day»0) of a R&D expendAure; 1979 -1992.
Daily Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%>
Industry CompetAors: R&D IntensAv Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-DAference Announcing Z-DAIerence Announcing Z-Dlfference


















-5 -0.0043 34 -0.0018 39 0.2 -0.0031 0.02 -0.0015 -0.07
-4 0.0009 42 0.0004 52 -0.06 0.0009 -0.09 0.0002 -0.09
-3 0.0006 55 -0.0004 52 0.56 0.0006 0.46 -0.001 0.55
-2 0.0006 46 0.0023 47 -0.16 0.001 -0.09 0.002 -0.04
-1 0.0037 61 0.0005 60 0.24 0.0029 0.19 -0.001 0.36
0 0.0019 49 0.0002 59 -0.17 0.0007 -0.07 .0127* -0.04
1 .0075* 63 0.0008 51 0.73 -0.0011 0.86 0.0022 0.64
2 -0.0044 41 0.0012 48 -0.48 0.0079 -0.33 0.0008 -0.61
3 0.0001 63 .0052* 58 0.03 0.0044 0.16 0.0052 -0.09
4 0.0026 57 0.001 56 -0.001 0.0018 -0.15 0.00000 0.15
5 0.0077 54 0.0000 51 
Panel B
0.43 0.0006 0.52 0.00000 0.41
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the Arm announcing As R&D activAy and for the 
samples of the announcing Ami's industry and As close and distant industiy competAors, the percentage of 
posAhre CAARs for the announcing Ami, As industry and As close and distant industiy competAors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing Arm and the announcing Arm's industiy and As close 
and distant industiy competAors for seven window internals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
R&D expendAures; 1979 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry CompetAors: R&D IntensAv Based
Window
[-5 to 5] 
(-3 to 0] 
(-2 to 21 
[-2 to 0] 
[-1 to 0) 
(-1 to 1] 
(0 to 5]
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difference
nnouncing PosAhre Firm's PosAhre Between Firm's Between Firm's Between
Its R&D CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARfirm Close Industiy CAARfirm Distant CAARfirm
ActivAy and CompetAois and Industiy and
CAARlndustry CAARdose CompetAors C  AARd start
0.0169 57 0.009 57 0.55 .0086** 0.71 0.008 0.58
0.0067 57 0.0021 56 -0.03 0.005 0.07 0.0006 0.25
0.0096 56 .0044** 62 0.11 .0033* 0.45 0.0048 0.27
0.0062 54 0.0024 61 -0.13 .0043* 0.13 0.0016 0.19
0.0056 54 0.0007 63 ■0.03 0.0033 0.09 -0.0004 0.18
0.0132 60 .0015** 58 0.32 0.0022 0.57 0.0022 0.44
0.0163 58 .0085** 59 0.29 .0065** 0.62 0.0092 0.25
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 is the Arst announcement date associated wAh a R&D expendAure as reported In the Dow Jones News
Retrieval Service (DJNRS).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industry competAors:
a. Median Industiy R&D intensAy (RDIm ,^ )  -  median of all Arm RDIs within an Industiy.
b.Firm R&D intensAy (RDIFm) “  ratio of Arm R&D expendAures to Ann total net sales.
c. When the announcing Ami and As competAor experience the same relative R&D intensAy 
(RDU™) > median (RDIm ,^ )  or (RDIFnr) < median (RDImuoJ they are considered to be close rivals 
wAh respect to competAion in R&D. If the announcing Ami and As competAor have different relative 
R&D intensAles, they are considered to be distant rivals as one Arm has a relative IntensAy above the 
median industiy and the other has a R&D intensAy below the median industry level.
(3) •***■ f* * \ “1 denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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announcing firms is broken out according to their respective industry groups. This is repeated for 
the R&D announcing firm’s close and distant industry competitors.
A.2 R&D Announcement Spillover Effects
To analyze the apparent relationship between the R&D announcing firm and its industry, 
Table 3 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns for the sample of R&D announcing 
firms, the announcing firm’s industry, and the announcing firm’s close and distant industry 
competitors. The overall sample is split into seven unique industries. The CAAR is for the 
period -2 to +2 days relative to the R&D announcement day (t=0). Within the industries of 
Aerospace and Metals, there is a significant positive relationship between the abnormal returns 
of the R&D announcing firm and the R&D announcing firm’s industry. The abnormal 
performances for the R&D announcing firm within each of these industries are 2.87% (Z-value =
1.56) and 1.87% (Z-value = .26) respectively. There is no own-firm effect. However, the market 
valuation of the R&D announcing firm’s industry exhibits significant abnormal returns of 2.76% 
(Z-value = 4.57) and 2.52% (Z-value = 2.40). The significant effect on the announcing firm’s 
industry implies that there may be a R&D spillover at the expense of the announcing firm. The 
competitor effect exists, but it is mitigated by the ability of competitor firms to free-ride on the 
technology and research of other innovators.
The Electronic and Healthcare industries pose complexing results. Both reveal 
insignificant negative abnormal performances for the R&D announcing firm (-.7% (Z-value 
of -1.73), -.8% (Z-value of -1.46), respectively). However, the market valuation of the R&D 
announcing firm’s industry was significantly negative, with abnormal returns o f-1.0% (Z-value = 
-2.25) and -1.2% (Z-value = -5.77).27 The R&D announcing firm has negative abnormal returns, 
yet it is the announcing firm’s industry which is significantly penalized. The result may be due to 
the announcing firm generating news which may cause a lot of uncertainty about the future and
27 Refer to the Appendix industry table. For the Electronics industry, within the (-2,2) interval, the percentage positive returns 
for the R&D announcing firm is 50% while for the announcing firm’s industry it is 44%. Within the Healthcare industry, the 
percentage of positive abnormal returns for the R&D announcing firm is 41 % while the announcer’s industry is just 25% 
positive. The results for these two industries may be outlier driven.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 3 
R&D Spillover Effects
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its R&D activity 
And for the samples of the announcing firm's industry and its close and distant industry competitors 
For the Five-day (-2,2) window interval around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of R&D expenditures. 


















0.0287 .0276*** .023*** .0305***
Caar (-2,2) 
Chemicals
-0.01 0.0076 -0.006 0.0172
Caar (-2,2) 
Computers
.0256*** 0.0026 0.0039 -0.002
Caar (-2,2) 
Electronics
.0193*** -0.009 0.0013 -0.02
Caar (-2,2) 
Healthcare
-0.007 -.01** -0.008 -0.009
Caar (-2,2) 
Metals
-0.008 -.012*** -.015*** -.012***
Caar (-2,2) 
OVERALL
0.0187 .0252** 0.0242 0.0289
Caar (-2,2) 0.0096 .0044** .0033* 0.0048
Noies:
(1) Day o is the first announcement date associated with a R&D expenditure as reported in the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval Service (DJNRS).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industry competitors:
a. Median Industry R&D Intensity (RDIindustry) = median of all firm RDIs within an industry.
b. Firm R&D Intensity (RDIFirm) ratio of firm R&D expenditures to firm total net sales.
c. When the announcing firm and its competitor experience the same relative R&D Intensity
(RDIFirm)» median (RDIindustry) or (RDIFirm) < median (RDIindustry) they are considered to be close rivals 
with respect to competition in the level of R&D. If the announcing firm and its competitor have different 
relative R&D intensities, they are considered to be distant rivals, as one firm has a relative intensity above 
the median industry and the other has a R&D intensity below the median industry level.
(3) '***• ( '" ,  '*■) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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alters the structure of the industry.
Contrary to the preceding industries, there appears to be no R&D spillover present in 
either the Chemicals or Computer industry. The market response to the R&D announcing firms 
was positive and significant in both cases. Chemicals showed abnormal returns of 2.56% with a 
Z-value of 2.59, while Electronics earned abnormal returns of 1.93% with a Z-value of 3.19. 
However, the industry competitors were met by an insignificant market reaction. In essence, 
these industries were not affected by the R&D news of the announcing firm. The competitive 
effect of the R&D announcement may have been strong enough to offset the free-rider effect as 
the market may perceive the inability of industry competitors to take any significant advantage of 
the announced R&D activity.
A.3 Close and Distant Competitor Abnormal Returns
As described earlier, Table 3 documents that the apparent R&D spillover to the 
announcing firm's industry was significantly influenced by its close rivals. The market 
understands that the announcing firm and its industry competitors are a diverse group with 
respect to R&D. It is the competition at the R&D level which may be crucial for firms to compete 
in the future. To examine the relationship between the R&D announcing firm and its close and 
distant rivals,28 the market valuation reaction to the close-distant interaction within each industry 
is also analyzed in Table 3.29
Within the Aerospace industry, the effect on both close and distant competitors is 
positive and significant upon the announcement of R&D. The competitor effects are 2.3% 
(Z-value = 3.10) and 3.05% (Z-value = 3.8), respectively. A R&D spillover exists and the 
announcing firm’s close and distant competitors benefit, with a slight advantage to the distant
28 Announcing firms as well as industry competitors are classified as being close or distant according to the R&D intensity 
criteria as explained in the 'Intra-Industry Sample Design' section of this paper.
29 The window intervals (-1,1) and (-2,2) have common results. The abnormal performance for the R&D announcing firm in 
the (-2,2) interval is 0.96% (Z-value = 1.61) and the announcing firm's industry has an abnormal performance of 0.44% (Z- 
value = 2.01). Just as in interval (-1,1), it suggests, on average, that no benefits accrue to the announcing firm, yet industry­
wide benefits exist. Interval (-2,2) differs from the (-1,1) window as it appears that the R&D announcing firm’s close industry 
competitors benefit from spillover and do so at a greater extent than their distant industry counterparts. The abnormal returns 
for the R&D announcing firm’s close industry competitors is 0.33% (Z-value = 1.95) and the abnormal performance for their 
distant competitors is 0.48% (Z-value = 1.71).
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rivals. It may be that the research infrastructures of both rival groups are strong enough to 
benefit from the announcement.
The significant positive spillover in the Metals industry from the R&D announcing firm’s 
announcement, while shared by both close and distant competitors, is not significant for either. 
The abnormal return for the close competitor is 2.42% with a Z-value of 1.62 and the abnormal 
performance of distant competitors are 2.89% with a Z-value of 1.69. The impact appears 
neutral with neither exerting a controlling industry influence.
The Electronic and Healthcare industries stand out from the sample in that the spillover 
witnessed by the industry was negative. The R&D announcing firm has negative abnormal 
returns, yet it is the announcing firm’s industry which is significantly penalized. In the Healthcare 
industry, the announcing firm may have generated news which may have caused a lot of 
uncertainty about the future, which could alter the structure of the industry. Note that both the 
close and distant competitors suffer significant abnormal returns upon the announcement. The 
close rivals incur negative abnormal returns of -1.5% with a Z-value of -5.53, while the distant 
competitors have negative abnormal returns of -1.2% significant at a Z-value of -2.85. The 
possible uncertainty brought on by the announcement appears to impact on the close 
competitors to a greater extent. Within the Electronics industry, both the close and distant rivals 
suffer at the R&D announcement, but it appears to be of equal impact (close rivals have 
abnormal returns of -.8% with a Z-value of -1.23, while the distant counterparts incur abnormal 
returns of -.9% with a Z-value of -1.29).
Within the Chemical and Computer industries there is no apparent R&D spillover. 
However, it is interesting to note that the close competitors incur positive abnormal returns, while 
the distant rivals experience negative abnormal returns. The market may perceive that the 
distant rivals are not able to compete at the R&D level and are more likely to fall behind in the 
innovation race.30
30 The Automobile Industry is completely neutral across the R&D announcing firm's aggregate industry and split between close 
and distant competitors.
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In summary, the evidence shows that the market reaction to the firm’s announcement of 
R&D is insignificant, yet the effect of the R&D announcement on the announcing firm’s industry 
is significantly positive.31 There appears to be a significant R&D spillover at the expense of the 
announcing firm. This paper posits that competitor interaction based on the competition at the 
R&D level may exert significant influence on the market valuation reaction to the announcing 
firm. Further, this market reaction may result from the competitive effect being offset by the 
free-rider effect as industry rivals take advantage of the announced R&D technology. 
Specifically, it appears that the close competitors of the R&D announcing firm enjoy the benefits 
of the announced R&D more than the distant rivals.
31 John, John, and Sundaram (1995) found the abnormal returns to the overall industry to be negative. They argued that the 
strategic interaction within an industry depended on the product-market strategy of the competitor firms.
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B. Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis
On average, R&D announcing firms encountered no significant market response to its 
announcement. However, the R&D announcing firm’s industry sample experienced a significant 
positive market reaction, implying a favorable spillover to industry competitors of the announcing 
firm. Upon further breakdown of the industry sample into groups of close and distant competitor 
firms, significant group interaction was not readily apparent. To gain further insight into the 
cross-sectional variation in stock price response by industry competitors to the announcement of 
R&D expenditures,32 a multiple-regression model is used to examine the influence of several 
cross-sectional variables. Ordinary least squares (OLS) are used to estimate the coefficients of 
the cross-sectional regression that relates the standardized cumulative abnormal return of R&D 
announcing firms (SCARann) on the standardized cumulative abnormal return of the industry of 
the R&D announcing firm (SCARIND) and three additional variables that control for possible 
effects of the R&D announcing firm’s R&D intensity (RDIANN), its market concentration (MC4ANN), 
and the interactive term of R&D intensity and market concentration (RIC4ANN).33
The (SCARIND) measures the abnormal returns generated by the industry of the R&D 
announcing firm. The result of examining the relationship between (SCARann) and (SCARIND) is 
that the announcement effect of the industry is significantly positively related to the 
announcement effect of the R&D announcing firm. The industry competitors of the R&D 
announcing firm quickly capture the benefits of such announcements. A spillover exists.
For the announcing firm, its R&D intensity ratio (RDIANN) is calculated as the firm’s total 
R&D expenditures divided by its total net sales. Next, the median of all of the firm RDIs in an 
industry is calculated and is used as the industry benchmark. This is labeled as the median 
(RDIind). The R&D intensity of the announcing firm (RDIANN) is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the announcing firm’s R&D intensity ratio exceeds its median industry R&D intensity ratio 
(RDIindustry). The predicted sign of (RDIANN) is positive. An increase denotes that the R&D
32 An additional motivation of the regression analysis is the Competitive and Free Rider hypotheses which hold that the 
valuation effect of R&D announcements is dependent upon both of these effects. Results can be positive, negative, or zero 
depending on the degree to which one effect offsets the other.
33 Several other variables were tested such as market-to-book value ratio, P/E ratio, asset size, net income, and number of 
employees. None of these had an impact on the announcement effect of R&D expenditures.
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announcing firm outspends the industry norm. The stock price of the announcing firm may 
benefit from the firm's leadership in innovation.34
Doukas and Switzer (1992) test if firms with market power experience larger stock price 
reactions to their spending on research and development. They find a possible relationship 
between market structure and innovation, implying that the differential market reaction to R&D 
depends on the announcing firm’s market concentration. The market concentration variable 
used is calculated as the median four-firm sales concentration (MC4) over the 1980 -1992  
period for the major four-digit SIC industry in which the firm operated. The median concentration 
ratio for the R&D announcing firm (MC4ANN) is a dummy variable equal to one, if the announcing 
firm is one of the four top-ranked firms in the industry, in terms of sales.
Finally, an interaction term is formed which involves the product of the (RDIANN) and 
(MC4ann) and is expressed as (RIC4ANN). This variable is used to show that the change in 
abnormal returns of the announcing firm with respect to a firm’s R&D intensity may depend on 
whether the announcing firm is in a concentrated industry.
B.1 Empirical Results
Table 4 lists OLS estimates of the coefficients in cross-sectional regressions which relate 
the three-day (-2,2) standardized cumulative abnormal return of R&D announcing firms 
(SCARann) to the standardized cumulative abnormal return of the R&D announcing firm’s 
industry (SCARIND), the announcing firm’s R&D intensity (RDIANN), its market concentration 
(MC4ann), and the interactive term of R&D intensity and market concentration (RIC4ANN). The 
entire sample includes sixty-five firms with pure R&D announcements covering the time interval 
of 1979-1992.
Table 4 reveals that the announcement effect of the R&D announcing firm is 
systematically related to the standardized cumulative abnormal return of the R&D announcing
M The free-rider effect posits that there may be a potential for industry competitors to freely benefit from an announcing firm’s 
R&D activity due to technological spillover. However, Bernstein (1988) finds that within an industry, characterized as having a 
relatively large R&D intensity, an intra-industry spillover acts as a compliment, not a substitute, for existing R&D capital. The 
existence of complimentary effects between intra-industry spillover and a firm's own R&D capital is also suggested by Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989), Rosenberg (1974), and Nelson (1982). The impact of spillovers will be lessened.
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Table 4
OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-sectional Regression Estimates and Independent Variables (predicted 
Sign in parenthesis) from regressing the five-day (-2,2) Announcement Period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (SCAR"*) for R&D announcing firms on the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return of the Industry of 
The Announcing Firm (SCAR*0), the Announcing Firms’s R&D Intensity (RDI"*), its Market Concentration 
(MC4"*), and the Interactive Term of R&D Intensity and Market Concentration (RIC4"*). There are 65 Firms 
Which Announced Their R&D Activity. The Time Period Covers 1979-1992 (t-values in parentheses).
Regression Adjusted








































SCAR*0 = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Industry of the Announcing Firm. 
M C 4"* = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcing firm is one of the four top-ranked firms 
in the industry, in terms of sales.
R D I"* = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcing firm's R&D Intensity ratio (RDIRm) exceeds its 
median Industry R&D Intensity ratio (R O li,*^ ).
Where the median (R D IlndUstry) equals the median of all firm RDIs within an Industry.
Firm R&D Intensity Ratio (RDIF«m) = ratio of firm R&D expenditures to firm total net sales.
* Significant at 0.1. level; "Significant at 0.05 level; " ‘ Significant at 0.01 level.
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firm’s industry (SCARIND). On average, the variable was significant at a 0.01 level (t-value of 
3.60). Consistent with the results from Table 3, on average, It appears that the R&D 
announcement effect is not significant and the industry competitors of the R&D announcing firm 
are a significant factor in determining the announcement effect. The announcing firm receives a 
positive market response to its R&D announcement yet its industry counterparts quickly benefit 
from the announcement. These regression results confirm previous findings in favor of R&D 
spillover effects.
In examining the effect of the (RDIANN) cross-sectional variable on the abnormal returns 
of the R&D announcing firm,Table 4 shows a negative relationship, but it is not significant from 
zero. The test of the (MC4ANN) variable to see if higher abnormal returns were experienced by 
announcing firms operating in highly concentrated industries also proved to have an insignificant 
influence. Likewise, the interaction term (RIC4ANN) of these two variables did not add any 
substantive explanation as to the changes in the abnormal returns of the R&D announcing firm.
B.2 Cross-Sectional Regression: Close and Distant Competitors
In their work on strategic competition, John, John and Sundaram (1995) find that the 
firm-specific R&D announcement effect is positive and insignificant. However, the abnormal 
returns to the announcing firm’s industry is significantly negative. The implication is that the 
announcing firms benefit at the expense of its industry rivals. They found no spillover effect. In 
analyzing this negative market response, they suggest that the market reaction to the 
announcing firm and the announcing firm’s industry may depend on the strategic interaction 
among industry competitors. The distinction between competitors is determined by whether the 
actions of one firm effects a competing firm's marginal profitability. Specifically, the response to 
the R&D announcement is a function of industry interaction, where firms either adopt a strategy 
to compete in product substitutes (produce a product which competes with that of the announcing 
firm) or follow a strategy to compete in product complements (produce a product which does not 
compete with the product of the announcing firm). To examine the interaction, they analyzed the 
market response when the announcing firm’s abnormal returns are positive and negative. When
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the announcing firm’s abnormal returns are positive, there is no spillover as competitors 
following a strategy of product substitution have significantly negative abnormal returns. The 
rivals utilizing complements suffer insignificant negative results. The implication is that firms 
following a strategy of close substitution have the greatest impact on the overall industry. Upon 
a negative abnormal return to the announcing firm, both the substitute and complement 
competitors incur insignificant negative abnormal returns. Once again, there is no spillover to be 
gained by the rival competitors.
A major departure in this paper is that in examining the nature of industry interaction, the 
distinction between industry competitors is based on competition at the R&D level. The 
probability of a firm benefiting from another firm's announcement may depend on how they 
compete with each other with respect to R&D. It is the differences across firms, with respect to 
their level of R&D, which may make it possible for some companies to better compete than 
others. It may be the success of R&D which is crucial and not product market strategy. The 
results reported in Tables 3 and 4 document that the insignificant R&D announcement effect for 
the announcing firm is attributed to strong positive industry spillover effects. There is a 
significant wealth gain to the competitors of the announcing firm (coefficient of 55.6% and t- 
value = 3.6), as they seem to quickly benefit from the R&D announcement. What is not clear, 
however, is whether close or distant industry competitors benefit the most (or equally) from the 
announcing firm’s R&D announcements. To investigate this issue, industry rivals are classified 
as either close or distant industry competitors based on their relative R&D Intensity with the 
median Industry R&D Intensity ratio.35 It is the rivalry with respect to the level of R&D which may 
ultimately allow a firm to successfully compete. When both the R&D announcing firm and its 
competitor experience a relatively high intensity (a firm’s R&D intensity is above the median
35 Within Table 5, the close and distant industry competitor portfolios (SCARcls) and (SCAR0ls) are created, based upon a 
Firms relative R&D Intensity ratio. For each firm within an industry, its R&D intensity ratio is computed. It is measured as the 
firm's total R&D dollar expenditure divided by its total net sales. Next, the median of all of the firm R&D intensities within the 
industry is calculated and is used as the industry benchmark. This is labeled as the median industry R&D intensity. When the 
announcing firm and its competitor experience the same relative R&D intensity, they are considered to be close rivals with 
respect to competition at the R&D level. If the announcing firm and its competitor have different relative R&D intensities, they 
are considered to be distant rivals, as one firm has a relative intensity above the median industry and the other has a R&D 
intensity below the median industry level.
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industry intensity), the expectation is that close competitors may outperform distant rivals, as the 
former possess superior technical know-how and the ability to reproduce competitor’s research.
Table 5 presents the OLS estimates of coefficients in a cross-sectional regression from 
regressing the five-day (-2,2) announcement period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return 
for R&D Announcing Firms (SCARann) on the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the 
Industry Close (SCARcls) and Distant (SCAR0ls) Competitors. Examining the market valuation 
reaction to both close and distant rivals, a significant positive relationship with the abnormal 
returns of the R&D announcing firm is reported. The coefficient of close industry competitors is 
87.4% with a t-value of 7.58. Distant competitors show a coefficient of 55.4% with a t-vaiue of 
3.56. As predicted, the close rivals seem to benefit the most from the R&D spillover effects.
This is further confirmed by the results of regression (3). This result shows that the close 
industry competitors enjoy a significant positive coefficient of 81.2% with a t-value of 6.22.
What is more interesting, is that the coefficient size of SCARcls remains virtually unchanged and 
significant as in regression (1) even after the SCARdis is introduced in regression (2). The close 
competitors have successfully gained the benefits of the R&D spillover to the detriment of both 
the distant rivals and the R&D announcing firm.
In order to further analyze the close and distant interaction effect, the sample of R&D 
announcing firm’s abnormal returns is split into positive and negative abnormal return 
subsamples. Table 6 presents the OLS estimates of coefficients in a cross-sectional regression 
from regressing the five-day (-2,2) Positive and Negative (SCARann) announcement period 
returns on the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns of close (SCARcls) and distant 
(SCARdis) competitors. Panel A indicates that when the announcing firm’s abnormal returns 
were positive, there is a slight spillover, but still significant. Close rivals earn abnormal returns of 
37.5% with a t-value of 1.79, while the abnormal performance of distant competitors is 
insignificant. In the product-market framework of John et al.(1995), there is no apparent spillover 
and it is the distant complements who had the stronger abnormal returns. More interesting, are 
the results of Panel B depicting the competitor interaction when the announcing firm's abnormal 
returns are negative. The close competitors of the announcing firm significantly take advantage
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Table 5
OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-sectional Regression Estimates and Independent Variables 
From Regressing the Five-day (-2,2) Announcement Period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return for 
R&D Announcing Firms (S C AR "") on the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the Industry 
Close (SCAR0-5) and Distant (SCAR015) Competitors. There are 65  Firms which announced R&D Activity; 
1979 -1 99 2  (t-values in parentheses).
Regression Adjusted
Model Intercept SCAR05 SCAR” 5 R-square
(1) 0.0511 0.874 47.60% 57.42
(0.69) (7.58)***
(2) -0.004 0.554 15.60% 12.65
(-0.04) (3 .5 6 )*"
(3) 0.0512 0.812 0.14 47.60% 29.21
(0.69) (6.22)*** (1.00)
Notes:
SCAR05 = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Close Industry Competitors of the Announcing Firm. 
SCAR015 =  Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Distant Industry Competitors of the Announcing Firm. 
The Close and Distant Industry Competitor Portfolios (SCAR05) and (SCAR015) are created based upon a Firm's 
relative R&D Intensity ratio. First, the Median Industry R&D Intensity (RDlMuoy) is calculated as the benchmark. 
The median (RDIi^try) equals the median of all firm RDIs within an Industry.
A Firm's R&D Intensity (RDfi*™) = the Firm's R&D expenditure (R&DFkTT1) divided by its Total Net Sales (TNSnmO. 
When the announcing firm and its competitor experience the same relative R&D intensity 
(RDInm) > median (R D I,™ ^) or (R D Ip j < median (RDIm ^ )  they are considered to be close rivals with respect to 
competition in the level of R&D. If the announcing firm and its competitor have different relative R&D intensities, 
they are considered to be distant rivals as one firm has a relative intensity above the median industry and the other 
has a R&D intensity below the median industry level.
“ Significantat0 .1 .level; "Significantat0 .0 5 level; " ’Significantat0.01 level.
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Table 6
OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-sectional Regression Estimates and Independent Variables 
From Regressing the Five-day (-2,2) Announcement Period Positive and Negative Standardized 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the R&D Announcing Firms on the Standardized Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns of Close (SCAR”-8) and Distant (SCAR01*) Competitors. There are 65 firms 
Which announced their R&D Activity; 1979 -1992 (t-values in parentheses).
Regression Adjusted
Model Intercept SCARa-S SCAR“s R-square F








































N = the number of observations.
SCAR"** = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the R&D Announcing Firm.
SCAR08 = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Close Industry Competitors of the Announcing Firm. 
SCAR06 = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Distant Industry Competitors of the Announcing Firm. 
The Close and Distant Industry Competitor Portfolios (SCAR01-8) and (SCAR06) are created based upon a firm'3 
relative R&D Intensity ratio. First, the Median Industry R&D Intensity (RDIm ^ )  is calculated as the benchmark.
a. The median (RDIlndutty) equals median of all firm RDIs within an Industry.
b. A Finn's R&D Intensity (R D M ) = the Finn's R&D expenditure (R&DFnn) divided by its Total Net Sales (TNSFm,).
c. When the announcing firm and its competitor experience the same relative R&D Intensity
(RDM) > median (RDIm^*,) or (R D M  < median (RDImM  they are considered to be close rivals with respect to 
competition in the level of R&D. If the announcing firm and its competitor have different relative R&D intensities, 
they are considered to be distant rivals as one firm has a relative intensity above the median industry and the 
other has a R&D intensity below the median industry level.
* Significant at 0.1. level; "Significant at 0.05 level; ‘"Significant at 0.01 level.
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of an apparent R&D spillover with abnormal returns of 32.6% and a t-value of 2.2. As the 
announcing firm suffers, so do the distant rivals as they incur negative but insignificant results. 
The implication is that the spillover appears to be strongly associated with the announcing firm 
experiencing negative abnormal returns. The reason why the market may react in a negative 
fashion to the R&D announcing firm may be because it has not established a successful R&D 
infrastructure. The market may not be convinced that the announcing firm can capitalize right 
away from the R&D activity.
In summary, the spillover differences seem to depend on whether the R&D announcing 
firm experiences positive or negative returns. Further, the spillover seems to be strongly 
associated with the announcing firm experiencing negative abnormal returns. This may be due 
to R&D intensities varying across firms with close competitors using their superior technical 
know-how to take advantage of the R&D announcement. In relating these results to the 
literature, this paper found that the insignificant positive market reaction to the R&D 
announcement was consistent with the findings of Doukas and Switzer (1992) and John, John 
and Sundaram (1995). The significant positive overall industry reaction is contrary to Doukas 
and Switzer (1992). However, their work was preliminary as they only investigated a single case. 
In their work on strategic interaction, John et al (1995) found a significant negative reaction as 
their sample mainly consisted of firms following a strategy of close product substitutes. In 
contrast, this paper posits that it is the competition at the R&D level that distinguishes the 
competitor interaction. Specifically, as R&D infrastructures differ across firms, it may be likely 
that the close industry rivals possess the superior technical know-how to reproduce research and 
better compete. Evidence of this is shown in Table 5. Further, market valuation reaction to R&D 
announcements may depend on the close-distant rival interaction where the competitive 
and free-rider effects may offset each other. This paper documents that when the announcing 
firm’s abnormal return was positive, close rivals significantly benefited from a R&D spillover 
effect. John et al (1995) found that the firms following a strategy of close substitution incurred 
significantly negative abnormal returns as there was no spillover effect. When the announcing 
firm's abnormal return was negative, this paper reveals close competitors enjoying even larger
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significant positive abnormal returns. The close competitors were able to free-ride on the R&D 
announcement. The competitive effect outweighed the firm’s ability to free-ride in John et al 
(1995) as both substitutes and complements had insignificant negative abnormal returns. The 
differences in findings may be due to their product market based classification of competitors, 
whereas this study suggests that more benefits may go to the firm which fiercely competes in 
terms of R&D.
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C. Post R&D Announcement Performance
While the evidence shows that the market reaction to the firm’s announcement of R&D is 
insignificant, the effect of the R&D announcement on the announcing firm’s industry is 
significantly positive. These results imply that there is a significant R&D spillover effect at the 
expense of the announcing firm. Here, the market appears unconvinced that these announcing 
firms will capitalize quickly from their R&D announcements. To further analyze this apparent 
market lag, an industry-adjusted post R&D performance test will be used. The objective of the 
test is twofold. First, it is used to determine whether R&D spending by the announcing firm 
improves its corporate performance. Second, it is used to determine how long these firm- 
specific results are sustained.
C.1 Industry-Adjusted Post R&D Performance
Following the work of John and Ofek (1995) and others,36 the earnings of the 
announcing firms for three years following the R&D announcement date are examined. The R&D 
announcing firm’s subsequent earnings performance may provide insight as to whether, after a 
commitment to R&D expenditures, benefits accrue to the announcing firm. There are three 
measures of earnings computed. The first is return on sales (ROS) where the net income 
available to common shareholders is divided by sales. The second is return on assets (ROA) 
where net income available to common shareholders is divided by assets and finally, the return 
on equity (ROE) is measured as net income available to common stockholders divided by 
common equity. The data was obtained from the Compustat Annual Industrial Survey. The 
abnormal (ROS), ROA), and (ROE) in relation to the industry are measured as the differential 
between the firm and the median industry (ROS), (ROA), and (ROE) for R&D announcing firms 
within the same industry. The Mann-Whitney test is used to examine the significance of 
differences between the performance of the R&D announcing firms and the industry.37
36 John and Ofek (1995) study the long-run performance of firms involved in divestiture. Loughran and Ritter (1995) look at the 
future performance of new issues, Meggison, Nash and Randenborgh (1993) look at the financial operating performance of 
newly privatized firms, and Blackwell, Marr and Spivy (1990) study the long-run performance of those firms associated with 
plant closings.
With the Mann-Whitney test, we control the probability of (falsely) rejecting the null hypothesis when the null is true. This 
error probability does not depend on the underlying population of e's.
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Panel A of Table 7, reports median abnormal earnings for the R&D announcing firm in 
the three years following R&D announcements. The three measures of earnings of the R&D 
announcing firm are systematically higher than the industry median38 in the (Years 0 to 1),
(Years 0 to 2), and (Years 0 to 3)39 periods. Only the (ROE) of the announcing firm is 
significantly higher than the industry median and this occurs in the period, (Years 0 to 1). While 
some R&D announcements are met with an insignificant market response, the results suggest 
that earnings of the announcing firm may improve after the announcement. However, the results 
also imply that the benefit of the R&D announcement does not last for more than a year.40
Within most industries, firms must strengthen their technological capabilities in order to 
maintain and more importantly, to improve, their relative competitive advantage. Firms may 
accomplish this through their R&D commitment. The higher R&D intensity firms should 
outperform those firms with a lower commitment. Panel B of Table 7 reports the sample of R&D 
announcing firms when split into high and low R&D intensity groups. The classification is based 
on two criteria. If the R&D intensity of the announcing firm (RDIANN) is greater than the median 
industry R&D intensity (RDIind) then the announcing firm is part of the High R&D Intensity 
(HRDIann) group. The median is calculated by first computing the R&D intensities of all the firms 
within an industry and then taking the median. If (RDIANN) is less than median (RDIind) then the 
announcing firm is part of the Low R&D Intensity (LRDIANN) group. The three measures of 
earnings of the R&D announcing firms are systematically higher than the industry median in all 
three performance periods for both high and low R&D intensity groups. Panel B1 reveals that 
the earning measures of (ROS) and (ROE) for the high R&D intensity group are significantly 
different from zero for the first year following the announcement. It suggests that earnings of 
R&D announcing firms tend to improve after the announcement. Further, as the R&D 
announcing sample is split into (HRDIANN) within Panel B1 and (LRDIANN) within Panel B2, it is
38 This test is also performed with Industry Means. Here, also, the earnings of the R&D announcing firm were systematically 
greater than the Industry Mean. However, unlike the test using Industry Medians, the earnings performance of the R&D 
announcing firm was not significant from zero in any case of (ROS), (ROA), or (ROE).
38 Year 0  indicates the year of R&D announcement. Years 1,2, and 3  indicate the one, two, and three year periods following 
the R&D announcement.
40 The R&D announcing firms in the sample averaged two to three unique announcement dates over the tested time period. If 
there had been more consecutive-year announcements than just multiple-year announcements, there may have been 
significance two or three years after the announcement.
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Industry-Adjusted Post R&D Performance
Profitabiitiy Changes of R&D Announcing Firms over a Three Year Post-Announcement Period. 
Median Significance Tests are based on the Mann-Whitney Test.
(p-values with * , " ,  * "  denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively)
ROS* ROAb ROEc
MEDIAN MEDIAN MEDIAN
Panel A: Industry-adjusted Post R&D Performance of Entire Sample.
Years 0 to 1 0.600 0.550 3.70
(.4774) (.5623) (.0700)*
Years 0 to 2 0.100 -0.650 1.125
(.9483) (.4922) (.5547)
Years 0 to 3 0.100 -0.400 1.575
(.8740) (.6196) (.3926)
Panel B: The sample of R&D Announcing Firms is split into High and Low R&D Intensity G
B1: High R&D Intensity Group
Years 0 to 1 1.875 1.20 5.98
(.100)* (.2143) (.0076)***
Years 0 to 2 1.20 0.400 2.28
(.3752) (.8269) (.2435)
Years 0 to 3 0.450 -0.550 2.20
(.6716) (.5587) (.3495)
B2: Low R&D Intensity Group
Years 0 to 1 -1.00 -0.65 -2.20
(.3827) (.6005) (.4194)
Years 0 to 2 -1.10 -1.80 -1.65
(.3710) (.2056) (.6784)
Years 0 to 3 -0.465 -0.05 0.075
(.7220) (1.000) (.9128)
Notes:
* The difference between the change in the announcer's net income available for common shareholders divided
by sales from year 0  to year t and the median change in the industry. 
b The difference between the change in the announcer's net income available for common shareholders divided 
by assets from year 0 to year t, and the median change in the industry. 
c The difference between the change in the announcer's net income available for common shareholders divided 
by common equity from year 0 to year t and the median change in the industry. 
d Year 0 indicates the year of the R&D announcement. Years 1 ,2 ,3  indicate the one, two and three year periods 
following the R&D announcement.
* The announcing firm's R&D Intensity ratio (RDl"**) equals the firms R&D expenses as a percentage of its sales. 
The median industry R&D Intensity is labeled as the median (RDI>nd). It equals the median of all firm R&D
intensities within an industry.
If (RDIAWI) > median (RDIind) then the announcing firm is part of the High R&D Intensity group.
If (RDl"*1) < median (RDIIN0) then the announcing firm is part of the Low R&D Intensity group.
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apparent that it is the (HRDIANN) firms which experience significant post earnings performance 
and not the low R&D intensity group of announcers.
C.2 Performance Comparison Between High & Low R&D Intensity Groups
Panels B1 and B2 in Table 7 show the three measures of earnings for the R&D 
announcing firms to be systematically higher than the industry median over the three post 
performance periods for both high and low R&D intensity groups. While Panel B1 documents 
that announcing firms with high R&D intensity have significant one-year post announcement 
performance, whether or not the earnings of the (HRDIANN) are systematically more significant 
than those of the (LRDIANN) has not been established. This point is examined in Table 8 which 
reports the performance comparison between R&D announcing firms with high R&D intensity and 
those with low R&D intensity. The comparison is over a three-year post-announcement period. 
The Mann-Whitney test is used to determine the difference of performance ratios between the 
(HRDIann) and (LRDIANN). The two earnings measures of (ROS) and (ROA) of the High R&D 
Intensity Announcers are significantly greater than those of the Low R&D Intensity Announcers in 
all three post-performance periods. In the terms of (ROE), the (HRDIANN) firms register a 
superior performance, but it does not extend beyond the year after the R&D announcement.
As discussed earlier, the insignificant market reaction to the R&D announcing firm’s 
announcement may be due to the market being unconvinced that the announcing firm will 
quickly benefit from the R&D announcement. However, the industry-adjusted post R&D 
performance test may suggest the opposite. The (ROE) earnings performance of the R&D 
announcing firm improved significantly (10% level) for one year after the announcement. When 
the sample of R&D announcing firms was split into High and Low R&D Intensity groups, the 
HRDIANN group had its (ROS) and (ROE) earnings performance ratios improve significantly at a 
10% and 1% level, respectively. This was sustained for one year after the R&D announcement. 
The ability to successfully compete at the R&D level may be a critical factor for the announcing 
firm in order for it to achieve improved corporate performance.
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Table 8
Performance Comparison between the R&D Announcing Firms with a High R&D Intensity (HRDI"")
And the R&D Announcing Firms with a Low R&D Intensity (LRDI""*) Over a Three-Year Post-Announcement 
Period. The Median Significance Tests are based on the Mann-Whitney Test.
(p-values with *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively)
ROS* ROAb ROEc
MEDIAN MEDIAN MEDIAN
Years 0 to 1 4.3 3.95 10.2
(.0032)*** (.0266)** (.0095)***
Years 0 to 2 3.4 2.6 5.6
(.0299)** (.0956)* (.2422)
Years 0 to 3 2.75 1.6 4.05
(.0506)* (.3339) (.1849)
Notes:
a The difference between the HRDIAWI median net income available for common shareholders divided 
by sales from year 0 to year t and the L R D I^  median ROS. 
b The difference between the HRDIAW median net income available for common shareholders divided 
by assets from year 0 to year t, and the LRDIArM median ROA. 
c The difference between the HRDI"" median net income available for common shareholders divided 
by common equity from year 0 to year t and the LRDIWW median ROE. 
d Year 0 indicates year of R&D announcement. Years 1, 2, 3 indicate the one, two and three year periods 
following the R&D announcement.
'  The announcing firm's R&D Intensity ratio (RDI*NN) equals the firms R&D expenses as a percentage of its sales. 
The median industry R&D Intensity is labeled as the median (RDl'N0). It equals the median of all of the firm R&D 
intensities within an industry.
If (RDl"") > median (RDIIN0) then the announcing firm is part of the High R&D Intensity group.
If (RDl"") < median (RDI1ND) then the announcing firm is part of the Low R&D Intensity group.
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VI. Summary and Conclusion
Valuation effects of R&D have been previously addressed, but few studies have shown the 
importance of R&D as a means of enhancing the growth opportunities of a firm. It may be the firm’s 
level of R&D that is crucial for it to sustain a competitive advantage. Prior to this paper, the intra­
industry spillover effects of R&D had not been examined at all.41 This study analyzes the intra­
industry effect of R&D announcements on the market valuation of both the announcing firm and the 
announcing firm’s relative industry competitors. Overall, the evidence shows that the market reaction 
to the firm’s announcement of R&D is insignificant. This result appears to be consistent with the 
findings of Doukas and Switzer (1992) and John, John, and Sundaram (1995), but contrary to the 
results reported by Chan, Martin, and Kensinger (1990). While the own-firm effect is insignificant, the 
effect of the R&D announcement on the announcing firm’s industry is significantly positive. The 
industry, as a whole, enjoys the benefits of firm-specific R&D announcements. The results imply that 
there may be a significant R&D spillover effect at the expense of the announcing firm. This result is 
contrary to the one-case study by Doukas and Switzer (1992) and the findings of John, John and 
Sundaram (1995) with respect to strategic competition in R&D. In addition, the results suggest that the 
nature of competitor interaction has a significant influence on the announcing firm and its overall 
industry. This paper posits that it is competition at the R&D level that distinguishes the competitor 
interaction. Specifically, as R&D infrastructures differ across firms, it may be likely that close industry 
rivals possess superior technical know-how to reproduce research and thus better compete. The 
results suggest that the close rivals of the announcing firm appear to be the driving force within the 
industry as market reaction is positive and significant. The market valuation reaction to R&D 
announcements may be the result of the free-rider effect of close competitors outweighing the 
competitive effect of the R&D announcing firm.
Further, the spillover differences seem to depend on whether the announcing firm reflects 
positive or negative abnormal market performances. Specifically, the R&D spillover appears to be 
strongly associated with those announcing firms who earn negative abnormal returns. This result is
41 Doukas and Switzer (1992) look at one case to see how the competitors of a specific R&D announcing firm reacted to the 
announcement John, John, and Sundaram (1995) study the strategic interaction between strategic complements and substitutes upon 
a R&D announcement.
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contrary to John, John, and Sundaram (1995) whose study did not reveal a R&D spillover. In fact, 
their close substitutes incur significant negative abnormal returns. The differences in findings may be 
due to their product-market based classification of rivals. This study suggests that greater benefits 
may be associated with the firm which fiercely competes in terms of R&D. An implication is that firms 
must be cautious with respect to any R&D commitment, as some firms lose out to their close industry 
competitors. An interesting aspect of the R&D spillover effect centers on the announcing firm's 
insignificant abnormal returns. Specifically, is there a lag in time that the market requires to evaluate 
the R&D announcing firm? This paper is the first to analyze the industry-adjusted post R&D 
announcement earnings performance of the announcing firm. The results indicate that the earnings 
performance of the R&D announcing firm improved significantly for one year after the announcement. 
In addition, firms with a relatively high commitment to R&D significantly outperformed the firms with 
relatively low R&D intensity for a year after the announcement. A source of this corporate 
performance improvement may be due to the firm’s ability to compete at the R&D level.
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Appendix To R&D Tables
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Appendix: Test of Linearity
Quadratic Functional Coefficients in Cross-sectional Regression Estimates and Independent Variables from 
Regressing the five-day (-2,2) Announcement Window Period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 
R&D Announcing Firms (SCAR"") on the Standard Cumulative Abnormal Return of the Industry of the 
Announcing Firm (SCAR'®) and this variable expressed as a Second-Degree Polynomial 
(SCAR*®)2. 1979 -1992  (t-values in parentheses). There are 65 firms announcing their R&D Activity.
Notes:
Day 0  is the first announcement date associated with a R&D expenditure as reported in the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval Service (DJNRS).
SCAR'® = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Industry of the Announcing Firm.
(SCAR1®)2 = The Quadratic of (SCAR1®).
'Significantat0 .1 0 level; "Significantat0 .0 5 level; "'Significantat0.01 level.
Adjusted
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Aerospace Industiy
Aerospace Industry 
Panel A
Daily average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its R&D activity and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's industiy and Its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing Arm, its Industiy and its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing Arm and the announcing Arm's industiy and As close and distant 
industiy competitors for the event period -S trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day»0) of a R&D expenditure; 1979 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs 1%)
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-DIAerence Announcing Z-Dltference Announcing Z-DAference


















-5 0.0042 75 -0.0030 25 1.19 -0.005 0.83 -0.0010 0.59
-4 -0.0110 0 -0.0040 25 -1.40 -0.002 -1.06 -.0060* -1.62
-3 -0.0030 25 -0.0040 50 -0.24 -0.001 -0.65 -0.0050 -0.03
-2 -0.0010 50 0.0046 50 -0.43 0.0014 -0.31 0.0000 -0.49
-1 0.0052 75 0.0046 75 0.70 0.0043 0.47 0.0048 0.14
0 0.0067 75 .0082*" 75 -0.23 .0066" 0.42 .0093*" -0.3
1 0.0129 100 0.0055 100 2.03" 0.0032 2.03" .0069" 1.90*
2 0.0050 75 .0089*" 100 -0.95 .0069*" -0.43 .0099” -1.1
3 -0.0020 50 0.0034 75 -0.12 .0069* -0.36 0.0012 0.14
4 0.0042 50 0.0000 75 0.79 0.0064 -1.2 -0.0050 1.07
5 .0179" 75 0.0030 75 1.00 
Panel B
0.0037 1.58 0.0026 0.74
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the Arm announcing As R&D acthrAy and for the 
samples of the announcing Arm's industry and As close and distant industiy competAors, the percentage of 
posAive CAARs for the announcing firm, As Industiy and As close and distant Industiy competAors, the Z-values 
for the mean dAference of CAARs between the announcing Arm and the announcing Arm's industry and As close 
and distant Industry competAors (or seven window intervals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
R&D expendAures; 1979 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry CompetAors: R&D intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-DAference Announcing Z-DATerence Announcing Z-DAference
Announcing PosAive Firm's PosAive Between Firm's Between Firm's Between
Its R&D CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARnrm Close Industiy CAARnrm Distant CAARnrm
ActivAy and CompetAors and Industiy and
Intenral CAARindustry CAARdose CompetAors CAARdi start
[-5 to 5] 0.0386 75 .0230” 100 0.62 .0317"* 0.65 0.0174 0.60
[-3 to 0] 0.0075 75 0.0097 50 -0.22 0.0116 -0.21 0.0085 -0.36
1-2 to 2) 0.0287 75 .0276*" 75 0.11 .0230*" 0.70 .0305*" -0.40
(-2 to 0] 0.0107 75 .0132"* 50 -0.19 0.0124 0.12 .0137*" -0.47
[-1 to 0] 0.0118 75 .0128*" 75 0.11 .0109“ 0.26 .0140*” -0.27
(-1 to 1] 0.0248 100 .0183” * 100 0.85 .0141" 1.21 .0210*" 0.56
[0 to 5] .0499" 100 .0287*" 100 0.70 .0343*" 0.80 .0252*” 0.68
Notes for Panels A and 6:
(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated wAh a R&D expendAure as reported In the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval service (DJNRS).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competAors:
a. The average R&D intensAy (RDI) is the ratio of the Ann's average R&D expendAures to As average net sales.
b. Determine which industry Anns are above and below the Industiy average R&D intensAy ratio.
c. A Arm wAh a RDI above the industry average is said to be close to all other 'above' Anns while A will consider 
those Arms wAh a RDI below the industiy average as being distant competAors.
d. A Arm with a RDI below the industiy average is said to be close to all other 'below' Anns while A will consider 
those Amis wAh a RDI above the industy average as being distant competAors.
(3) •*•*' (■"•, '*•) denotes signAicance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Automobile Industry
Automobile Industiy 
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its R&D activity and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, its industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and Its close and distant 
industiy competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the Initial announcement 
(day-0) of a R&D expenditure; 1979 -1992.
Daily Average Abnormal Returns. AARs <%)
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dilference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference















-5 -0.016 0 -.009*” 20 -0.076 -0.007 -1.15 -.011“ -0.79
-4 -0.002 40 -.008" 60 0.26 -0.005 0.22 -0.01 0.23
-3 .0192” 100 0.0015 80 2.52" 0.0024 2 .37"  0.0008 2.46”
-2 -0.005 40 0.0029 80 -0.079 0.0028 -0.88 0.0033 -0.81
-1 0.0062 60 .0047” 60 0.05 0.0038 0.05 0.0052 0.26
0 -0.002 40 .0069*" 80 -0.54 0.0010 -0.25 0.0118 -0.48
1 0.0063 80 -0.002 40 1.52 -0.002 1.56 -0.001 1.44
2 -0.016 20 -.006" 20 -1.16 -.011*" -0.73 -0.002 -1.53
3 0.0034 60 -0.003 40 0.81 -0.004 1.09 -0.002 0.23
4 -0.004 40 0.0000 60 -0.58 0.0000 -0.41 0.0000 -0.45
5 0.0043 40 -.005 40 0.65 
Panel B
-0.005 0.52 -0.005 0.79
Cumulative average abnomtal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the dim announcing its R&D activity and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, its industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and Its close 
and distant industiy competitors for seven window internals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
R&D expenditures; 1979 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnomtal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Window
[-5 to 5] 
[-3 to 0] 
[-2 to 21 
[-2 to 0] 
[-1 to 0) 
[-1 to 1] 
[0 to 5]
Finn % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-DlfTerence Announcing Z-Dlfference
nnouncing Positive Firm's Positive Between Firm's Between Firm's Between
Its R&D CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARfirm Close Industry CAARflrm Distant CAARfirm
Activity and Competitors and Industiy and
CAARnduslry CAARdose Competitors CAARd start
-0.005 60 -0.017 40 0.37 -0.024 0.12 -0.01 -0.02
0.0186 60 .0160*" 80 -0.08 0.0101 0.29 0.0211 -0.08
-0.01 40 0.0066 80 -1.08 -0.006 -0.59 0.0172 -1.17
-0.001 40 .0146*" 80 -0.93 0.0077 -0.66 0.0203 -0.8
0.0046 40 .0116"* 60 -0.43 0.0048 -0.18 0.017 -0.32
0.011 60 .0101"* 40 0.08 0.0025 0.37 0.0163 0.16
-0.007 20 -0.009 20 0.17 -.021" 0.77 0.0017 -0.23
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with a R&D expenditure as reported in the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval sen/ice (DJNRS).
(2) Process for deteimining close and distant Industiy competitors:
a. The average R&D intensity (RDI) Is the ratio of the firm's average R&D expenditures to its average net sales.
b. Determine which Industiy firms are above and below the Industiy average R&D intensity ratio.
c. A firm with a RDI above the Industiy average Is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a RDI below the industiy average as being distant competitors.
d. A firm with a RDI below the Industiy average is said to be close to all other 'below1 firms while it will consider 
those firms wtth a RDI above the industiy average as being distant competitors.
(3) **” • (■**•, ■*■) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Chemical Industry
Chemical Industry 
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its R&D activity and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant Industry competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, its industiy and its close and distant Industiy competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing film's industry and its close and distant 
industiy competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the Initial announcement 
(day-0) of a R&D expenditure; 1979 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%>
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-DUference
Announcing Positive Finn's Positive Between Finn's Between Finn's Between
Its R&D AARs Industiy AARs AARflrm Close Industiy AARflrm Distant AARflrm
Day Activity and Competitors and Industiy and
AARlndustry AARdose Competitors AARdstart
-5 0.0000 30 0.001 67 0.03 0.0000 -0.03 -0.001 -0.05
-4 -0.001 40 -0.001 44 0.06 -0.001 0.08 0.0001 0.15
-3 0.0027 50 -0.003 44 0.49 0.0000 0.37 -0.005 0.37
-2 .0086* 70 .0025“ 56 1.08 .0024” 1.04 0.0009 1.01
-1 .0127" 80 0.0013 56 1.01 0.0032 0.92 0.0021 1.52
0 0.0025 60 -0.001 56 0.81 -0.002 0.9 -0.003 0.54
1 -0.002 50 0.0018 56 -0.49 0.001 -0.54 0.0014 -0.5
2 0.004 60 -0.002 44 0.94 0.0000 0.9 -0.004 1.16
3 .0064* 50 .0041“ * 56 0.96 0.0019 0.75 .0040” 0.8
4 0.0000 60 .0051*” 67 -1.01 .0049*“ -0.89 .0038” -0.98
5 0.0056 40 0.0014 56 0.62 0.002 0.54 .0029“ 0.59
Panel B
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its R&D activity and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industry and its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, its industiy and its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and Its close 
and distant industry competitors for seven window intenrals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
R&D expenditures; 1979 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Diflerence Announcing Z-Difference
Announcing Positive Finn's Positive Between Finn's Between Finn's Between
Its R&D CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARflrm Close Industry CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitors and Industry and
Window CAARlndustry CAARdose Competitors CAARd start
[-5 to 5] .0393” * 60 .0099*" 67 2.43” .0112* 2.15” 0.0028 2.49”
[-3 to 0] .0265” 65 0.0000 44 2.05" 0.0028 1.92 -0.005 1.95*
[-2 to 2] .0256*” 64 0.0026 67 2.51*” 0.0039 2 .3 " -0.002 3.06*”
[-2 to 0] .0238*” 70 0.0026 78 2.09" 0.0031 2 .1 " 0.0001 2.35”
[-1 to 0) .0152" 70 0.0001 67 1.44 0.0007 1.41 -0.001 1.77
(-1 to 1] 0.0129 63 0.0018 56 1.06 0.0017 1.01 0.0006 1.22
[0 to 5] 0.0163 53 .0094” * 67 0.75 0.0072 0.69 0.0055 0.69
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with a R&D expenditure as reported In the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval service (DJNRS).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competitors:
a. The average R&D Intensity (RDI) is the ratio of the firm's average R&D expenditures to its average net sales.
b. Determine which industiy firms are above and below the Industry average R&D intensity ratio.
c. A firm with a RDI above the industiy average is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a RDI below the Industiy average as being distant competitors.
d. A firm with a RDI below the industiy average is said to be close to all other 'below' firms white It will consider 
those firms with a RDI above the industry average as being distant competitors.
(3) ’***• (’**', '*■) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Computer Industry
Computer Industiy 
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its R&D activity and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's Industry and its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing Arm, Its industry and Its close and distant industry competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant 
Industiy competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day»0) of a R&D expenditure; 1979 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%)
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dltference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difleience


















-5 -0.009 10 0.0023 34 -0.7 -0.007 -0.46 0.0107 -0.84
-4 0.0000 40 0.0090 61 -0.97 0.007 -0.87 .0106** -0.99
-3 -.014*** 60 0.0100 66 -0.97 0.0104 -1.1 .0099* -0.97
-2 0.0104 60 0.0067 48 0.17 .0026** 0.1 0.0108 0.09
-1 0.0040 50 -0.003 57 1.14 0.0108 0.76 -0.017 1.44
0 -0.010 30 -.011* 48 -0.67 -0.004 -1.08 -0.016 -0.37
1 .0266— 50 -0.003 48 1.07 -0.006 1.12 -0.002 1.03
2 -0.0120 30 0.0009 51 -2.06** -0.002 -1.61 0.0035 -2.26**
3 -.02"* 70 .0136— 69 -1.54 .0181 — -1.51 .0087** -1.47
4 .0168— 60 -0.001 49 1.19 -0.002 1.12 0.0000 1.21
5 .0282— 90 0.0021 61 1.78 
Panel B
0.0028 1.35 0.0036 1.73
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its R&D activity and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's Industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, its Industiy and its close and distant Industry competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industry and its close 
and distant industiy competitors for seven window intervals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
R&D expenditures; 1979 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industiy Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-DUference Announcing Z-Difference
Announcing Positive Firm's Positive Between Finn's Between Firm’s Between
Its R&D CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARfirm Close Industiy CAARflrm Distant CAARfirm
Activity and Competitors and Industiy and
Window CAARindusliy CAARdose Competitois CAARdstart
[-5 to 5] 0.0211 50 0.027 54 0.28 0.0309 0.1 0.0238 0.3
[-3 to 0] -0.0100 50 0.0032 57 -1.12 0.0194 -2.07** -0.012 -0.45
1-2 to 2] .0193— 44 -0.009 50 0.61 0.0013 0.62 -0.02 0.77
[-2 to 0) 0.0045 47 -0.007 51 0.51 0.009 0.08 -.022* 0.79
[-1 to 0) -0.006 40 -0.014 52 0.42 0.0064 0.01 -.033* 0.69
[-1 to 1] .0207— 43 -0.017 51 0.97 0.0007 0.87 -.034** 1.08
[0 to 5] .0297— 55 0.002 54 0.6 0.0071 0.56 -0.002 0.62
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with a R&D expenditure as reported In the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval service (DJNRS).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competitors:
a. The average R&D intensity (RDI) is the ratio of the firm's average R&D expenditures to its average net sales.
b. Determine which industiy firms are above and below the Industry average R&D intensity ratio.
c. A firm with a RDI above the industiy average Is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a RDI below the industiy average as being distant competitors.
d. A firm with a RDI below the industiy average Is said to be close to all other 'below' firms while It will consider 
those firms with a RDI above the industry average as being distant competitors.
(3) '—  (-* \ '*) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Electronics Industiy
Electronics Industiy 
Panel A
Daily average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its R&D activity and lor the samples 
of the announcing firm's industry and Its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, Its industry and Its close and distant industry competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industry and Its close and distant 
industiy competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day>0) of a R&D expenditure: 1979 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs 1%)
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difference















-5 -0.002 44 0.0095 44 -0.24 .0122** -0.36 0.0022 0.00
-4 0.0006 36 0.0013 50 -0.42 -0.002 0.11 0.0052 0.00
-3 -0.002 44 0.0012 56 -0.31 0.0007 -0.32 0.0013 -0.36
-2 -0.003 32 -0.002 25 -0.07 -0.002 -0.06 -0.001 -0.04
-1 -0.002 48 -0.008*** 56 -0.26 -.008*** 0.03 -0.004 -0.26
0 0.0092 56 0.0006 69 -0.06 0.0012 -0.16 0.0046 0.01
1 -0 .01 *** 24 -.005** 13 0.00 -0.005 0.16 -0.006 0.01
2 -0.002 36 0.0038 31 0.02 0.0059 0.03 -0.002 0.17
3 -0.001 56 0.0096 38 0.00 0.0085 0.05 .0079— -0.1
4 -0.002 56 0.0035 50 0.16 0.0035 0.83 0.0021 0.16
5 0.0041 64 .0035** 56 0.40 
Panel B
.0055** 0.14 0.0000 0.48
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its R&D activity and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industry and its close and distant industry competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, its Industry and Its close and distant industry competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing Ann's Industry and its close 
and distant Industry competitors (Or seven window Intervals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
R&D expenditures: 1979 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference
Announcing Positive Finn's Positive Between Finn's Between Finn's Between
Its R&D CAARs Industry CAARs CAARflrm Close Industiy CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitors and Industiy and
Window CAARlndustry CAARdose Competitors CAARdstart
[-5 to 5] -0.009 31 0.0191 31 -0.06 0.0208 0.18 0.0101 0.00
r-3 to oj 0.0032 44 -0.007 44 -0.31 -0.008 -0.25 0.0005 -0.29
(-2 to 2] -0.007 50 -.01** 44 -0.08 -0.008 0.04 -0.009 -0.01
[-2 to 0] 0.0048 56 -0.009 63 -0.14 -0.009 -0.07 -0.001 -0.09
[-1 toO) 0.0076 63 -.007** 69 -0.16 -0.007 -0.10  0.0002 -0.13
[-1 to 1) -0 .002 44 -.012— 44 -0.08 -.012** 0.07 -0.005 -0.03
[0 to 51 -0.001 56 0.0163 50 0.28 0.0194 0.60 0.0068 0.33
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with a R&D expenditure as reported In the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval sendee (DJNRS).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industry competitors:
a. The average R&D intensity (RDI) is the ratio of the firm's average R&D expenditures to its average net sales.
b. Determine which industiy firms are above and below the Industiy average R&D Intensity ratio.
c. A firm with a RDI above the industry average is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while It will consider 
those firms with a RDI below the industiy average as being distant competitors.
d. A firm with a RDI below the industiy average is said to be close to all other 'below' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a RDI above the industiy average as being distant competitors.
(3) •***• (" •, " 3  denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Healthcare Industry
Healthcare Industiy 
Panel A
Daily average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its R&D activity and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's Industry and Its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing film, its industry and its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industry and Its close and distant 
Industry competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day»0) of a R&D expenditure; 1979 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%>
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference















-5 0.0014 65 0.0005 59 0.47 0.0019 0.38 0.0005 0.40
-4 .0057" 71 -0.001 59 1.79 -0.002 1.08 -0.001 1.05
-3 .0071" 71 -0.001 35 1.76 -0.002 2.10”  -0.001 1.81
-2 -0.004 35 -.004"* 18 -1.85 -.004"* -0.7 -.004*” -0.03
-1 -0.003 47 -0.002 59 -1.24 -0.002 -0.38 -0.002 -0.52
0 -0.003 47 -.005"* 35 -0.25 -.005*** 0.00 -.005"* 0.33
1 0.0035 71 0.0000 53 0.75 0.0000 1.00 0.0000 0.79
2 -0.002 35 -0.001 41 -0.21 -.002" -0.37 -0.001 -0.94
3 0.0038 71 0.0016 65 0.4 0.0017 0.69 0.0016 0.45
4 0.0002 53 -0.001 41 -0.49 -0.002 -0.49 -0.001 0.08
5 -0.002 
Panel B
35 -0.002 35 -0.97 -.003*” -0.01 -0.002 -1.07
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its R&D activity and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, its industiy and Its close and distant industry competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and its close 
and distant industiy competitors for seven window intervals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
R&D expenditures; 1979 -1992.
Cumulative Averane Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Finn % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference
Announcing Positive Finn's Positive Between Firm's Between Finn's Between
Its R&D CAARs Industry CAARs CAARfirm Close Industiy CAARfirm Distant CAARfirm
Activity and Competitors and Industiy and
Window CAARindusby CAARdose Competltois CAARdstart
[-5 to 5] 0.0081 65 -.013*" 29 0.25 -.02"* 1.63 -.013*" 0.88
[-3 to 0] -0.003 47 -.012*” 35 -0.47 -.014*” 1.09 -.012*" 0.91
[-2 to 2] -0.008 41 -.012*" 35 -1.22 -.015"* 0.14 -.012*” -0.21
[-2 to 0] -.010” 29 -.011” * 24 -1.98* -.012” * -0.24 -.011*” -0.26
[-1 to 0] -.007" 29 -.007*" 35 -1.27 -.008"* -0.31 -.007"* -0.3
[-1 to 1 ] -0.003 47 -.007*” 35 -0.54 -.008*" 0.37 -.007*” 0.27
[0to5] 0.001 59 -.007*" 41 -0.23 -.011*" 0.98 -.007*" 0.06
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with a R&D expenditure as reported in the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval sendee (DJNRS).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competitors:
a. The average R&D intensity (RDI) is the ratio of the firm's average R&D expenditures to its average net sales.
b. Determine which industiy firms are above and below the Industry average R&D intensity ratio.
c. A firm with a RDI above the industiy average Is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a RDI below the industiy average as being distant competitors.
d. A firm with a RDI below the industiy average is said to be close to all other 'below' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a RDI above the industiy average as being distant competitors.
(3) •***• (’**', '*•) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Metals Industiy
Metals Industry 
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its R&D activity and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's Industiy and its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, Its Industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitois, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant 
industiy competitors for the event period -S trading days to +5 trading days around the Initial announcement 
(day*0) of a R&D expenditure; 1979 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%)
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference















-5 -0.009 17 -.014“ 27 0.75 -.017*** 0.92 -0.011 0.21
-4 0.0139 67 0.0064 63 0.23 .0113“ -0.21 0.0026 0.56
-3 -0.006 33 -0.008 33 0.67 -0.006 0.42 -0.008 0.59
-2 -0.002 33 0.0051 54 0.03 0.0039 0.16 0.0041 -0.04
-1 0.0029 67 0.0056 58 0.31 0.0081 -0.51 0.0037 -0.09
0 0.0099 33 0.0027 50 -0.22 0.0072 -0.3 0.0035 -0.14
1 0.0152 67 0.0081 48 0.22 0.0008 0.68 .0162“ -0.17
2 -0.008 33 0.0037 52 0.07 0.0042 -0.13 0.0014 0.17
3 0.009 83 0.0073 60 -0.29 -0.002 0.4 .015“ -0.65
4 0.0032 83 0.0005 52 -0.07 0.0021 -0.01 0.0001 -0.07
5 -0.004 33 -0.003 37 -0.45 
Panel B
-0.002 -0.5 -0.002 -0.42
Cumulative average abnomtal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its R&D activity and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industry and its close and distant industry competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, Its industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitois, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industiy and its close 
and distant industiy competitors for seven window Internals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
R&D expenditures; 1979 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry Competitors: R&D Intensity Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference















[-5 to 5) 0.0255 60 0.0138 80 -0.07 0.0093 0.11 0.0246 -0.21
[-3 to 0] 0.0047 60 0.005 80 -0.05 0.0131 -0.25 0.0029 0.08
[-2 to 2] 0.0187 80 .0252“ 80 -0.1 0.0242 -0.08 0.0289 -0.12
[-2 to 0] 0.0111 60 0.0134 80 -0.29 0.0192 -0.39 0.0113 -0.17
[-1 to 0} 0.0128 60 0.0083 80 -0.34 0.0153 -0.48 0.0072 -0.19
[-1 to 11 0.0281 60 .0164** 80 -0.13 0.0161 0.07 .0234“ 0.18
[0 to 5] 0.0258 60 
Notes for Panels A and B:
0.0192 80 -0.25 0.0095 -0.03 0.0339 0 .4
(1) Day 0 Is the first announcement date associated with a R&D expenditure as reported In the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval service (DJNRS).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competitors:
a. The average R&D intensity (RDI) Is the ratio of the firm's average R&D expenditures to its average net sales.
b. Determine which industiy firms are above and below the Industiy average R&D intensity ratio.
c. A firm with a RDI above the industiy average Is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a RDI below the Industiy average as being distant competitors.
d. A firm with a RDI below the industry average Is said to be close to all other 'below firms while it will consider 
those firms with a RDI above the industry average as being distant competitors.
(3) •***• (■**•, •*•) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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Introduction
An increasing number of companies claim that new products are the critical component for 
their continued earnings growth. In a firm survey, 63% of managers felt that within five years their 
companies would get 30% of sales from new products.42 The accumulation of improvements in 
products and processes may be the surest path to competitive advantage. The future economic 
growth and development of a firm may depend on its longer-range research programs. In order for 
the innovating firm to protect its ability to profit from its ideas, they can obtain a legal monopoly for a 
limited amount of time (17 years) in the form of a patent. The granting of a patent may play a crucial 
role in the success of a corporation.43 However, the patent grant does not come without a cost. 
Patents are public documents and as such proclaim to eveiyone, and to rivals in particular, a detailed 
description of a firm’s innovations. The question then centers on the attitude of corporate managers to 
the risk of revealing years of research and more importantly, what the perception of the market is with 
respect to patent grants.44
While the literature lacks a consensus regarding the specific value of patents45 the actions by 
corporate managers seem clear. For example, the management at Merck & Co., invested more than 
$125 million and ten years of research time into finding a way to block cholesterol formation. Their 
work resulted in the patented drug called Mevacor which generates nearly $430 million a year in 
sales.46 North American Philips Corp. paid for the rights to the microprocessor patent as the firm 
expected to earn more than $100 million in sales47 In the rapidly changing computer industry, the 
management at Digital Equipment Corp. (DEC) claims that patents serve a dual puipose as either a 
“sword or a shield” for competing in the marketplace. Even though not all patent applications are
42 “To Outpace Rivals, More Firms Step Up Spending on New-Product DevelopmentWall Street Journal 
(October 28,1992).
The works of Schmookler and Brownlee (1962), Griliches and Schmookfer (1963), Scherer (1965), and Schmookler (1966) used 
successful patent applications as their output measure.
44 The following discussed market value but prraded the market with annual book value figures. Refer to the Literature Review of this 
paper with respect to the works of Taylor and Silberston (1973), Scherer (1977), Griliches (1904)Pakes (1965), and Hall et al. (1966).
45 Griliches (1964) finds positive effects of the number of patents applied for on the market value of the firm while Pakes (1965) shows 
that most of the variance in market value has little to do with a firm's inventive activity as measured by its patent output. Thelengthof 
the optimal patent life, the timing of patent awards, and the influence of the costs of imitation have all met with mixed results in the 
literature too (Nordhaus(1989), Debrock (1965), Kiteh (1977), and Gallini (1992).
48 “A Cure that Just Keeps Dishing Up Success,” Business Week, 1969 Bonus Issue on Innovation.
47 “Is It Time to Reinvent the Patent System," Business Week, December 2,1991.
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granted, corporate management still appears interested in the patent grant pursuit. Without knowing if 
they would be granted a patent, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer spent $45 million on an AIDS vaccine before it 
was approved by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
While corporate management seems to place a value on the pursuance of patent grants, the 
question is, does the market feel the same way? In the competitive telecommunications industry, 
Spectrum Information Technologies received a patent on the technology enabling the transmission of 
information from portable computers over cellular phones. The firm already had over 200 innovations 
patented. Analysts believed that the strength of the company was in its patents. Further, the market 
responded by doubling Spectrum’s stock price in the space of four months following the grant date.48 
Upon settling the patent dispute over Zantac, an ulcer drug, the share values of Glaxo rose 
dramatically. The uncertainty surrounding the firm’s ability to benefit from Zantac’s potential $3.6 
billion annual sales had been removed.49 Allegheny Ludlum Corp., a producer of specialty steels, 
patented a corrosion-resistant alloy to help reduce heat loss in automobile catalytic converters.
Product commercialization came in the form of contracts with Porsche and General Motors. The 
firm’s return on equity was the best in the steel industry.50 While the market may perceive a firm’s 
patent grant as evidence of future product commercialization, it is also aware of the film’s inability to 
fully appropriate all the benefits of the granted patent. In the electronics industry, Eastman Kodak 
sued Sony Corp. for allegedly violating its patent on the recording technology used in many video 
machines. Sony was able to “borrow" from the granted patents and rush the product to market. In the 
camera industry, Honeywell Inc. sued Minolta Camera Co. for infringement on its patented autofocus 
technology. Honeywell won $427 million in settlement fees and license payments.51 Patents should 
be important as they may signal a firm’s future growth potential with respect to product 
commercialization and positive discounted cash flows. Are the patent-grant announcing firm’s future 
cash flows greater than those of its industry competitors? Within the existing literature, there have 
been no tests to determine market perception of patent-grants. This study investigates the firm-
48 “Patents Fuel Tech Firm's Fortunes," USA Today, December 11,1902, page 3B.
49 “Share Lift For Glaxo as Zantac Patent Case Is Settled," The Financial Times, October24,1995.
50 “Specialty Metals That Are Special Indeed," Business Week, 1989 Bonus Issue on Innovation.
51 “Patent Showdown Pending," Business Week, May 24,1993.
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specific and intra-industry valuation effects of a firm’s patent-grant announcement.52 Specifically, this 
paper examines the validity of the competitive and free-rider hypotheses to explain the market 
reaction to announcements of granted patents. While the evidence reveals that the market response 
to the firm's announcing the granting of patents is not significant, the impact of the patent-grant 
announcement on the announcing firm’s industry is significantly positive. The implication is that there 
is a strong patent spillover effect at the expense of the announcing firm. In addition, the nature of 
competitor interaction appears to have a significant influence on the announcing firm and its overall 
industry. A distinction is made between rival firms based on their relative technological strength. It is 
the distant rivals of the patent-grant announcing firm which incur significant positive market abnormal 
returns. It may be that the research and technical infrastructure of the distant rivals allow them to be 
more capable (because of their key scientists or through their ability to make generic products) at free­
riding on the technological spillover. In addition, it appears that whether or not the patent-grant 
announcing firm earns positive or negative abnormal returns may have an influence on the spillover 
differences to industry rivals. Specifically, the spillover seems to be strongly associated with those 
announcing firms who earn negative abnormal returns. Finally, on average, the announcing firm does 
not seem to gain from its innovation. In order to ascertain whether or not spillovers eliminate all 
benefits to patent-grant announcing firms, this paper uses a post patent-grant announcement 
performance analysis. The evidence indicates that the patent-grant announcing firms tend to improve 
their profitability overtime.
The organization of this essay is as follows. The next section examines the literature 
pertaining to the use of patents as a measure of the success of a firm's innovation and the existence 
of an effective patent protection period. Section III discusses the intra-industry patent-grant 
announcement effects. Section IV provides a description of the data and intra-industry sample design. 
The methodology and empirical evidence for the patent-grant announcement abnormal returns, 
cross-sectional regression analysis, and post-patent-grant announcement performance is found in 
section V. The summary and concluding remarks are found in section V I .
52 Following the general Intra-industry information transfer model of Foster (1961), the patent-grant announcements of other firms within 
the industry can be regarded as one source of information transfer as they convey a change in the relative competitive advantage among 
firms.
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II. Literature Review
A. Patents: Productivity and Profitability
The major areas of patent research have focused on productivity, profitability, and the optimal 
patent life. Generally, in measuring firm productivity, the value of patents was discussed in terms of 
its ability to proxy for innovation output.53 As a proxy for R&D outputs, the patent statistic was usually 
formed from the number of patent applications. Taylor and Silberston (1973) suggested that patents 
were not an important factor in a firm’s R&D sirategy. in contrast, Pakes and Griliches (1980) and 
Hall, Griliches, and Hausman (1986) found that patents were a good indicator of the success of R&D. 
Profitability studies also had mixed results regarding the impact of patents. Scherer (1977) and 
Griliches (1984) asserted that firm valuation reflected the present value of expected returns from the 
firm’s innovation. Using annual book market values (equity and debt) and patent applications, a 
significant and positive relationship between the number of patents of a firm and its market value was 
found. Contrary to the Griliches and Scherer studies, Pakes (1985) reported that the relationship 
between a firm's annual rate of return and its patent applications was insignificant. There are several 
limitations of these productivity and profitability studies that may have led to the found results. First, 
most of the research used annual data to measure the ongoing innovation process. The tests also 
defined market value in terms of book values (i.e., equity and debt) without any reliance on current 
stock changes. Third, the studies made use of straight patent applications with no adjustments for 
those patents that may not have been granted. The fact that not all patents applied for are actually 
granted could create a bias in the results.
B. Effective Patent Protection
The ability of patents to enhance the efficiency of the allocation of research resources was the 
focus of the optimal patent life literature. These studies viewed the patent process as a means to 
lower the marginal costs of production and therefore bring about a more efficient allocation of 
resources to R&D. Noidhaus (1969), using a model with no rivalry between firms, argued that the
53 These studies primarily viewed patent statistics as a means to measure technical change: Scherer (1965), Schmookler (1966), and 
Comanor and Scherer (1969).
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fixed patent life of seventeen years came close to maximizing the research process. He asserted that 
patent policy was dependent on the trade-off between the social loss from the temporary monopoly 
and the social benefits from the innovation itself.54 Even when Kamien and Schwartz (1974) and 
DeBrock (1985) introduced rivalry into the Nordhaus model, their results were fairly consistent as 
imitation was not assumed to be a threat to the innovator-firm.55 Any attempt to duplicate the product 
or process was considered prohibitive.56 In contrast, in a world of costly imitation, Gallini (1992) found 
that a competitor firm’s decision to try and duplicate an innovator’s product depended on the length of 
the patent protection57 Specifically, in the case of the 17 year protection period, rival firms could not 
afford to wait for the technology as the consequence would be a loss of market share. Her model 
predicted that rivals would invent around the patented product. The implication is that the effective 
protection period is less than the 17 years granted by a patent. The weakness of these studies is that 
they conjectured about the effective protection period of patents but did not address the possible 
variance in market reaction to the competitor firms involved.
C. Extensions
The general understanding among researchers that patents are a potential sign of 
technological innovation permeates much of the existing patent literature. However, the literature has 
diluted the issue of the relationship between patents and firm value. It is not the cost-reduction 
attributes of patents nor the number of patent applications that can measure the impact of patents on 
the value of the firm. The fundamental question centers on the market valuation reaction to those 
firms engaged in the pursuit of patent grants. This paper is the first to address this issue using market 
based information. If the market believes that the granted patent delivers 17 years of protection, then 
it should react favorably to the announcing firm. On the other hand, if market perception of patents is 
that they do not protect the firm's product for the stated length of time, then its reaction may be
54 The innovator is assumed to patent its invention, no matter the length of patent protection. Similar assumption found in 
Scherer(1972), Kamien and Schwartz (1974), Tandon (1982), Wright (1964), DeBrock (1965), Kotowrtz (1968), Gillespie (1969), Gilbert 
and Shap'ro (19900 and Klemperer (1990).
55 Kamien and Schwartz (1974) claim the optimal life is longer than that posited by Nordhaus (1909) while DeBrock (1965) finds the
, the optimal patent life 
could still be 17 years.
57 Parker (1974) states that the period of patent protection may have a direct influence on commercial rivalry.
Even when Tandon (1962) assumed imitation was costless and therefore always a threat to the innovator-firm
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twofold. First, market valuation reaction may not be favorable to the announcing firm as it 
understands that a technological spillover is likely. Second, market perception may be that the 
announcing firm has the technical know-how as evidenced by the patent grant, but it may be skeptical 
about the patent-grant announcing firm’s ability to turn the patent into a commercial success. This is 
what this paper seeks to test as it investigates the firm-specific and intra-industry valuation effects of a 
firm’s patent-grant announcement. Specifically, this study examines the validity of the competitive 
and free-rider hypotheses to explain the market valuation reaction to announcements of patent grants. 
Due to competition within industries, it may be more likely that these two effects exist with one 
offsetting the other. Further, in analyzing the nature of industry competitors, this paper posits that the 
relative technological strength (TSR) of firms is a critical factor in determining the interaction 
between the patent-grant announcing firm and its competitors. Basically, the TSR measures the 
frequency with which a firm’s patents are cited in the innovations of other firms. If a firm is known by 
the market as having its patents frequently cited, the market should react favorably to the firm’s 
technological reputation. The industry challengers of the patent-grant announcing firm are classified 
as being either close or distant competitors as the TSRs vary across firms. Finally, the market may 
have difficulty in analyzing the announcing firm’s patent grant announcements due to factors such as 
pending regulations, possible spillover, or loss of key research employees. These factors may allow 
competitor firms to take advantage at the expense of the announcing firm. In order to determine if 
there is a lag between the announcement and a subsequent gain, this paper is the first to examine the 
industry-adjusted post patent-grant announcement earnings performance of the patent-grant 
announcing firm.
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III. Intra-Industry Effects of Patent-Grant Announcements
A. Competitive Effect
In general, the theoretical literature shows that the relationship between a firm’s patent policy 
and its rivals to be neutral.58 Imitation is not seen as a significant threat to the innovator firm. Even 
when Tandon (1982) assumed that imitation was costless, the effective patent protection period was 
still seventeen years. In marked contrast, Gallini (1992) argued that the longer the patent protection 
period the stronger the rival’s reaction would be to invent around the patented product. The effective 
patent protection period is likely to be less than seventeen years and hence the innovator-firm is 
expected to be affected by the actions of its rival imitator-firms. Within this innovator-imitator 
framework, when managers of innovator-firms possess private information concerning the firm’s 
investment opportunity set, the patent-grant announcement may be taken by the market as a signal59 
about the innovator-firm's future commercialization opportunities.
The management of patent policy may be a driving force in developing a firm’s relative 
competitive advantage. The patent-grant announcement may communicate to the market that the 
announcing firm has made significant progress in its technology and innovation efforts which may 
recast the competitive composition of its industry to the announcing firm’s own advantage. In a study 
of the electric lamp industry, Bright (1949) argued that the reason for General Electric’s (GE) initial 
industry dominance was its ability to secure the Edison patent. GE was able to maintain its 
competitive lead through the accumulation of other minor patents on the lamp and related equipment. 
Bresnahan’s (1985) study of post-entry competition in the plain paper copier market, examined 
Xerox’s use of patents as an entry barrier. The strategy of Xerox was, in addition to securing key 
patents on the basic Xerography process, to patent alternative technologies to prevent challenges 
in the market. Robinson (1988) found that within the Industrial Goods industries, the firms which were 
the first to innovate, benefited from patents to a greater extent than industry rivals who tended to
58 See Nordhaus (1969), Scherer (1972), Kamien and Schwartz (1974), and DeBrock (1985).
50 The foundation for this interpretation is built on the works of Milter and Rock (1965) (dividend announcements), Myers and Majluf 
(1964), Ross (1977) (security issue announcements), Aharony and Swary (1960), Asquith and Mullins (1963) (equity issues), Dennis 
and McConne) (1966) (mergers), and Vermaeien (1964) (stock repurchases).
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follow the lead of the innovator.60 The likelihood of a decline in the competitive position of industry 
competitors, due to an announcing firm’s commitment to innovation and product commercialization, 
constitutes the competitive effect of patent-grant announcements. The predictions of the hypothesis is 
that industry competitors will experience negative abnormal returns while positive abnormal returns 
will accrue to the patent-grant announcing finm.
B. Free-Rider Effect
The literature61 suggests that industrial firms develop new products and strengthen their 
competitive positions by securing the granting of patents. Arrow (1962), however, observed that a 
firm’s incentive to invest in research is weakened when this technical-knowledge is involuntarily 
transferred to competitors. By U.S. law, the patent announcement is a detailed disclosure of the 
workings of the patented product. Due to the nature of this public announcement, the innovator-firm 
may not be able to stop competitors from costlessly acquiring the benefits of its patented work. In 
other words, the gains from the innovator’s patent activity may spill-over to its industry competitors 
even though there has been no compensation paid by the rival firm. Levin (1988) conducted a survey 
study of 650 research executives and reported that patent-grant announcements were rated as an 
effective method of acquiring technical knowledge of competitors. These findings on patent 
disclosures favor the presence of a technological spillover of the type that concerned Arrow (1962) 
and Spence (1984).62 In a study of 48 patented product innovations in the pharmaceutical, chemical, 
and electrical products industries, Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981) found that imitators 
duplicated patented innovations for about 65% of the innovation cost. Lieberman and Montgomery 
(1988) contend that the free-rider phenomenon can reduce, or even completely negate the net 
advantage of the initial innovating firm. The patent-grant announcing firm’s net advantage from
60 Mascarenhas (1992) suggests that first-entrants in the semi-submersible oil-drilling industry maintain higher market share. Tufano 
(1990), in a study of financial innovation, finds that banks capture a larger share of underwriting with innovations than with imitative 
products. Innovators enjoy lower costs of trading, underwriting, and marketing.
Mascarenhas (1992), Tufano (1990), Robinson (1968), Bresnahan (1965) and Bright (1949).
62 Cohen and Levinthal (1969), and Nelson (1964) point out that for the spillover to be as strong as Spence assumed, the free-riding firm 
must have its own labs and engineers to assimilate the technical knowledge.
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preemptive patenting may be eroded by the ability of rivals to free-ride on their patented information.63 
The potential for spillovers of detailed technical information and more specifically, the ability of 
industry competitors to benefit from an announcing firm’s technological innovation, formulates the 
free-rider effect hypothesis of patent-grant announcements.
C. Valuation Effects of Patent-Grant Announcements
In general, from the two competing hypotheses above, the expectation would be that the 
competitive effect will result in positive abnormal returns for the patent-grant announcing firm and 
negative abnormal returns for its industry competitors. In the case of the free-rider effect, positive 
abnormal returns would be generated for the competitor firms. As yet, there have been no tests 
specifically undertaken to determine how the market reacts to the patent-grant announcing firm’s 
announcement. However, studies on whether or not patents are value-enhancing have been 
performed, with mixed results. Griliches (1984) asserted that the present value of expected returns 
from a firm's innovation should be reflected in firm valuation. Using a market value proxy of the firm’s 
assets, the Q measure, he found a significant and positive relationship between the number of patent 
applications by a firm and its Q-market value. Contrary to Griliches, Pakes (1985) found the 
relationship between a firm’s annual rates of return and its patent applications to be insignificant. His 
data set was comprised of annual patent applications, R&D expenditures, and rates of return for 120 
firms over an eight year period. The changes in the firm’s book market value had little to do with its 
patent output. Within the signaling framework of this paper, if a firm's market value is influenced by 
signals sent by its industry rivals, then the patent-grant announcement may concurrently impart two 
such signals. The first may convey the competitive position and relative technical and commercial 
advantages of the announcing firm. That the industry competitor may be able to costlessly benefit 
from the intra-industry technological spillover is the second signal. Upon the patent-grant 
announcement, the market’s response to both the patent-grant announcing firm and its industry 
competitors, should reflect the net influence of the competitive and free-rider effects.
63 Mulder and Vergragt (1991) reported that the result of Du Poofs patent of the air gap spinning process gave its rival, AKZO.an 
almost complete recipe to produce their first aramid fibres. Chaney, Devinney, and Winer (1991) stated that innovating firms must 
realize that their competitors will try and imitate their lead in product innovation.
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Several possible market valuation effects for the patent-grant announcing firm and its industry 
competitors might be observed. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) developed a model of preemptive 
patenting, in which a firm with an early lead in research, exploits its lead to deter industry competitors 
from entering the patent race. When a firm can patent new technologies before its competitors, this 
preemptive action may lower the returns to potential rivals (i.e., a decline in the competitive position of 
industry challengers). On average, when the stock price of the patent-grant announcing firm 
increases, while the share prices of its industry competitors are unchanged or decrease, this may 
reflect that the competitive effect is greater than the free-rider effect. Similarly, when the shareholders 
of industry competing firms find that their stock values decrease, on average, while the patent-grant 
announcing firm’s value remains constant or increases, this may indicate that the competitive effect 
dominates the free-rider effect. In both cases, the perception of the market may be that the patent- 
grant announcing firm is relatively more technically advanced or closer to product commercialization. 
Because of this, the announcing firm may have a competitive advantage in the innovation race 
despite the potential ability of rivals to benefit from such technology.
When the patent-grant announcing firm encounters negative abnormal returns, on average, 
while constant or positive abnormal returns are associated with its industry rivals, the free-rider effect 
may offset the competitive effect. Horstman, MacDonald, and Slivinski (1985) developed a model 
where patents transferred information from the innovating fine to its competitors. They argued that 
rivals could earn positive returns through imitation of the patented product.
When positive abnormal returns are associated with the industry competitor firms, on 
average, while the shareholders of the patent-grant announcing firm receive constant or negative 
abnormal returns, the free-rider effect may dominate the competitive effect. Baldwin and Child’s 
(1969) derive conditions under which the imitator profits more than the innovator. It may be less 
expensive for a competitor to examine the published results of the patent-innovator firm than to 
perform its own research. They suggest that imitation, with the aid of patent disclosures, may be the 
research strategy of choice for many competitor firms.
There are several major limitations with the prior patent studies. The measure of market 
value was a ‘book’ value and it was annualized. This definition of market value may have difficulty in
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capturing the value accruing to the firm engaged in an ongoing innovation process. The patent figures 
were also annualized and they utilized applications rather than grants. Since all patent applications 
are not granted, the probability of a bias exists. This paper is the first to investigate the valuation 
effects of patent-grant announcements, for both the patent-grant announcing firm as well as its 
industry competitors as free-riding may exist within the industry. It makes use of a standard event 
study methodology in order to present a more timely measure of the market reaction to both the 
patent-grant announcing firm and its industry competitors. The sample observations include pure 
patent-grant announcements. In a further attempt to strengthen the integrity of the data set, if an 
earnings report or capital expenditure announcement is made either five days before or five days after 
the patent-grant announcement, the announcement was not included in the sample set of 
observations. Major differentiating factors in this paper are the hypotheses of the competitive and 
free-rider effect to explain the market reaction to announcements of granted patents. Further, the 
industry challengers of the patent-grant announcing firms are categorized as being either close or 
distant competitors as the technological strength (TSR) of patents does vary across firms. Finally, the 
post patent-grant announcement earning performance of the patent-grant announcing firm is 
analyzed.
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IV. Data Description and Intra-Industry Sample Design
A. Data Description
The data sample consists of public announcements of patents granted over the period 1987 
to 1992. Each patent grant-date of a firm is matched with its common stock daily return from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tape files over the 1987-1992 period. The firms 
included in the sample are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX).
The announcement dates of patents granted coincide with the publication date of the Official 
Gazette of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The Official Gazette (OG), is a weekly 
publication and covers the period from 1872 to the present. The listings are provided in patent 
number order. It also reveals the actual application date which is kept secret from the public until the 
publication date (i.e., grant date) of the patent.64 The patent announcement reveals the drawing, 
background, and explanation of how the invention works in detail. Available at any US Patent 
Depository, is the USPTO Classification and Search Support Information System (CASSIS) 
computerized database. A search can be conducted through the use of either a patent number or a 
patent assignee number.
In selecting patent-grant announcements, it is critical that these announcements are not 
influenced by other financial declarations. The sample is made up of firms having ‘pure’ patent grant 
announcements. The generated sample adheres to the following criteria:
• There is an unambiguous initial patent grant announcement date. This is verified through 
reference to the publication date of the Official Gazette.
•  There is no other announcement made on this initial date nor during the five trading days before 
or after the announcement date (i.e., the definition of a ‘pure’ patent announcement).
•  The sample is limited to firms whose CRSP daily stock return data is available.
84 The US awards patents on the basis of the “first to invent'and not the “first to file" as is the practice in Europe 
and Asia. In order to protect the inventors, the application is not public knowledge until the patent appears in the OG.
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Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics of the 91 patent-grant announcing firms included in 
the final sample. In the year of the announcement, average net sales for the firms in the sample are 
$16.33 billion and average net incomes are $862.8 million and average total assets are $18.99 
billion. These figures are taken from the annual Standard and Poor's Compustat Services. The 
average number of patents granted per firm is approximately 186. For those firms with a relatively 
higher number of granted patents, the market is expected to react positively to the firm's pursuit of 
technological advancement. Next, a patent activity ratio (PAR) is calculated by taking the total 
number of patents granted to the fiim and dividing it by the firm's number of unique announcement 
dates. On average, on each unique announcement date, the firm reports being granted approximately 
five patents. Those firms associated with a relatively large 'bundle' of patents may be better able to 
defend their competitive position. Hence, the market is expected to respond more favorably to those 
firms having relatively higher PAR values. TSR is the Technological Strength of a firm and is 
obtained from the ‘Patent Scoreboard’ published each year by Business Week. It is the number of 
patents granted to a firm times a Current Impact Index. This index measures the significance of a 
company’s patents and is based on how often they are cited in the patents of other firms. In other 
words it reflects how frequently a firm's patents are used as the foundation for other innovations.
While the patents granted to a firm and its PAR emphasize the importance of the number of patents a 
firm has obtained, the TSR variable focuses on the quality of the announced patent grant. It may be a 
way for the market to measure a firm's technological vigor relative to its industry competitors. If the 
patents of a firm are known to be highly regarded and used by other industry competitors, the market 
is expected to behave in an approving manner.
B. Intra-Industry Sample Design
The intra-industry patent information transfer analysis demands that the sample data be 
further refined in order to ascertain the impact of patent 'news' on both the announcing fiim and its 
industry competitors. Initially, the patent-grant announcing firm's industry will be defined as all other 
firms with the same primary 4-digit SIC code in the CRSP tape file. In order to compute stockholders' 
wealth effects of a patent-grant announcement on the announcing firm's competitors, a value-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 1
Statistics Describing the Sample of Firms Making Patent Grant 
Announcements. The Time Period Covers 1987 to 1992 and there are 









Net Sales ($mn.) 16330.0 22092.0 62.0 132429.0 8744.0
Net Income ($mn.) 862.8 2995.3 -6865.0 44350.0 371.8
Total Assets ($mn.) 18990.0 31292.0 16.0 192876.0 8618.0
Patents3 186.41 223.72 0.00 1348.00 103.00
PARb 4.52 4.58 0.96 23.15 2.65
TSRC 270.59 311.46 2.00 1650.00 139.00
Total Employees 86739 105595 602 750000 53530
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.59 2.07 0.08 16.76 1.94
Price-Eamings Ratio 17.45 11.33 2.00 94.00 15.00
* Total number of patents granted to the sample portfolio of firms from 1987 to 1992. 
b The Patent Activity Ratio. It is the ratio of the number of patents granted to the firm 
divided by the firm's number of unique announcement dates. 
c The Technological Strength Ratio. It is the number of patents times the Current Impact 
Index, where this index is a measure of how significant a firm's patents are, based on 
the frequency with which they are cited in other patents. In other words, they are 
used as the foundation for other innovations.
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weighted portfolio of all firms with stock returns available from the CRSP file, over the 1987-1992 
period is formed. These industry portfolios are then sorted into a set of industry groups as delineated 
in the 1992 Business Week Patent Scoreboard. Each industry group possesses at least two member 
firms, ensuring the matching of a patent announcing firm with its industry competitors.
In analyzing possible intra-industry patent-grant announcement effects, the sample of industry 
competitors is further classified into close and distant competitors of the patent-grant announcing firm. 
A justification for the distinction between close and distant industry competitors is that the degree of 
research capabilities and potential product commercialization may not be the same across all firms. 
There may be competitor firms characterized as having certain research and or product-market 
capabilities which permit them to significantly benefit from the research activities of the patent-grant 
announcing firm. On the other hand, distant competitors may lack the research personnel or new 
product potential to keep pace. This type of firm may specialize on patent imitations. This is evident 
in the U.S. motorcycle market. The earnings of Harley-Davidson increased 130% since 1991 with 
sales increases of 85% and a rise in bike output of nearly 50%. The sale of big cruisers comprises 
44% of all U.S. motorcycle sales and is the major bike product of the firm. The Harleys have patented 
engines, configurations and exhaust technology but this has not stopped some competitors from 
entering into this market. Firms such as Honda, Kawasaki and Yamaha have introduced high-tech 
imitaions. The chief engineer at Harley-Davidson admits that some of these bikes are as good as, if 
not better than the Harley cruisers.65
While the number of patent grants are important to a firm, it may be their quality which really 
counts in the market. The method chosen to distinguish between the patent-grant announcing firm 
and its close and distant industry competitors is based on the technological advancement of a firm as 
measured by a firm’s relative technological strength (TSR) variable. In general, by determining the 
number of times a particular patent is cited in subsequent applications, and then comparing this to the 
average number of citations for a patent in that industry, a measure of its importance can be obtained. 
It is designed to show how well the winners of U.S. patents performed relative to their industry. For 
each of the firms, an annual (TSRRm,) is calculated as the product of the following two components.
85 Tune-up Time for Harley,” BusinessWeek, April 8,1996.
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The first component of (rSR*™) is the number of patents granted by the U.S. Patent Office to each 
firm for a specific year. Next, the firm's Cunrent Impact Index (CIIr™) is specified.66 The (CIIRim) 
measures the importance of the firm’s granted patents based upon how often they are cited in all other 
granted patents. This indicates how many times they are used as the basis for other innovations. A 
current impact index of 1.0 means that the firm’s granted patents are cited as often as the overall 
average. A rating of 1.3 infers that the firm’s granted patents are cited 30% more often than the 
overall average. The firm’s 1992 Current Impact Index is calculated as the average number of 
times the patents (which have been granted to the firm over the prior 5 years) are cited in the new 
patents granted in 1992 divided by the average number of times the patents (which have been 
granted to all firms over the prior 5 years) are cited in the new patents granted in 1992. Next, the 
median of all the firm TSRs within an industry is calculated and is used as the industry benchmark. 
This is labeled as the median (TSRindustry). When the announcing firm and its competitor experience 
the same relative degree of TSR ((TSRn™) > median (TSRindustry) or (TSRpm) < median (TSRmdus&y)) 
they are considered to be close rivals with respect to a firm’s relative technological advancement and 
potential product commercialization. If the announcing firm and its competitor have opposite relative 
TSR values, they are considered to be distant rivals as one firm has a relative technical strength 
above the median industry and the other firm has a relative technical strength below the median 
industry level.
When both the patent-grant announcing firm and its competitor experience a relatively high 
Technological Strength (the TSRnm > median TSRindustry), it implies that the close rivals face similar 
dollar, managerial, and lab commitments to the innovation process and product commercialization. 
The distant competitors may lack the research infrastructure (i.e., research engineers) and technical 
know-how to keep in step with the other competitors. It is the differences across firms with regards to 
their technological advancement and potential product commercialization, which may make it possible 
for some companies to better compete than others. If a firm is known as having its patents widely 
cited in subsequent patent applications, the market is expected to react favorably to the technological
68 The source for patent citations is the intellectual property database, IFI/Plenum Data Corp. and the databank, DIALOG.
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reputation of that firm. On the other hand, if a firm's patents are seldom cited, the market’s reaction 
may be unfavorable.
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V. Methodology: Estimation of Abnormal Stock Returns of Patent-Grant 
Announcing Firms and Their Competitors
A. Computing Abnormal Stock Returns
The standard event study method is applied to measure the effects of patent grant 
announcements on the stock price of the patent-grant announcing firm and its industry 
competitors.67 The initial announcement date is designated as Day 0 in event time and is 
verified in the Official Gazette of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The 
abnormal return for a patent-grant announcing firm is the differential between the actual return 
on its own equity and the contemporaneous expected return generated by the market model. 
The market model, following Fama (1976) is used and is specified as:
Rj, = a j + Pj Rm + Si,
where
R j = the rate of return on security j for event day t,
R mt = the rate of return on the CRSP equally weighted index on event day t,
s j(  = the error term of security j on event day t.
Following the Mikkelson and Partch (1986) common event study methodology, the 
abnormal common stock return (AR) of firm j on day t is obtained:
ARi , =Ri , - ( tti +A ^ / )
67 If markets are efficient, a change in security prices represents an unbiased reflection of changes in the expected future cash 
flows of a firm. When analyzing stock price behavior around the announcement of a significant event (i.e., granting of a patent) 
which is assumed to affect the firm’s future value, one is explicitly testing any change in the unbiased market forecast 
concerning the future cash flows of the firm. As with all capital market tests, this is a test of the hypothesis of market efficiency 
as well as the hypothesis under consideration.
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where
ARjt = abnormal return for firm j on event day t,
R j = daily return of firm j common stock on day t,
Rmt -  daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted index for all common stock on the NYSE
and the AMEX (used as a proxy of the market portfolio of risky assets) on event 
day t,
a  j  = ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the regression model intercept term, and
P j  = OLS estimate of firm j ’s market model parameter.
Daily abnormal returns are calculated for each firm in the sample over the time interval t 
= -5 to t = +5.68 The equally-weighted Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) index is 
used as the market proxy. The estimation period is from t = -120 to t = -30 relative to the first 
date of a patent grant announcement in the Official Gazette, day t = o.
For a sample of (N) patent-grant announcing firms,69 a daily average abnormal return 
(AAR) for each day t is measured by
1 N
AR. =  — Y JA R ,
' N% "
In the case of no abnormal performance, ARt has an expected value of zero. The 
average standardized abnormal return (ASARt)is calculated next, in order to determine whether
1 *  ARJ t
the average daily abnormal return is statistically different from zero. It is ASAR, =  —  ^  '
N  j= i bJt
68 Equity prices are naturally noisy, implying that an event must be significant before it will be seen above the normal 
background noise. Even though a public announcement may exist, it is not always clearly evident when information has been 
incorporated in the price of the stock. It is not uncommon, at times, to find abnormal returns prior to public announcements 
(Chaney, Devinney and Winer, 1991).
The procedure which follows applies to both announcing firms and their industry competitors.
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where
S j = the square root of firm j’s estimated forecast variance.
It is computed by:
L
where
S j = the residual variance for security j from the market model regression,
L the number of observations during the estimation period,
R mk -  the return on the market portfolio for the kth day of the estimation period,
R mt = the return on the market portfolio for day t,
R m = the average return of the market portfolio for the estimation period.
It is assumed that each of the abnormal return terms are normal and independent across 
t and across securities. This allows the use of the Z t statistic to test the hypothesis that the 
average standardized abnormal return equals zero. Dodd and Warner (1983) find that the Z- 
statistic follows a unit-normal distribution. It is calculated as: Z t =  J~N ASARt 7°
To test for possible nonlinearity between the announcing firm and its industry, ordinary 
least squares (OLS) is used to estimate the quadratic functional coefficients in the cross- 
sectional regression. The eleven-day announcement window standardized cumulative abnormal 
returns of the firms having patent-grant announcements (SCARann) are regressed on the 
standardized cumulative abnormal returns of the industry (SCARIND) of the patent-grant
70 This standardization procedure makes it possible, in principle, that the daily average abnormal return (AR t ) and the average 
standardized cumulative abnormal return (ASAR t) will be of a different sign. This implies that different signs between the 
(AR t) and (Z t ) statistics are possible.
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announcing firm. The latter is expressed as a second-degree polynomial (SCARIND)2. The t- 
value of (SCARind)2 is -0.09, implying there is significant evidence against nonlinearity.7172
71 A.H. Studenmund, Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide. Second Edition, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 1992, 
pps. 662.
The regression results are reported in the appendix: Test for Linearity.
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Empirical Results:
A.1 Patent Grant Announcement Abnormal Returns
Table 2 presents the average daily (AARs) and cumulative (CAARs) abnormal returns for 
the sample of patent-grant announcing firms, the announcing firm’s industry, and the announcing 
firm’s close and distant industry competitors. The percentage of positive average abnormal 
returns and the 2-values for the mean difference of (AARs) between the patent-grant announcing 
firm and its industry and its close and distant industry competitors are presented too. The 
(AARs) and (CAARs) are calculated for the complete sample of 91 patent-grant announcing 
firms for the period -5 to +5 days surrounding the announcement day (t=0). The lower panel, 
Panel B, presents the window cumulative average abnormal returns and the related percentage 
of positive (CAARs) and the Z-values for the mean difference of (CAARs) between the patent- 
grant announcing firm and its industry, and its close and distant industry competitors over seven 
unique window intervals.
Panel B shows that the event interval of (-5,5) was the only one in which any significant 
market reactions were reflected. While this may be a wider window than is usually associated 
with many event studies, it is the unique nature of patent grant announcements which may justify 
the observed market response. In event study time, day 0 is the first time the patent grant 
announcement appears in the Official Gazette (OG). However, it is probably not the day on 
which the market finds out about the granted patents through traditional sources such as the Wall 
Street Journal(WSJ), the Dow Jones News Wire(DJNW), the Broad Tape or Barrons. 
Conceivably, there might be a lag between the time the patent grant is reported in the Official 
Gazette and when the market subsequently hears about it on the street.73 The results in Table 2 
indicate that a relatively short window does not capture the effect of the patent-grant 
announcement on either the patent-grant announcing firm and/or its industry competitors.
73 There have been two recent works recognizing the need to make use of relatively larger event window intervals. In the study 
where the board of directors of Nestle AG decided to allow their registered stock to be held by foreign investors, Loderer and 
Jacobs (1995) utilized event time intervals as long as (+353). in examining the stock market reaction to the Continental Illinois 
banking crisis, Swary (1986) focused on the eight weeks before and the twelve weeks after the interim rescue of Continental 
was announced.
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Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its Patent Grant and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's Industry and its close and distant Industry competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, its Industry and Its close and distant Industry competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industry and its close and distant 
Industry competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day-0) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992. There are 91 firms announcing the granting of patents.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%1
Industry Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference


















-5 0.0190 67 0.0147 82 0.32 0.0336 -0.65 0.0138 0.38
-4 0.0045 66 0.0023 67 0.25 0.0035 0.12 -0.0189 0.47
-3 -0.0508 41 -0.0207 57 -0.97 -0.0261 -0.78 -0.0189 -0.96
-2 0.0397 81 0.0326 93 0.39 0.0351 0.26 0.0434 -0.17
-1 0.0128 66 .0018* 70 0.97 0.0072 0.49 0.0104 0.18
0 0.0063 66 0.0081 76 -0.14 0.0115 -0.43 0.0002 0.46
1 -0.0116 71 0.0024 75 -0.92 0.0019 -0.87 -0.0016 -0.60
2 -0.0246 52 -0.0231 57 -0.10 -0.0201 -0.30 -0.0199 -0.29
3 0.0400 82 0.0387 88 0.07 0.0386 0.07 0.0258 0.61
4 -0.0200 58 -0.0004 62 -0.75 0.0014 -0.83 0.0027 -0.83
5 0.0188 72 0.0132 77 0.54 
Panel B
0.0205 -0.15 0.0169 0.15
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its Patent Grant and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industry and Its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm. Its industry and its close and distant industry competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industry and Its close 
and distant Industry competitors for seven window intervals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Diflerence Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Dlfference
Announcing Positive Finn's Positive Between Finn's Between Finn's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARfirm Close Industiy CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitors and Industiy and
Window CAARindUslry CAARdoM Competitors CAARd start
(-5 to 5] 0.0513 65 .0645” 73 -0.36 0.0805 -0.75 .0784” -0.64
(-3 to 0] 0.0309 64 0.0238 74 0.29 0.0286 0.09 0.0285 0.09
[-2 to 2] 0.0260 67 0.0214 74 0.21 0.0308 -0.22 0.0296 -0.16
(-2 to 0J 0.0601 71 0.0625 80 -0.07 0.0545 0.18 0.0567 0.11
(-1 to 0] 0.0155 66 0.0081 73 0.52 0.0183 -0.18 0.0053 0.67
[-1 to 1] 0.0099 68 0.0072 74 0.17 0.0169 -0.44 0.0107 -0.05
[0 to 51 0.0346 67 0.0322 72 0.10 0.0457 -0.40 0.0358 -0.04
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with a  Patent grant as reported In the Official Gazette of the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant Industiy competitors;
a. Film’s Technological Strength (TSRrJ  -  the number of patents granted to the firm times the Current Impact Index.
b. The Current Impact Index measures the Importance of a granted patent based on how often it is cited in other patents.
c. The median Industiy Technological Strength (rS R *** ,)« median of all of the firm TSRs within an Industry.
d. When the announcing firm and its competitor experience the same relative technological strength 
((TSRfoti)  > median (TSRmuss,) or (TSRfm) < median (TSRnun)) they are considered to be close rivals
with respect to technological strength. If the announcing firm and its competitor have different relative TSRs, they are 
considered to be distant rivals as one firm has a relative TSR above the median Industry and the other firm has 
a TSR below the median industry level.
(3) '*** C***, ■*") denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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The patent-grant announcing firm in the (-5,5) interval shows an insignificant positive 
abnormal return of 5.13% (Z value = 0.81). The announcing firm’s industry, however, has a 
significant abnormal performance of 6.45% (Z-value = 2.15). While the announcing firm 
registered insignificant abnormal returns, it does not mean that the market did not respond to 
patent-grant announcements. These results suggest that the competitive effect of the patent- 
grant announcements was not perceived by the market to be strong enough to stop industry 
competitors from free-riding on the technological information of the patent-grant. In examining 
the announcing firm's close and distant industry competitors, the evidence shows that distant 
rivals gained the most compared to both patent-grant announcing firms and close industry 
competitors. While the abnormal return of the distant industry rivals is a positive 7.84% and 
significant at a 5% level, the close industiy competitors earn an insignificant positive abnormal 
return of 8.05% (Z-value = 1.28). Several factors could cause this to occur. First, as previously 
noted, the market may believe that the announcing firm cannot fully protect its patented product. 
Second, while some distant competitors may depend on the announcing firm to grow, there may 
be others which can make use of their existing technological strength and research personnel to 
maneuver around the announcing firm. It may be that distant rivals’ research infrastructure 
allows it to be more adept at developing new products around the announcing firm’s patents. 
While announcing firms do not realize significant abnormal returns, the evidence seems to 
suggest that the market believes that distant competitors are the immediate beneficiaries of 
patents. For instance, Human Genome Sciences Inc., a firm that specializes in biotechnology 
products, is known to bring together top-level scientists for the purpose of finding genes that 
could revolutionize medicine and drug development. Their strategy is to quickly stake out a 
claim to any information that offers even a remote chance of patentability. Biotech leaders, 
however, such as Genentech Inc. and SmithKline, have been cited in the financial press to lack 
the investigative speed and the scientific knowledge of startups like Human Genome.74
The patent-grant announcing firms, as well as their industries, are diverse groups with 
respect to the degree of their technological strength and potential product commercialization. In
74 "Gene Hunters Go For The Big Score,” Business Week, August 16,1993.
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order to examine the possible specific-firm announcement effects and subsequent industry-wide 
effects, the sample of patent-grant announcing firms is broken out according to its respective 
industry groups. This is repeated for the patent-grant announcing firm’s close and distant 
industry competitors.
A.2 Patent-Grant Announcement Spillover Effects
Table 3 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns for the sample of patent-grant 
announcing firms, the announcing firm’s industry, and the announcing firm's close and distant 
industry competitors. The overall sample is split into thirteen unique industries. The CAARs are 
reported for the period -5 to +5 days relative to the patent-grant announcement day (t=0).
Across all thirteen industries, none of the announcing firms realize significant abnormal 
returns. These industry-specific results are consistent with the overall results implying, in 
general, that announcing firms, regardless of industry, do not gain substantial abnormal returns. 
The market’s reaction may be due to the uncertainty with respect to the ability of the announcing 
firm to convert patents into successful products that would enhance the firm’s cash flows. For 
example, in the area of genomics (i.e., the study of genes and their role in health and disease) 
SmithKline Beecham has been searching for a ‘blockbuster’ drug. No product has been 
developed yet, but by the year 2000 the firm says it will base 100% of its drug-discovery 
programs on such a development. The firm has filed nearly 200 of the 450 human-gene- 
based patent applications that have been filed in the U.S. The average time it takes for the firm 
to bring a new drug to market is 7.8 years.75 That may explain the market’s weak reaction to the 
announcing firm’s patent grants.
In sharp contrast to the patent-grant announcing firms, there seems to be strong 
evidence of a technological spillover at the expense of the announcing firm. Eight of the thirteen 
(62%) sample industries reflect significant positive abnormal returns. The aerospace industry 
shows an abnormal return of 1.34% and significant at the 5% level. The percentage of positive 
CAARs is 80%. The market valuation reaction to the automobile and electrical industries is .15%
75 “Is SmithKline's Future In Its Genes?”, BusinessWeek, March 4,1996.
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Table 3 
Patent Spillover Effects
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its Patent Grants 
And for the samples of the announcing firm's industry and its close and distant industry competitors 
For the eleven-day (-5,5) window interval around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of Patent grants. 
The time period covered is from 1987to 1992. There are 91 firms which announced the granting of patents.
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(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with a patent grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industry competitors:
a. A Firm's Technological Strength (TSRprm) =  the number of patents granted to a firm times the Current Impact Index.
b. The Current Impact Index (Cll) measures the importance of a granted patent based on how often it is cited in other patents.
c. Determine the median Industry (TSRmu* ,)  = median of all of the firm TSRs within an industry.
d. When the announcing firm and its competitor experience the same relative technological strength
( ( (TSRpm) > median (TSRm **,) or (TSRnm,) < median (T S R ,^ *,) they are considered to be close rivals with 
respect to technological strength. If the announcing firm and its competitor have different relative TSRs, they are 
considered to be distant rivals as one firm has a relative TSR above the median industry and the other firm has a 
TSR below the median industry level.
(3) '***' (’**', '*') denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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(Z-value= -2.68) and 1.05% (Z-value = 2.68), respectively. Both industries reflect that 68% of 
their CAARs are positive. The abnormal performance for the patent-grant announcing firms in 
the computer industry is 1.48% and significant at the 1% level. The respective positive CAAR 
percentage is 88%. With 73 percent positive CAARs, the food industry's abnormal return is 
0.28% and a Z-value o f -2.01. The healthcare industry, with 74 percent positive CAARs, 
registered positive abnormal market returns of 0.17% and significant at the 1% level. The 
patent-grant announcing firms in the machinery industry have 74 percent positive CAARs and 
incur abnormal returns of 0.12% at a level of significance of 5%. Finally, with 73 percent of its 
CAARs being positive, the abnormal market reaction in the telecommunications industry is .23% 
and significant at the 10% level. The market reactions in these eight industries suggest that 
industry competitors of patent-grant announcing firms benefit from an intra-industry spillover.
For instance, within the cellular or wireless phone market, AT&T commands sixty percent of the 
long-distance market and owns the largest cellular network. However, Sprint, one of AT&T’s 
competitors, is developing one of the largest wireless calling networks in the U.S. using the new 
personal communications services (PCS) technology. This new method uses the existing 
technology of delivering calls over radio waves, but is enhanced to an all-digital mode, which 
should prove to be less expensive to operate in the long-run. The recent deregulations in the 
telecommunications industry, allowing more competitors access to the technologies such as 
optical fibers and cellular calling, has seen the market react with shares of AT&T falling by 9.4% 
over three months.76 The competitor effect appears to be mitigated by the ability of competitors 
to free-ride on the existing technology of others.
Two of the industries, however, reflect significantly negative abnormal returns as industry 
rivals of the announcing firm were not able to free-ride on the patent-grant announcement. 
Chemicals registered an abnormal return of -0.49% which was significant at the 10% level. With 
41 percent of the CAARs being negative, the electronics industry showed a negative abnormal 
return of -0.03% at a 1% level of significance. These two industries present evidence in favor of 
the competitive advantage hypothesis. While competitors of the patent-grant announcing firms
78 “Telecom's New Age," Business Week April 8,1996.
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may be determined to match the product of the patent-innovating firm, the announcer may have 
the technological know-how to put its product or service together in a more effective manner.
This is the long-term attitude some market analysts believe will take place with respect to long­
distance phone carriers. The markets for local and long distance carriers, data transmission, and 
video services will be dominated by those few competitors having superior marketing skills,
77 78brand awareness, and technological expertise.
Finally, the three industries of fuels, industrials, and metals show, on average, that their 
market abnormal returns are insignificant. In essence, these industries are not affected by the 
patent-grant news of the announcing firm. These results seem to imply that the competitive 
effect associated with the announcing firm is offset by the free-rider effect of the announcing 
firm’s industry.
In summary, the evidence supports both the technological spillover effect and the 
competitive effect with regards to the patent-grant announcing firm’s industry and the 
announcing firm, respectively. Moreover, the spillover effect seems to exist in more industries 
than does the competitive effect. Finally, several industries are observed where neither of the 
two effects appear to be significant.
A.3 Close and Distant Competitor Abnormal Returns
More interesting than the aggregate industry reactions may be the market valuation 
response to the close and distant industry competitors of the announcing firm.79 The distinction 
between an announcing firm's close and distant rivals is based on each firm’s relative 
technological strength (as measured by the TSR variable) to its median industry TSR.80 Overall, 
the announcing firm's close industry competitors showed a positive abnormal return of 8.05% but
77 “The Giants Aren’t Sleeping,” Business W eek, April 8,1996.
7S Note: The negative abnormal returns for these two industries may be due to an outlier effect. Normally, one would expect the 
negative percentage of CAARs to outweigh the positive CAAR percentage. In both industries, the positive percentage of 
CAARs is greater than the negative percent.
79 The motivation for splitting the aggregate industry into close and distant rivals is based on the assumption that the ability to 
take advantage of a patent's technical information is not the same for every firm within an industry. For example, it is likely that 
the relative staff of engineers and research budgets vary among firms.
80 Announcing firms as well as industry competitors are classified as being close or distant according to the Technological 
Strength (TSR) criteria as explained in the 'Intra-Industry Sample Design’ section of this study.
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it was insignificant with a Z-value of 1.28. in comparison, the patent-grant announcing firm's 
distant industry competitors was associated with a positive market reaction of 7.84% and was 
significant at a five percent level. The evidence reveals that in eight of the announcing firm’s 
thirteen industries, the market abnormal returns of the announcing firm's industry was driven by 
the patent-grant announcing firm’s distant industry rivals. These results may be the result of a 
few factors. First, the ability of the announcing firm to safeguard its patented product may be of 
concern to the market. Second, there may be distant industry rivals who can invent around the 
patents of an announcing firm due to their existing research infrastructure. These distant rivals 
may be more adept at developing new products. This finding is further analyzed by examining 
competitor-specific results in each industry.
In the industries of electricals and healthcare, the significant positive industry results 
appear to spillover across both the close and distant rivals of the patent-grant announcing firm. 
Close rivals in the electrical industry had positive abnormal returns of 1.05% with a Z-value of 
2.12 while distant competitors had positive abnormal returns of 0.91% and a Z-value of 2.02. In 
the healthcare industry, close rivals incur positive abnormal market results of 0.26% and a Z- 
value of 2.40 while distant competitors earned 0.17% and a Z-value of 3.07. Two cases from the 
healthcare industry exemplify the positive market reactions to both close and distant rivals.
Many of the new products from the firm of Johnson and Johnson are based not only on their in- 
house technology but depends on the technological innovations of others. The firm states that 
due to the expense and sophistication of current technology, even the largest firms (J&J’s market 
value is over $19 billion) cannot afford to do it all themselves. In 1983, the firm bought the 
technology on disposable contact lenses and produced their patented Acuvue product. One 
strategy of the firm is to support basic research being done at universities and then step in at the 
final development stage. An example was the product Retin-A, developed at the University of 
Pennsylvania, an acne cream that could also repair wrinkles. The firm relies on its own research 
too. Recent innovations include a new birth-control pill which produces fewer side effects. The 
firm earned 28% of its 1988 sales from products it developed and introduced within the past five
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years.61 Also within the medical products area of healthcare is the Stryker Corp. It is small in 
comparison with Johnson & Johnson having a market value of $574 million. The firm has carved 
out a niche in developing surgical tools. They developed battery-powered saws and drills used 
by orthopedic surgeons, while drills made by most rivals are pneumatic and require air hoses. 
Stryker is also developing new coating compounds for artificial body-part replacements. The 
firm earns 58% of its sales from products that were developed in the past five years. Their net 
earnings have grown 22% per year, on average, for the past five years, while return on equity 
has averaged 19%.82 The evidence from these two industries suggest that the close and distant 
rivals are able to make use of specific product development strategies which enable them to 
successfully defend themselves and earn positive cash flows.
In the industries of automobiles, computers, food, and telecommunications, the 
announcing firm’s industry positive market reaction is driven by the distant industry rivals of the 
announcing firm. The close rivals in the auto industry earned insignificant positive abnormal 
returns, while the distant competitors enjoyed positive abnormal returns of 0.15% and significant 
at a 1% level. A similar market reaction is observed in the computer industry. Here, close 
competitors show insignificant positive abnormal returns of 1.37% with a Z-value of 1.67, while 
distant rivals earn a positive abnormal return of 1.54% with a significant Z-value of 1.91. This 
relationship is repeated in the food and telecommunications industries. The close rivals in the 
food industry reflect an insignificant positive abnormal return of .18% (Z-value = .76), while the 
distant competitors have a higher positive abnormal return of .22% and it is significant at the 5% 
level. In the industry of telecommunications the distant rivals show significant positive abnormal 
returns of .36% with a Z-value of 3.58, while close competitors earn insignificant positive 
abnormal returns of .47% with a Z-value of 1.01. Consistent among these four industries is the 
insignificant market reaction to close rivals and the significant abnormal returns to distant 
competitors. While, in general, the technological strength and product commercialization 
potential are predicted to be greater for close rivals relative to the distant rivals, the evidence
81 “Going Over the Lab Wall in Search of New Ideas," Business Week, Innovation in America, 1989.
82 “Carving A Niche in Surgical ToolsBusiness Week, Innovation In America, 1989.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
suggests that distant competitors benefit the most from patent-grant announcements. The 
market seems to believe that distant competitors are more adept at developing new products. 
This can be seen where relatively small distant rivals can make more efficient use of their 
research manpower which leads to effective product development. The Hughes-Delco 
Electronics Corp, a producer of original electrical parts for the auto industry, had their scientists 
work with engineers and marketers in an effort to link new technology to commercial 
opportunities. This setup is not typically found in most large corporations, where engineers and 
scientists rarely get involved in the business units. One result of this strategy is the prototype 
collision warning system that can spot oncoming cars and help avert collisions. The technology 
was borrowed from a night vision system developed for the military in the Persian Gulf War. It 
will be offered as an option on 1997 Cadillacs and Toyota Motor Corp hopes to offer it on their 
cars within five years.83 Another example of the ability of distant rivals to create and quickly take 
their product to market is found in the telecommunication’s industry fight over the building of the 
Information Highway. The major phone companies are saddled with antiquated computers for 
call-handling, maintenance, and billing. Nynex Corp. spends nearly $300 million a year to 
maintain mainframe software which is over ten years old. While some firms rush to produce 
Internet access software, the transportation lines are inefficient and costly to replace, given the 
market that these firms are targeting. Aware Inc., using detection methods it developed for the 
US military, is promoting a new technology that would allow the phone companies to obtain more 
capacity of existing twisted-pair phone wiring. In an effort to bring digital signals closer to rural 
homes, Advanced Fibre Communications developed the technology which would allow the phone 
companies to upgrade rural lines to handle high-speed communications signals.84 The 
significant positive market returns for these distant rivals may be due to their ability to profit from 
a complimentary role with the larger players in the industry. The market appears to reward firms 
that are perceived to be able to move quickly on changing technology and bring products to 
market.
83 “Liftoff,” Business Week, April 22,1996.
84 “Please Hold for New Technology," Business Week, April 8,1996.
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In the chemical and electronics industries, the announcing firms' industry losses are 
realized by the distant competitors. Specifically, while distant rivals in the chemical industry 
have negative market reactions of -0.31% with a Z-value of 2.46, close competitors show 
insignificant positive returns of 0.30% and a Z-value of 1.12. With respect to the electronics 
industry, distant competitors register negative abnormal returns of -0.3% with a significant Z- 
value of -4.02. The close rivals incur negative abnormal returns o f-0.2%, but it is insignificant at 
a Z-value of -1.66. Although the announcing firm does not seem to gain from patent grants, the 
evidence seems to support the view that distant rivals are more vulnerable than close rivals to 
technological (product) innovations. Dow Chemical Co., is the industry’s second-largest firm 
after Du Pont. It has developed an incubator system for new ideas and products and spends 
approximately $13,910 per employee on R&D which is twice the industry average. Dow formed 
an Innovation Development Dept, to seek out commercial opportunities where the firm can make 
use of its basic research. The reward can be seen in the number of new patents granted as 
Dow received 473 in 1988, compared with 330 in 1983. A promising product area involves 
ceramic compounds. Dow invested $500,000 to the basic research while the Innovation team 
found a lucrative application for military armor equipment. The firm was awarded a Defense 
Dept, contract worth more than $1 million. Dow still leads in more traditional chemical areas, 
such as supplying the commodities of chlorine and caustic soda. The firm’s competitive 
advantage has forced competitors such as Monsanto Co. and Hercules Chemical Co. to leave 
that segment of the business as they were continually hurt by the new technology of Dow. 
Another instance where distant rivals may face overbearing competition is in the area of 
electronics and specifically where integrated circuits, random-access memory, and 
microprocessors are concerned. The pioneer in memory chips and microprocessors, Intel Corp. 
follows a strategy of moving fast and following up with ever-better designs. Their most 
successful innovation has been the 80386 chip which is used in the personal computers of IBM 
and its clones. The firm is always trying to develop new chipmaking technology to increase its 
competitive advantage. By getting its manufacturing and design teams to work together, Intel 
has reduced the average time it takes for a new chip to go from conception to profitability from
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64 weeks to 52 weeks. Competitors such as Sun Microsystems Inc. and MIPS Computer 
Systems Inc. have been forced to try other approaches to chipmaking (i.e., the RISC approach), 
but Intel's new 486 still has some advantages over this approach and Intel also has been able to 
make its own competing RISC chips. By patenting new technology and speeding up product 
commercialization, Intel hopes to keep computer designers from going over to any new 
technology developed by its rivals.85 While Intel’s market value increased 76% from the 
previous year, rivals such as Micron Technology and Analog Devices saw their values fall by 
more than 20% between 1988 and 1989.86
Finally, within the industries of aerospace, fuels, industrials, machinery, and metals, 
there are no industry-wide effects across either the close or distant competitors. The close rivals 
in the aerospace industry show insignificant positive abnormal returns of 1.24% (Z-value = 1.65) 
while distant competitors have a positive return of 2.29% and an insignificant Z-value of 0.98. 
Similarly, in the fuels industry, the close competitors reveal positive abnormal returns of 3.15% 
and close rivals had positive abnormal returns of 2.93%. Both market returns were statistically 
insignificant. The close and distant rivals in the Industrials group show insignificant negative 
abnormal returns with Z-values of -0.90 and -0.43 respectively. In the machinery industry, the 
close and distant competitors incurred insignificant positive abnormal returns of 0.13% and 
0.18% with respective Z-values of 1.33 and 1.66. In the Metals industry, close rivals had a 
positive abnormal return at a Z-value of -0.03, while distant rivals had an insignificant negative 
abnormal return of -.10% at a Z-value of 0.15. The evidence suggests that the patent-grant 
announcements do not signal any significant growth potential for firms in these specific 
industries.
In summary, the evidence shows that the market reaction to the firm’s announcement of 
patent-grants is insignificant, but the effect of the patent-grant announcement on the announcing 
firm’s industry is significantly positive in most industries with the exception of chemicals and 
electronics. On average, patent grant announcements do not seem to raise the market value of
85 “It takes More Than A Good Idea," BusinessWeek, Innovation In America, 1989.
88 ‘The Business Week 1000,” 1990 Special Bonus Issue.
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the announcing firms. This implies that patents do not strengthen the competitive advantage of 
the announcing firms. On the contrary, the announcing firm’s industry competitors appear to 
significantly benefit from technological spillovers from the patent-grant announcing firm. A 
further breakout of the announcing firm’s industry into its close and distant industry competitors, 
suggests that distant rivals gain the most from patent-grant announcements. This could be due 
to several strategic factors. First, the ability and the extent to which announcing firms can 
defend their patents from rivals may concern the market. Second, some distant rivals may 
depend on the technology of announcing firms to grow as their research infrastructure may be 
adept at developing new products. This can be seen in battery innovations that power electronic 
products such as pocket phones, laptop computers, handheld TVs, and electronic organizers. 
Companies such as Hitachi Maxell, Sanyo Electric, and Toshiba placed their research emphasis 
on nickel-cadmium and nickel metal hydride battery innovations. Sony Corp. failed to duplicate 
the latter products, but through a team of one hundred engineers and scientists perfected a new 
battery innovation based on the use of lithium ion which left their major rivals trying to catch-up 
to this new technology. However, Valence Technology, a small California firm, obtained nearly 
$35 million in support from Delco Electronics and the US Advanced Battery Consortium and 
developed a new battery technology based on lithium polymer. Motorola Inc. signed an 
agreement to purchase $100 million worth of Valence batteries for use in their cellular phones. 
The reaction by the market was positive, as the stock price rose from an initial $8 per share to 
$21 per share, which gave the startup a market value over $400 million.87 Another approach by 
rivals in utilizing existing technology can be seen in the Copper industry. Phelps-Dodge Corp. 
was one of the pioneers in a technology known as solvent-extraction/electrowinning, or SX/EW, 
which is used to process lower-grade ores. The process reduced copper refining by 40 cents a 
pound. Arimetco International Inc., a small startup was able to benefit from the technological 
advances of others. The firm was able to build four SX/EW plants as the entrenched market 
positions of the traditional billion-dollar multinationals eroded due to “shared’’ technological 
advances. After just three years, the firm earned a profit over $400,000 compared with a loss of
87 “The High-Voltage Rivalry In Batteries," Business Week, February 15,1993.
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$120,000 in the previous year.88 This is analogous to the case where distant rivals utilize their 
technological know-how to make use of existing innovations and can successfully compete with 
patent-grant announcing firms.
88 “Copper Entrepreneurs Tap Lucrative New Technology,” Wall Street Journal, page B2, November 3,1992.
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B. Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis
On average, the patent-grant announcing firm experienced an insignificant market 
valuation reaction to its patent-grant announcement. However, the effect of the patent-grant 
announcement on the announcing firm's industry is significantly positive. When industry 
competitors are split into groups of close and distant rivals, according to their relative 
technological strength, the evidence reveals that distant rivals gained higher abnormal returns 
than the patent-grant announcing firm and its close industry competitors. To gain further insight 
into the cross-sectional variation of stock price response by industry competitors to the 
announcement of patent grants,89 a multiple-regression analysis is conducted to examine the 
influence of several other factors. Ordinary least squares (OLS) are used to estimate the 
coefficients of the cross-sectional regression. This relates the standardized cumulative abnormal 
return of patent-grant announcing firms (SCARann) on the standardized cumulative abnormal 
return of the industry of the patent-grant announcing firm (SCARIND) and four additional variables 
that control for possible effects of the patent-grant announcing firm’s technological strength 
(TSRann), its patent activity ratio (PARANN), its skilled employee pool (EMPANN), and its market 
concentration (M C ^ 1™).90
While the number of patent grants may be important to a firm, it is more likely that the 
quality of the patents has greater meaning to the market. For the announcing firm, a 
technological strength variable (TSRANN) is calculated as the product of the number of patents 
granted to the announcing firm for a specific year and the firm’s Current Impact Index (Cll).91 
The current impact index measures the importance of the firm’s granted patents based on how 
often they are cited in all other granted patents. A current impact index of 1.3 infers that the 
announcing firm’s granted patents were cited 30% more often than the overall industry. Next the 
median of all the firm TSRs in an industry is calculated and is used as the industry benchmark. 
This is labeled as the median (TSRIND). The technological strength of the announcing firm
99 An additional motivation of the regression analysis is the Competitive and Free Rider hypotheses which hold that the 
valuation effect of patent grant announcements is dependent upon both of these effects. Results can be positive, negative, or 
zero depending on the degree to which one effect offsets the other.
90 Several other variables were tested such as patent activity, R&D intensity, asset size, market-to-book value ratio, P/E ratio, 
and net income. None of these variables had an impact on the abnormal returns of the patent-grant announcing firm.
91 The source for patent citations is the intellectual property database, IFI/Plenum Data Corp and the databank, DIALOG.
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(TSRann) is a dummy variable equal to one, if the announcing firm’s technological strength 
exceeds its median industry technological strength (TSRIND). If a firm is known as having its 
patents widely cited in subsequent patent applications, the market should react favorably to the 
technological reputation of that firm. On the other hand, if an announcing firm’s patents are 
seldom cited, the market reaction may be unfavorable.
The ability of a firm to better defend its competitive position may lie in its propensity to 
patent. In other words, associated with an announcement date is the 'bundling' of a group of 
patents by the announcing firm. This ‘bundle’ effect is represented by the announcing firm’s 
Patent Activity Ratio (PARann). This variable is calculated as the ratio of the total number of 
patents granted to the firm to the firm’s number of individual announcement dates. The PAR 
variable can be interpreted by the market as a defensive measure as the bundle of announced 
patent-grants may act to protect a firm’s competitive advantage. Here, the market is expected to 
respond more favorably to those firms having relatively higher PAR values. On the other hand, 
the PAR variable can work against the firm in one of two ways. First, the market may interpret it 
to be a signal that the announcing firm is overinvesting. Second, the PAR may suggest to the 
market that the patents are no good and the firm must compensate through the announcement of 
patent bundles. Here, a relatively high PAR value may be met with a less favorable market 
response.
For a firm to win against its competition, some sort of technological advantage may be 
needed. When there is a jump in technology, firms which can only refine their existing products 
are likely to fall behind their competitors. For a firm to harness the ever changing technology, it 
must have adequate human resources in place. A good example, among others, is SmithKline 
Beecham Corporation which has a $1 billion R&D budget with 4,200 scientists and R&D staffers. 
Their people produce at least two novel drugs and one vaccine per year, as nearly 200 of the 
450 human-gene-based patent applications filed so far in the US have come from SmithKline.92 
Therefore, the number of skilled employees (EMPANN) is used as an alternative measure of 
technological strength. This EMPANN variable is estimated from the Business Week R&D
82 “Is Smithkline’s Future In Its Genes,” BusinessWeek, March 4,1996.
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Scoreboard.93 Next, the median of all of the firm EMPs in an industry is calculated and is used 
as the industry benchmark. This is labeled as the median (EMPIND). The employee pool of the 
patent-grant announcing firm (EMPANN) is a proxy for the skilled staff that it has available for 
research relative to its industry. It is a dummy variable equal to one, if the announcing firm’s 
skilled employee pool exceeds its median industry skilled employee pool (EMPIND). If the 
announcing firm is known to have a competent research staff, the market should react favorably 
to the technological strength of that firm. On the other hand, if the announcing firm is known to 
lack an adequate skilled research staff, the response by the market may be unfavorable.
in their work on innovation and firm market value, Ooukas and Switzer (1992) find the 
announcing firm’s market concentration to explain its gains from engaging in technological 
innovations reflected by the firm’s R&D spending. The market concentration variable used to 
study whether the announcing firm's market structure is a relevant factor in explaining its gains 
associated with patent-grant announcements. It is calculated as the median four-firm sales 
concentration (MC4) over the 1985 -1992  period for the major four-digit SIC industry in which 
the firm operated. The median concentration ratio for the patent-grant announcing firm (MC4ANN) 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the announcing firm is one of the four top-ranked firms in the 
industry, in terms of sales.
B.1 Empirical Results
Table 4 lists OLS estimates of the coefficients in cross-sectional regressions which relate 
the eleven-day (-5,5) standardized cumulative abnormal return of patent-grant announcing firms 
(SCARann) to the standardized cumulative abnormal return of the patent-grant announcing firm’s 
industry (SCARIND), the announcing firm’s technological strength (TSRANN), its patent activity ratio 
(PARANN), its employee pool (EMPANN), and its market concentration (MC4ANN). The entire 
sample includes ninety-one patent-grant announcing firms covering the time interval of 1985 - 
1992.
93 The announcing firm's number of employees is obtained from the “R&D Scoreboard." Business Week, June 28,1993.
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Table 4 documents a systematic and significant positive relationship between the 
announcement effect of the patent-grant announcing firm and the standardized cumulative 
abnormal return of the patent-grant announcing firm’s industry (SCARIND). On average, this 
variable appears to be significant at a 0.01 level (t-value of 4.22). This result confirms the earlier 
findings that while the firm-specific effect may be insignificant, the industry of the patent-grant 
announcing firm seems to gain substantially from such patent-grant announcements. This 
suggests that the announcer’s competitive advantage drawn from patents is relatively weak, and 
therefore industry competitors are able to free-ride and dilute the announcing firm’s competitive 
advantage. This evidence is consistent with the view that there is a technological spillover. This 
is evidenced in several industries including the household goods industry. For instance, Mr. 
Coffee Inc. experienced declining sales and market share as competitors brought out ‘similar’ 
products to its patented products. In its defense, the firm increased its spending on new product 
development by nearly 15% over the previous year’s budget. Facing strong rival pressure in the 
photography industry, Eastman Kodak Co. spent $30 million on their patented Photo CD system. 
This was its first new product since the disk camera.94 In the early 1980s, Hewlett Packard’ (HP) 
technological prowess was known by the market and it helped the firm to be a leader in the 
computer industry. By the late 1980s, HP had lost substantial ground to faster-moving rivals 
such as Sun Microsystems Inc. and Compaq Computer Corporation, who developed their own 
new products or invented ‘around’ those of the industry leaders. While many cases of spillover 
exist, not all firms’ competitive effect is offset by free-riders. In fact, just the opposite can occur. 
In the computer-chip industry, Intel invented the microprocessor 20 years ago and holds a near 
patent monopoly on the computer industry’s key chip yet, it still tries to propel its technological 
capabilities faster than its competitors. Intel’s philosophy is to attempt to make its products 
obsolete before rivals can benefit from previously developed technology. The Market appears to 
approve Intel’s patent strategy and this may explain why over the period of 1992 to 1993 its 
market value increased 18% as profits and sales rose 115% and 50%, respectively.95
M “To Outpace Rivals, More Firms Step Up Spending on New-Product Development," Wall Street Journal, October 28,1992.
85 “The Nimble Giants," Business Week, March 28,1994.
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Table 4
OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-sectional Regression Estimates and Independent Variables (predicted 
sign in parenthesis) from regressing the Eleven-day (-5,5) Announcement Period Standardized Cumulative 
Abnormal Return for Patent-Grant Announcing Firms (SCAR"**) on the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal 
Return of the Industry of the Announcing Firm (SCAR*®), the Announcing Firm's Technological Strength (TSR"**), 
Its Patent Activity Ratio (PAR"**), its Employee Base (EMP"**), and its Market Concentration (MC4“ **);













































































N ■ There were 18,258 observations.
SCAR**0 *  Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Industry of the Announcing Firm.
TSR"** « Dummy Variable equal to 1 If the announcing tirm's Technological Strength (TSR"**) exceeds its median
industry Technological Strength (TSR*®).
Technological strength (TSR)» the number of Patents granted times the Current Impact Index.
The Current Impact Index measures the Importance of a granted patent based on how olten ft Is cited 
in other patents.
If the (TSR"**) > median (TSR*®) then It is considered as having a relatively High Technological Strength.
If the (TSR"**) < median (TSR*®) then It is considered as having a relatively Low Technological Strength.
PAR"** -  Dummy variable equal to 1 If the announcing Ann's Patent Activity Ratio exceeds Its median Industiy 
Patent Activity Ratio (PAR*®).
EM P"**« Dummy variable equal to 1 1f the announcing Ann's Skilled Employee Base (EMP"**) exceeds its median 
Industry Skilled Employee Base (EMP*®).
This Is a proxy for the skilled staff that the patent-grant announcing Arm has available for its technical research. 
MC4"** ■ Dummy variable equal to 1 1f the announcing Arm is one of the four top-ranked Anns In the industry, in terms of sales. 
‘ Significantat0 .1 .level; "Significantat0 .05 level; *"Signiffcantat0.01 level.
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In examining the effect of the technological strength of the announcing firm (TSRANN) on 
the abnormal market returns of the patent-grant announcing firm, the second regression reveals 
a positive and significant relationship. On average, the variable seems to be significant at a 0.10 
level (t-value of 1.84). If the intellectual property of the announcing firm is cited more often than 
that of its industry rivals, the announcing firm’s reputation may be seen by the market as a 
measure of its relative technological vigor. In the mid-1970s, some of SmithKline Beckman’s 
patents were associated with more than 15 citations per year. That number fell to nearly 4 
citations per year from 1978 to 1981. At the end of the decade, the company was taken over by 
Beecham. Meanwhile, rival Merck & Co. prospered as some of their patents were cited nearly 
ten times a year for the first half of the 1980s.96
Regression four reveals a positive and significant relationship between the patent activity 
ratio (PARann) of the patent-grant announcing firm and its abnormal market returns. This 
variable may act as a defensive measure for firms attempting to maintain their competitive 
advantage. It represents announcements of patent 'bundles' which may elicit positive market 
reactions as patent-grant announcing firms try and signal their commitment to establishing a 
competitive edge in their industry. This is evidenced in the Biotech industry where SmithKline 
Beecham has more compounds awaiting approval than any other rival firm. The firm has filed 
nearly 44% of all human-gene-based patents in the U.S. Between March 1995 and March 1996, 
the market has pushed the stock price of SmithKline up nearly 50%.97 The management at 
Lanxide Corp, a materials company, follow the belief that the only way to win in their industry is 
to have a technological advantage. The firm is pioneering the work in advanced reinforced 
ceramics and metals. Within the first eight years of this startup, it has generated more than 2000 
patents. Lanxide has entered into agreements with Alcan Aluminum Corp and Du Pont Co. to 
commercialize their innovative products.98
98 "Patents: Hiden Agenda," The Economist, November 20,1993.
97 “Is SmithKline's Future In Its Genes?,” BusinessWeek March 4,1996.
98 "He's A Materials Boy,” Business Week, The Quality Imperative, Bonus 1991 Issue.
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The employee pool variable (EMPANN) in regression six, as expected, proved to be 
significant at the 0.05 level." The relative strength of the patent-grant announcing firm to 
allocate skilled employees towards research and product commercialization appears to be 
positively related to the announcing firm’s abnormal returns. This result is consistent with the 
general belief by managers that it is their staff of top-level scientists that give them the prowess 
at the process of gene sequencing, patentability, and product commercialization and is 
exemplified in firms such as Human Genome Sciences Inc., Genentech Inc., and Amgen Inc.100
The (MC4ann) variable is used to see if higher abnormal returns were experienced by 
announcing firms operating in highly concentrated industries. It proved to be an insignificant 
influence.
B.2 Cross-Sectional Regression: Close and Distant Competitors
The documented gains to the announcing firm’s industry competitors implies that 
competing firms are able to benefit from technological advances even though the intellectual 
property is protected by patents. On average, the industry competitors of the announcing firm 
have the technological competence to free ride. This paper posits that there is a distinction 
between competitors based on their relative technological prowess. The ability to free-ride or 
effectively protect technical knowledge should vary across firms. Table 5 presents the OLS 
estimates of coefficients in a cross-sectional regression from regressing the eleven-day (-5,5) 
announcement period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return for patent-grant Announcing 
Firms (SCARann) on the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the Industry Close 
(SCARcls) and Distant (SCARDIS) competitors. The first regression 1 reveals a positive 
coefficient of 19.6% significant at the 10% level (t-value = 1.82) for the close competitors. While 
the close competitors do benefit, the spillover gain is smaller than that of distant rivals of the 
announcing firm. The results of the second regression 2 show that distant rivals have a positive
99 This paper argues that there may be some multicoliinearity between TSR and EMP. Hence, while both proved to be 
significant, the EMP is treated as an alternative to TSR in explaining the movement in the abnormal returns of the announcing 
firm.
100 “Gene Hunters Go for the Big Score," Business Week, August 16,1993.
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Table 5
OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-sectional Regression Estimates and Independent Variables 
From regressing the Eleven-day (-5,5) Announcement Period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return 
For the Patent-Grant Announcing Firm (SCAR"*1) on the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Of the Industry Close (SCAR0-*) and Distant (SCARDls) competitors; 1987-1992 (t-values in parentheses). 
There are 91 Firms which Announced the Granting of Patents.
Regression 



























N = There were 18,258 observations.
SCAR01-® = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Close Industry Competitors of the Announcing Firm. 
SCARdis = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Distant Industry Competitors of the Announcing Firm. 
Process for determining close and distant industry competitors:
a. Determine a firm's Technological Strength (TSRpm) 3 the number of patents granted times the Current Impact Index.
b. The Current Impact Index measures the importance of a granted patent based on how often it is cited in other patents.
c. Determine the median Industry Technological Strength (TSRim^,) = median of all firm TSRs within an industry.
d. When the announcing firm and its competitor experience the same relative technological strength
( (TSRFim) > median (TSRi„d„*,) or (TSRr™) < median (TSRi^,,)) they are considered to be close rivals 
with respect to technological strength. If the announcing firm and its competitor have different relative 
technological strengths, they are considered to be distant rivals as one firm has a relative TSR above the median 
industry and the other firm has a TSR below the median industry level.
* Significant at 0.1. level; "Significant at 0.05 level; ***Significantat0.01 level.
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coefficient of 45% significant at a 1% level (t-value = 3.44). However, the results, based on both 
industry competitors, show that the close industry competitors, on average, are inversely affected 
by their competitor's patent-grant announcements. These results suggest that close rivals may 
rely on a strategy of developing new patented technology as their means of achieving a 
competitive advantage. These competitors do not invent around an existing technology but 
actually seek to create new competing innovations. This strategy is evidenced in battery 
technology. The industry was surprised when SLM International said it would introduce a 
breakthrough technology which would allow disposable alkaline batteries to be recharged. 
Competitor firms claimed that it was a dangerous process and could not be successfully done.
On the day of the announcement by SLM, its stock price rose nearly 15% in intraday trading 
before it settled at about 2% over its pre-announcement level. At the same time, Duracell 
International, the leading manufacturer in single-use alkaline batteries, saw its share price fall as 
much as 12% on the day of the announcement. SLM claims that their battery-recharge system is 
safe and effective and they have a patent pending for the product.101 There also exists a strong 
rivalry in the rechargeable battery industry. Nearly twenty-five years ago, the nickel-cadmium 
batteries were introduced for use in portable appliances. In the early 1990s, a new technology, 
nickel metal hydride, was introduced which was less toxic and offered about 50% more energy 
output by weight than the cadmium battery. The technology and subsequent product 
commercialization was carried out by firms such as Hitachi Maxell, Matsushita, Sanyo Electric, 
and Toshiba. However, Sony Corp. failed to take advantage of the new technology and could 
not successfully enter that market. Its solution and strategy was to develop an entirely new 
battery technology. This new battery innovation was lithium ion and allowed Sony’s batteries to 
be smaller, lighter and possess a higher energy output in watt-hours than the competing nickel 
metal hydride technology.102
101 “SLM Seeks Added Spark With Recharger," Wall Street Journal.
102 “The High-Voltage Rivalry In Batteries,” Business Week, February 15,1993.
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In sharp contrast, the distant rivals benefit from technological spillovers. The SCARdis 
coefficient of 53.9% was significant at a 1% level (t-value = 2.94). The implication of this result 
may be that distant competitors gain by inventing around the granted patent. For instance, in the 
healthcare industry, Mylan Laboratories faced heavy competition on its patented diuretic drug 
called Maxzide. Rival competitor, Bolar Pharmaceutical increased its market share by relying 
on a generic version of the drug. While Forest Laboratories, a generic drug maker, has used 
licensing agreements for several analgesic and respiratory drugs. In contrast to these firms, 
Ascend communications, a maker of high-speed digital switching equipment, relies on the 
success of competing Internet access providers. No matter which online company dominates the 
battle for the Internet access market, Ascend will be able to service the firm, its market value 
rose 665% by the end of 1995.103 The latter case exemplifies the strategy used by a rival firm 
who’s technology complements the innovations of other industry competitors.
The evidence from the last regression reveals that upon the patent-grant 
announcements, the distant rivals seem to be benefiting the most. In general, the market 
perception may be that the distant competitors are better equipped to free ride on the 
announcement (as discussed above) than the close rivals. How do the close and distant 
competitors react when the market valuation on the announcing firm is positive or negative? In 
order to further investigate the nature of the technological spillover between the patent-grant 
announcement effect and the close and distant rivals, Table 6 presents the OLS estimates of 
coefficients in a cross-sectional regression from regressing the eleven-day (-5,5) announcement 
period Positive and Negative (SCARann) on the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns of 
close (SCARcls) and distant (SCARdis) competitors. Panel A reports the results when the 
announcing firm realizes a positive abnormal return. Close competitors register a negative but 
insignificant coefficient of -.40% (t-value of -0.02), but it is less negative than the distant 
competitor reaction of -3.59% (t-value of .-0.17). There is no apparent spillover to the industry 
rivals when the market reacts positively in response to the announcing firm's patent grants. 
However, the more interesting results happen when the announcing firm realizes negative
103 “Good Things In Small Packages," BusinessWeek, March 25,1996.
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Table 6
OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-sectional Regression Estimates and Independent Variables 
From Regressing the Eleven-day (-5,5) Announcement Period Positive and Negative Standardized 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Patent Grant Announcing Firms on the Standardized Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns of Close (SCAR01-8) and Distant (SCAR018) Competitors. There are 91 Firms 




SCARCLS SCAR018 R-square F
Panel A; Positive SCAR"*1 



















Panel B: Negative SCAR**1




















SCAR*" = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Patent-Grant Announcing Firm.
SCAR”-8 = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Close Industry Competitors of the Announcing Firm. 
SCAR018 = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Distant Industry Competitors of the Announcing Firm. 
Process for determining close and distant industry competitors:
a. Determine a firm's Technological Strength (TSRnm,) = the number of patents granted times the Current Impact Index.
b. The Current Impact Index measures the importance of a granted patent based on how often it is cited in other patents.
c. Determine the median Industry Technological Strength (TSRin*,*y) = median of all of firm TSRs within an industry.
d. When the announcing firm and its competitor experience the same relative technological strength 
((TSRFirm) > median (TSRm ,,*,,) or (TSRFhn) < median (TSR,,^^)) they are considered to be close rivals
with respect to technological strength. If the announcing firm and its competitor have different relative TSRs, they are 
considered to be distant rivals as one firm has a relative TSR above the median industry and the other firm has 
a TSR below the median industry level.
* Significant at 0.1. level; “ Significant at 0.05 level; ‘ "Significant at 0.01 level.
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abnormal returns. These results are shown in Panel B. The close industry competitors register 
insignificant negative abnormal returns o f -15.5% (t-value = -0.94). The distant industry 
competitors, on the other hand, experience significant positive abnormal returns of 52.3% (t- 
value = 2.79). Contrasting the results in both panels, there are several important observations 
concerning the patent-grant announcing firm and its close and distant industry competitors. First, 
there appears to be a stronger spillover when the SCARann is negative than when it is positive.
In order to gain a better understanding as to why the competitive effect works for some firms but 
not for others, the announcing firm’s technological strength variable (TSRANN) and its patent 
activity ratio (PARann) are analyzed. For those patent-grant announcing firms having a positive 
standardized cumulative abnormal return (SCAR), the average technological strength variable is 
108. The mean TSRANN for the announcing firms with negative SCARs is 247 and is significantly 
greater (p-value of 0.0081) than the TSR variable associated with firms having positive SCARs. 
The TSR variable may be construed by the market to act as an offensive tool to enhance a firm’s 
competitive advantage. If this is true, it is not the usual expectation that a significant TSR would 
be associated with patent-grant announcing firms having negative SCARs. However, these 
results are better understood after analyzing both the patent-grant announcing firm’s TSRANN with 
its patent activity ratio (PARann). The mean PARann associated with those patent-grant 
announcing firms having a negative SCAR is 4.69 and is statistically significant (T = -2.63) from 
the mean PARann of 2.68 associated with those announcing firms having positive SCARs. While 
PAR can be viewed as a defensive measure for a firm to maintain its competitive advantage, the 
evidence suggests that, on average, the market views the announcing firm’s patent activity as 
working against the firm. In other words, the market may view the announcing firm as having too 
many patents which can indicate possible overinvesting by its managers. While the market may 
believe in the announcing firm’s technological vigor, it may have doubts concerning the firm’s 
ability to successfully commercialize all of its product innovations thus bringing about negative 
abnormal returns. Second, there seems to be a wealth gain to industry competitors and 
specifically to the distant rivals. Finally, the greater the gain enjoyed by distant competitors, the 
greater the chance the announcer will experience negative returns. These results seem to be
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consistent with this paper’s competing hypotheses and the manner in which industry competitors 
are classified. While some competing firms do not benefit from the patent activity of the 
announcing firm, there are others who rely on enhancements of existing technology in order to 
realize significant gains. The evidence suggests that reliance on just patent protection is not 
enough to stop competitors. It may require the ability of a firm’s propriety product to erect high 
barriers to entry or the firm’s possession of superior innovations over their industry rivals. An 
example can be seen in the computer/communications industry where the core computing 
hardware and networking architecture has been developed and is controlled by a few large 
corporations such as IBM, Microsoft, Novell and Intel. Nutek USA Corp., a computer startup, 
claims it has the technology to legally mimic Apple Computer Inc.’s Macintosh computer. It 
claims it developed the critical hardware and software from scratch over a four year period. The 
Mac compatibles would sell for at least $300 less than comparable Apples and the firm also 
plans to offer a model which runs both MAC and IBM-compatible software. While clone-makers 
have been able to steal away nearly twenty percent of IBM's share in the market since 1984, 
Apple has continued to be the sole provider of Macintosh technology as the firm has over 90 
patents on its various products. Even though the engineers of Nutek studied the publicly 
available specifications, the firm claimed that what they created was a Mac ‘workalike’ and 
wholly original.104 Here, the market may determine the financial success of upstarts and smaller 
competitors, such as Nutek, on their ability to harness and embellish on existing technology and 
innovation. Another example involves an innovation which has transformed the pharmaceutical 
industry and specifically the area of gene research. The idea of gene sequencing (reading the 
code of each DNA strand) is not new, but the established industry firms claimed it could not be 
done with any speed or in any great volume. An upstart, Human Genome Sciences Inc (HGS), 
however, patented a new technology, the CDNA Approach, which was able to take cells and read 
their genetic code. In addition to sequencing, the firm has filed patents on the new genes 
discovered in the process. The managers believe that the aggressive patent stance will pay off 
in the form of being the first firm to commercialize its biotech drugs. In turn, the actions of HGS
104 “You’ve Got Company Mac," Business Week, March 22,1993.
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have prompted other rivals such as Incyte Pharmaceutical, Bristol-Meyers Squibb, and Amgen to 
enter into this market. Each one has developed a ‘new’ sequencing technology based on the 
CDNA Approach pioneered by Human Genome Sciences Inc.105 The evidence suggests that the 
market favors those competitor firms who are adept at modifying existing technology and 
subsequently move towards product discovery and commercialization.
105 “The Gene Kings,” Business Week, May 8,1995.
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C. Post Patent-Grant Announcement Performance
While the evidence shows that the market reaction to a firm's announcement of a patent- 
grant is insignificant, the effect of the patent-grant announcement on the announcing firm’s 
industry is significantly positive. The technological spillover appears more prevalent as the 
abnormal returns of the patent-grant announcing firm turns negative. However, several firms 
benefit from their own announcements while their competitors do not. If the industry, on 
average, benefits more than the announcing firm, is it worth the effort for firms to secure 
patents? Is it just a zero-sum game? Hence, does the performance of the patent-grant 
announcing firm improve over a post-announcement period? In an attempt to answer this 
question, the post patent-grant performance analysis is undertaken.
C.1. Industry-Adjusted Post Patent-Grant Performance
Following the work of John and Ofek (1995) and others,106 the earnings of the 
announcing firms for three years following the patent-grant announcement date are examined. 
The patent-grant announcing firm’s subsequent earnings performance may provide insight as to 
whether, after a firm is granted a patent or patents, benefits accrue to the announcing firm.
Three measures of earnings performance are used. The first is return on sales (ROS) where the 
net income available to common shareholders is divided by sales. The second is return on 
assets (ROA), where net income available to common shareholders is divided by assets, and 
finally, the return on equity (ROE) is measured as net income available to common stockholders 
divided by common equity. The data was obtained from the Compustat Annual Industrial 
Survey. The first step in the analysis is to determine the three earnings performance measures 
for all of the firms within the patent-grant announcing firm’s industry. Next, the median industry 
earnings performance ratios are calculated and are used as the industry benchmark. Industry- 
adjusted (ROS), (ROA), and (ROE) are calculated as the differential between the announcing
108 John and Ofek (1995) study the long-run performance of firms involved in divestiture. Loughran and Ritter (1995) look at 
the future performance of new issues, Meggison, Nash and Randenborgh (1993) look at the financial operating performance of 
newly privatized firms, and Blackwell, Marr and Spivy (1990) study the long-run performance of those firms associated with 
plant closings.
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firm's performance ratios and the median industry performance ratios. The Mann-Whitney test is 
used to examine the significance of differences between the performance of the patent-grant 
announcing firms and its industry.107
Table 7, Panel A , reports industry-adjusted median abnormal earnings for patent-grant 
announcing firms for three years following the patent grant announcement (year 0). For all three 
annual intervals following the patent-grant announcement, the (ROA) of the announcing firm was 
significant at conventional levels (p-value of .0007, .0004 and .0015 respectively). However, the 
(ROS) and the (ROE) results were not statistically different from zero108 in the (Years 0 to 1), 
(Years 0 to 2), and (Years 0 to 3)109 periods. Even though patent-grant announcements are met 
with an insignificant market response, the results show that the earnings of the announcing firm 
tend to improve each year after the announcement. The implication is that the benefits 
associated with patent-grant announcements accrue over time.110
One possible explanation for this accrual of benefits, may depend on the link between 
the patent-grant announcing firm’s technological strength and its subsequent product 
commercialization. Panel B of Table 7 reports the sample of patent-grant announcing firms 
when classified as high and low technological strength groups. The grouping of the announcing 
firms is based on the following criteria. First, the median industry technological strength (TSRIND) 
is calculated as the median of all firm TSRs within an industry. When the announcing firm’s 
(TSRann) is greater than the median industry’s (TSRIND) then the announcer is part of the high 
technological strength (HTSRANN) group. If the announcing firm’s (TSRANN) is less than the 
median industry’s (TSRIND) then the announcing firm is part of the low technological strength 
(LTSRANN) group. A  firm’s technological strength, as measured by its TSR variable, may be 
interpreted by the market as being a critical offensive weapon utilized by corporations in order to 
enhance their relative competitive advantage. The expectation is that those patent-grant
107 The Mann-Whitney test controls for the probability of (falsely) rejecting the null hypothesis when the null is true. This error 
probability does not depend on the underlying population of e's.
This test was also performed with Industry Means. Similar to the test using Industry Medians, the earnings performance of 
the patent-grant announcing firm was significant from zero in the case of (ROA).
109 Year O indicates the year of patent-grant announcement. Years 1,2, and 3  indicate the one, two, and three year periods 
following the patentgrant announcement.
110 The patentgrant announcing firms in the sample averaged nearly 5  patents per each announcement date over the tested 
time period. There was a definite propensity to patent over a consecutive-year span.
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Table - 7
Industry-Adjusted Post Patent-Grant Performance 
Profitably Changes of the Patent-Grant Announcing Firms over a Three Year Post Announcement 
Period. Median significance tests are based on the Mann-Whitney Test, p-values shown in 
Parentheses. '***’, ('***, '*') Denotes Significance at the 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level.
ROS* ROAb ROE®
MEDIAN MEDIAN MEDIAN
Panel A: Industry-adjusted Post Patent-Grant Performance of Entire Sample.
Years 0 to 1d 0.37 1.48*** -0.72
(.3495) (.0007) (.3718)
Years 0 to 2 0.50 1.68*** -0.34
(.2559) (.0004) (.6935)
Years 0  to 3 0.39 1.64** -0.365
(.4014) (.0015) (.7302)
Panel B: The sample of Patent-Grant Announcing Firms split into High and Low TSR Groups.®
B1: High TSR Group
Years 0 to 1 -0.10 0.70 -0.40
(.8691) (.1702) (.6859)
Years 0  to 2 0.20 1.10* -1.40
(.6689) (.0808) (.1777)
Years 0 to 3 0.30 1.25* -0.50
B2: Low TSR Group
(.5976) (.0845) (.7008)
Years 0 to 1 0.10 0.9 -0.10
(.8925) (.1409) (.8925)
Years 0 to 2 0.15 1.20* -1.20
(.7729) (.0980) (.2959)
Years 0 to 3 0.00 1.00 -1.20
Notes:
(.9634) (.1541) (.2913)
* The difference between the change In the announcers net income available for common shareholders divided
by sales from year 0 to year t and the median change in the industiy. 
b The difference between the change In the announcers net Income available for common shareholders divided 
by assets from year 0 to year t, and the median change In the industiy. 
c The difference between the change In the announcers net income available for common shareholders divided 
by common equity from year 0 to year t and the median change in the Industiy. 
a Year 0 indicates year of Patent-Grant announcement. Years 1, 2, 3 indicate the one, two and three year periods 
following the Patent-Grant announcement.
• The Technological Strength Ratio (TSR):
The announcing firm's TSR ratio (TSR"*) Is the number of its granted patents times a current Impact Index 
where the index Is a measure of how significant a firm's patents are based on the frequency with which they 
are cited In other patents. In other words, how often they are used as the foundation for other innovations.
The median Industry Technological Strength (TSRlmi1B4y)» median of all firm TSRs within an industry.
If (TSRANN) Is greater than the median (TSR*®) then the announcing firm Is part of the High TSR group (HTSR""). 
If (TSRAm) is less than the median (TSR*®) then the announcing firm is part of the Low TSR group (LTSR"*).
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announcing firms with relatively high technological strength (HTSRANN) will outperform those 
firms associated with low technological strength (LTSRANN) over the post-announcement period.
Panel B1 and B2 report the annual post-period results for the High TSR and Low TSR  
groups respectively. In the two year and three year periods following the patent-grant 
announcement, the ROA for the HTSRANN group was significant at a 0.10 level with p-values 
of .0808 and .0845 respectively. The Low TSR group also had a ROA significant at a level of 
0.10 (with a relatively weaker p-value of .0980) for the (0 to 2) year period, but showed an 
insignificant performance ratio for the (0 to 3) year interval. While the ROS earned by both the 
High and Low TSR groups were not statistically significant from zero, the HTSRANN outperformed 
the LTSRann over both the (0 to 2) and (0 to 3) time intervals. In the case of the ROE 
performance ratio, both groups reported negative results in all three post announcement 
intervals. While the results are comparable for the periods of (0 to 1) and (0 to 2), the LTSRANN 
group had a substantially less negative performance ratio for the post annual period of (0 to 3). 
The results seem to suggest that over time the patent-grant announcing firm benefits from 
patents granted. Market reactions appear to indicate that it is worth a firm’s efforts to secure the 
granting of patents.
C2. Performance Comparison Between High & Low TSR Groups
The evidence from this analysis seems to indicate, particularly with respect to the ROS 
and ROA ratios, that a stronger earnings performance may be associated with the high TSR 
group. The question then becomes whether it can be established that the earnings of the 
(HTSRann) class is systematically more significant than those of the low TSR group. This point is 
examined in Table 8 which reports the performance comparison between the patent-grant 
announcing firms with high technological strength versus those with low technological strength. 
This comparison is conducted over three-year post-announcement periods. The difference 
between the performance ratios of the (HTSRANN) and (LTSRANN) is measured by the Mann- 
Whitney test. While the ROS and ROE earnings ratios of the High TSR group was 
systematically greater than that of the Low TSR group, the comparison of these earnings
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Table - 8
Performance Comparison between Patent-Grant Announcing firms with a High TSR (HTSRANN)e 
And Patent-Grant Announcing firms with a Low TSR (LTSRANN) over a three-year Post 
Announcement Period. The Median Significance Tests are Based on the Mann-Whitney Test, 
(p-vaiues shown in parentheses. ’***', ('**','*') Denotes Significance at the 0.01, (0.05, 0.10) level.
YEARS ROS® ROAb ROEc
Oto 1d 0.000 0.00 1.10
(.8857) (.9810) (.4484)
Oto 2 0.000 -1.30 0.70
(.9536) (.9884) (.6450)
Oto 3 -0.350 -0.20 0.00
(.5692) (.6604) (.9468)
Notes:
* The difference between the change in the (HTSR*w)‘s median net income available for common 
shareholders divided by sales from year 0 to year t and the median change in the ratio
for the (LTSFO .
b The difference between the change in the (H TS R ^ 's  median net income available for common 
shareholders divided by assets from year 0 to year t, and the median change in the ratio 
for the (LTSR"*4).
c The difference between the change in the (H T S R ^ ’s median net income available for common 
shareholders divided by common equity from year 0 to year t, and the median change 
in the ratio for the (LTSR"**). 
d Year 0 indicates year of the Patent-Grant Announcement. Years 1,2, 3 indicate the one, two, 
and three year periods following the Patent-Grant Announcement.
* The announcing firm's TSR ratio (TSRAW<) is the number of its granted patents times a Current Impact
Index where the index is a measure of how significant a firm's patents are based on the 
frequency with which they are cited in other patents, in other words, how often they are used as the 
foundation for ether innovations. The median industry TSR ratio is labeled as the median (TSRIND).
It equals the median of all firm TSRs within an industry. If the (TSRAW4) > median (TSR1*®) then the 
announcing firm is part of the High TSR group (HTSRAf*4). If the (TSR*"1) < median (TSRino) 
then the announcing firm is part of the Low TSR group (LTSRANN).
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performance ratios revealed no statistically significant differences between these two groups of 
announcing firms. For the ROA ratio, the Low TSR group outperformed the High TSR group for 
the two time intervals of (0 to 2) and (0 to 3), but neither are statistically significant from zero.
As discussed earlier, the industry competitors of the patent-grant announcing firm, on 
average, appear to benefit more than the announcing firm. The question was raised whether or 
not it was worth the effort for firms to pursue the securing of patents. An industry-adjusted post 
patent-grant performance analysis was conducted and revealed several interesting results. Of 
the three performance ratios (ROS, ROA, ROE) measured over three post-announcement period 
intervals, the evidence suggests that over the (0 to 1), (0 to 2), and (0 to 3) annual periods, the 
patent-grant announcing firm's ROA was statistically significant. While the other two ratios were 
not significant, they generally increased over time. The results suggest that the patent-grant 
announcing firms benefit from patents. Further, it was posited that the technological strength of 
a firm can act as an offensive weapon in creating a competitive advantage. In order to test if the 
TSR of the announcing firm has any long-term impact, the sample of patent-grant announcing 
firms was split into High and Low TSR groups. On average, the High TSR group outperformed 
those firms having a relatively lower technological strength, and the performance of the patent­
grant announcing firms improved after the announcement for a period of three years. The 
evidence suggests that it is worth the effort to secure patent grants. Over a three year time 
interval, the performance of the patent-grant announcing firms significantly improved.
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VI. Summary and Conclusion
Market valuation effects of patent-grants have not been previously addressed in the literature. 
Further, the importance of patents as a means of magnifying the growth opportunities of the firm has 
been overlooked. The only way to win in the marketplace may be to have a technological advantage. 
As technology progresses, the firms who are content to refine their existing products may fall behind 
their competitors. Prior to this paper, the intra-industry technological spillover effects of patent-grants 
had not been examined at all. This paper is the first to investigate the intra-industry effect of patent­
grant announcements on the market valuation of both the announcing firm and the announcing firm's 
relative industry competitors.
Overall, the evidence shows that the market reaction to the firm’s announcement of patent 
grants is insignificant. The response by the market may be due to its concern with the ability of the 
announcing firm to convert patents into successful products, thereby improving the firm’s cash flow. 
This is not to say, however, that the market does not reward innovators. This paper finds the patent­
grant announcement effect to be positively related to the relative technological strength of the firm.111 
For instance, Alza Corp., which specializes in drug delivery systems and pharmaceutical products, 
has had much success with its patented hypertension-fighting drug called Procardia XL and has nearly 
30 products in various stages of development waiting for federal approval. Between 1989 and 1990, 
sales increased 21% while earnings for the firm rose by 31% .112 While the firm-specific effect is 
insignificant, the impact of the patent-grant announcement on the announcing firm’s industry is 
significantly positive. The evidence does not imply that the market fails to respond to patent-grant 
announcements. More likely, the competitive effect of the announcing firm is regarded by the market 
as not being strong enough to prevent industry competitors from free-riding on the technological 
information of the patent-grant. Hence, the evidence suggests that industry rivals of patent-grant 
announcing firms benefit from an intra-industry technological spillover. Further, the findings reveal 
that the nature of competitor interaction has a significant influence on the announcing firm. This paper 
posits that it is the firm's technological know-how that distinguishes it from other industry competitors.
111 The Patent Activity Ratio (PAR) and Skilled Employees (EMP), two alternative variables, are also found to have a significant positive 
relationship with the announcing firm.
112 "The Little Giants,” BusinessWeek, The Business Week 1000, Special 1991 Bonus Issue.
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In analyzing the industry interaction between the announcing firm and its close and distant rivals, the 
evidence indicates that the market believes that distant competitors are the immediate beneficiaries of 
patents. These results may be influenced by the factors that in addition to the announcing firm's 
inability to fully safeguard its patent-grants, the maiket recognizes the ability of certain industry rivals 
(i.e., distant competitors) to utilize their existing technological know-how and research infrastructure to 
invent around the patent of the announcing firm and achieve initial product commercialization.
Further, the strength of the spillover effect seems to depend on whether the announcing firm 
earns positive or negative abnormal returns. Specifically, the technological spillover seems to be 
strongly associated with patent-grant announcing firms who earn negative abnormal returns. In this 
case, the distant competitors earn significant positive returns while insignificant returns are realized by 
close rivals. In order to gain a better understanding about the strength of a firm’s competitive effect, 
the patent-grant announcing firm’s technological strength (TSR) and its patent activity (PAR) were 
analyzed. The TSR variable may be interpreted by the market as being an offensive tool for the 
announcing firm in establishing its competitive advantage. In contrast, while the PAR variable can be 
considered a defensive weapon to maintain a competitive position, the evidence suggests that, on 
average, the market views the announcing firm’s patent activity as working against the firm. A 
relatively high patent activity may signal to the market that the announcing firm has too many patents. 
Therefore, the firm will not be able to convert them to product commercialization. Additionally, the 
patents may be seen by the market as evidence of overinvestment activity by management. While 
the market recognizes the announcing firm’s technological prowess, the results may imply that the 
firm's TSR is outweighed by the uncertainty of new product development and possible project 
overinvesting.
If industry competitors, on average, gain more than the patent-grant announcing firm, the 
question becomes whether or not it makes sense for firms to secure patent-grants. In order to 
determine if the performance of the patent-grant announcing firm improves overtime, a post patent­
grant performance analysis was undertaken. Three performance ratios (ROS, ROA, ROE) were 
measured over three post-announcement periods ranging from one year to three years after the 
announcement of a patent-grant. The evidence revealed that the patent-grant announcing firm’s ROA
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was significant over all three intervals. The ROS and ROE associated with the announcing firm, while 
not significant, generally increased over the same time period. Additionally, in order to test if the 
technological strength (TSR) of the announcing firm has any long-term impact, the sample was 
divided into high and low TSR groups. On average, the High TSR groups outperformed the Low TSR 
groups. With respect to both the aggregate sample and the High/Low TSR classifications, the patent­
grant announcing firms appear to be rewarded by the market as their performance improved after the 
announcement for a period of three years.
In conclusion, the findings of this paper appear to be consistent with the competing 
hypotheses and the manner in which industry rivals are classified. The results imply that a firm’s 
reliance on just patent protection to combat its competitors is not enough, and that it may require the 
patent-grant announcing firm to either erect high barriers to entry or possess superior innovations over 
their industry rivals. While some competitors do not gain from the patent activity of the announcing 
firm, there are other rival firms which pursue new technologies or utilize their research infrastructures 
to invent around existing patents. The evidence suggests that the market rewards those competitor 
firms who are competent at converting existing technology and who consequently move towards 
product discovery and commercialization.
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Appendix: Test of Linearity 127
Quadratic Functional Coefficients in Cross-sectional Regression Estimates and Independent Variables from 
Regressing the (-5,5) Announcement Window Period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 
Firms with a Patent Grant Announcement (SCARWW) on the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return of the 
Industry of the Announcing Firm (SCAR*®) and this variable expressed as a Second-Degree Polynomial 
(SCAR*®)2. ^ ?  -1992 (t-values in parentheses). There are 91 firms announcing their Patent Grants.
Notes:
Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with a Patent Grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO).
SCARIND = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Industry of the Announcing Firm.
(SCARIND)2 = The Quadratic of (SCARIND).
* Significant at 0.10 level; “ Significant at 0.05 level; -“ Significant at 0.01 level.
Adjusted
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Aerospace Industiy
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, Its Industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing Arm's industiy and As close and distant 
Industiy competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the Initial announcement 
(day-0) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992. There are 91 Arms announcing the granting of a patent.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%>
Industiy Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-DAforence Announcing Z-Diflerence Announcing Z-DATerence


















-5 0.0005 50 0.0041 88 -0.85 0.0037 -0.73 0.0061 -1.36
-4 0.0034 75 0.0006 63 0.65 -0.0002 0.58 -0.0013 -0.47
-3 -0.0092 38 -0.0008 88 -1.43 -0.0037 -0.89 -0.003 0.79
-2 0.0029 75 0.0055 100 -0.41 0.0055 -0.42 0.0099 -1.04
-1 0.003 75 .0.0019 88 0.28 0.0023 0.18 0.0029 -0.95
0 -0.0025 63 -0.0004 75 -0.38 0.0009 -0.60 -0.0009 0.02
1 -0.0047 50 -0.0003 38 -1.04 41.0017 -0.71 0.0001 -0.30
2 -0.0066 88 -.0035* 88 -0.59 -0.0025 -0.82 -0.0029 -1.12
3 0.0035 50 0.0042 88 -0.16 0.0052 -0.41 0.0084 -1.02
4 0.0061 88 0.0013 88 0.67 0.0003 0.80 0.0017 0.60
5 0.004 63 0.0037 75 0.08 
Panel B
0.0052 -0.30 0.0063 -0.58
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the Arm announcing As Patent activAy and for the 
samples of the announcing Arm's industiy and As close and distant Industiy competAors, the percentage of 
posAive CAARs for the announcing Arm, As industiy and As close and distant industiy competAors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industiy and As close 
and distant industiy competAors for seven window intervals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992. There are 91 firms announcing the granting of a patent.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry CompetAors: Technical Strength Based 
Firm % Announcing % Z-DUference Announcing Z-Difierence Announcing Z-DIAerence
Announcing PosAive Firm's PosAive Between Firm's Between Firm's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industiy CAARs C AARflrm Close Industiy C AARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and CompetAors and Industiy and
Window CAARindJstry CAARdosa CompetAors CAARd slant
[-5 to 5] 0.0003 65 .0134" 80 -0.70 0.0124 -0.65 0.0229 -1.18
[-3 to 0] -0.0069 63 .0043* 88 -0.80 0.0038 -0.77 0.0084 -1.05
[-2 to 2] -0.0089 70 .003" 78 -0.90 0.0026 -0.87 0.0053 -1.06
[-2 to 0) 0.0023 71 0.006 88 -0.34 0.0089 -0.61 0.0112 -0.75
[-1 toO] -0.0008 69 0.0008 82 -0.27 0.0021 -0.46 0.0024 -0.56
(-1(0 1) -0.0054 63 0.0016 72 -0.90 0.0013 -0.82 0.0016 -0.89
[Oto 51 -0.0007 67 0.0053 75 -0.63 0.0074 -0.82 0.008 -0.86
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated wAh a Patent grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competAors:
a. The Technological Strength of a firm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average CAation Ratio Index.
b. The CAation Ratio Index measures the importance of a patent based on how ofien patents are cAed In other patents.
c. Determine the Industiy average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along wAh the individual firm's TSRs.
d. A firm with a TSR above the industry average is said to be close to all other 'above' Amis while A will consider 
those firms wAh a TSR below the Industry average as being distant competAors.
e. A firm with a TSR below the industry average is said to be close to aA other 'below' firms while A will consider 
those firms wfih a TSR above the industiy average as being distant competAore.
(3) '***■ (•**■, •*•) denotes slgnAlcance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Automobile Industiy 129
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's industry and its close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, Its industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industiy and its close and distant 
industiy competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the Initial announcement 
(day»0) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Daily Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%)
Industry Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difierence Announcing Z-Difference


















-5 0.0003 71 0.0002 100 -0.20 0.0004 -0.68 0.0005 0.46
-4 0.0005 71 0.0001 71 0.63 0.0000 -0.48 0.0001 -0.51
-3 -0.001 14 -.001*" 43 -1.26 -.001" -2.06" -.001*” -1.26
-2 0.0018 100 0.0012 86 1.10 0.0012 -0.65 0.0016 -0.57
-1 -0.001 57 .000" 71 -0.93 0.0003 -0.02 .0001" -0.77
0 0.0001 71 0.0005 71 -0.75 0.0004 -0.08 0.0004 -0.75
1 0.001 71 0.0000 86 -0.18 0.0000 0.03 0.0000 -0.05
2 0.0000 57 -.001" 57 -0.01 -.001* 1.32 -.001" 0.83
3 0.001 71 0.001 86 -0.66 .0014*" -0.28 0.001 0.19
4 -0.001 57 .000* 71 -0.66 0.0000 -0.85 0.0000 0.37
5 0.0003 57 0.0003 86 -1.20 
Panel B
0.0002 -1.63 0.0002 -1.42
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the film announcing its Patent Grants and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, Its industiy and its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industiy and its close 
and distant industiy competitors for seven window internals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Diflerence Announcing Z-Difference
Announcing Positive Firm's Positive Between Finn's Between Firm's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industry CAARs CAARflrm Close Industiy CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitors and Industry and
Window CAARjnddsrry CAARdose Competitors CAARd start
(-5 to 5] 0.002 63 .0015*" 68 -1.14 0.0016 -1.40 .0015*" -0.89
[-3 to 0] -0.0002 61 .0008* 68 -0.86 0.001 -1.82* 0.0011 -1.79
[-2 to 2] 0.0017 71 0.0011 74 -0.34 0.0009 0.32 0.001 -0.6
[-2 to 0] 0.0011 76 0.0018 76 -0.32 .0019" -0.50 0.0022 -1.36
[-1 to 0] -0.001 64 0.0006 71 -0.85 0.0007 -0.07 0.0005 -0.91
[-1 to 11 0.0003 66 0.0005 76 -0.73 0.0006 -0.07 0.0003 -0.81
£0 to 51 0.0013 64 0.0009 76 -0.97 0.0006 -0.30 .0003* -0.23
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 Is the first announcement date associated with a Patent grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competitors:
a. The Technological Strength of a firm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average Citation Ratio Index.
b. The Citation Ratio Index measures the importance of a patent based on how often patents are cited in other patents.
c. Determine the Industry average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along with the Individual firm's TSRs.
d. A firm with a TSR above the industiy average is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a TSR below the industiy average as being distant competitors.
e. A firm with a TSR below the Industiy average is said to be close to all other 'below' firms while It will consider 
those firms with a TSR above the industry average as being distant competitors.
(3) •***■ (•**•, •*■) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Chemical Industry 130
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's Industiy and Its close and distant Industry competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, Its Industry and Its close and distant Industry competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industry and Its close and distant 
industry competitors tor the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day>0) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Daily Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%)
Industry Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dlfferance Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difference


















-5 -0.0010 43 -0.0039 43 0.80 -0.0010 0.00 -0.0038 0.78
-4 -0.0010 57 -0.0026 57 0.39 -0.0007 -0.07 -0.0012 0.05
-3 -0.0032 29 -0.0036 43 0.09 -0.0046 0.31 -0.0038 0.13
-2 0.0051 100 0.0043 86 0.21 0.0034 0.49 0.0077 -0.77
-1 0.0022 86 0.0018 86 0.15 0.0014 0.31 0.0025 -0.11
0 -0.0018 57 -0.0040 43 0.89 -0.0018 0.00 -0.0060 1.91*
1 0.0014 57 -0.0035 71 0.34 -0.0014 0.00 -0.0015 0.01
2 -0.0003 71 -0.0015 71 0.46 -0.0025 0.82 -0.0024 0.79
3 0.0078 100 0.0079 100 -0.03 0.0061 0.46 0.0085 -0.20
4 0.0033 86 0.0038 86 -0.12 0.0020 0.29 0.0030 0.07
5 0.0020 86 -0.0005 86 0.61 
Panel B
0.0021 -0.03 -0.0030 -0.24
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its Patent Grants and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's Industry and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, its industiy and its close and distant Industiy competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and its close 
and distant industiy competitors for seven window Intervals around the two-dey announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industiy Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Finn % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference
Announcing Positive Firm's Positive Between Firm's Between Firm's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARflrm Close Industiy CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitors and Industry and
Window CAARindusJry CAARdose Competitors CAARdstart
[-5 to 5] 0.0087 70 -.0049* 70 0.94 0.0030 0.39 -.0031** 0.83
[-3 to 0] 0.0014 68 -0.0018 65 0.55 -0.0005 0.39 -0.0013 0.54
(-2 to 2] 0.0021 74 -0.0038 71 0.84 -0.0003 0.36 0.0003 0.26
[-2 to 0] 0.0042 81 0.0015 72 0.52 0.0035 0.16 0.0038 0.10
[-1 to 0) •0.0003 72 -0.0022 65 0.72 -0.0004 0.04 -0.004 1.51
(-1 to 11 -0.0019 67 -0.0066 67 0.64 -0.0028 0.11 -.0057* 0.49
(Oto 5] 0.0062 76 -0.0004 76 0.57 0.0032 0.25 -.0038* 0.83
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) DayO is the first announcement date associated with a Patent grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant Industry competitors:
a. The Technological Strength of a firm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average Citation Ratio Index.
b. The Citation Ratio Index measures the Importance of a patent based on how offen patents are cited In other patents.
c. Determine the Industiy average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along with the individual firm's TSRs.
d. A firm with a TSR above the Industiy average is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a TSR below the Industiy average as being distant competitors.
e. A firm with a TSR below the Industiy average is said to be close to all other 'below' firms while It will consider 
those firms with a TSR above the industry average as being distant competitors.
(3) ’***• C*", •*■) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level
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Appendix: Abnomial Returns for Computer Industry
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's Industry and Its close and distant industry competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, its industry and Its close and distant industry competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industry and Its close and distant 
industry competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day>0) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%)
Industry Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Finn % Announcing % Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-DHference
Announcing Positive Firm's Positive Between Finn’s Between Firm's Between
Its Patent AARs Industiy AARs AARflrm Close Industry AARflrm Distant AARflrm
Day Activity and Competitors and Industiy and
AARlndustry AARdose Competitors AARdstart
-5 0.0036 67 0.0047 100 -0.31 0.0032 0.11 0.0021 0.40
-4 -0.0033 50 0.0015 100 -1.33 0.0004 -0.98 -0.0018 -0.38
-3 -0.0023 50 -.0007* 83 -0.42 0.0008 -0.70 0.0076 -2.38**
-2 0.009 100 -.0007 100 0.49 0.0036 0.90 -0.0002 1.52
-1 0.0051 83 -.0007** 83 1.47 0.0002 1.19 .0069* -0.47
0 0.0061 83 0.0057 100 0.11 0.0041 0.56 -0.0005 1.88
1 -0.0013 67 0.0006 100 -0.68 0.0012 -0.88 -0.0064 1.30
2 -0.0055 67 -.006*** 17 0.09 -0.0013 -0.69 .0015** -1.23
3 0.0008 83 0.0017 100 -0.54 0.0010 -0.12 0.0012 -0.18
4 0.0027 83 -0.0001 83 0.75 -0.0002 0.70 -0.0004 0.85
5 0.0054 100 0.0046 100 0.30 0.0040 0.50 0.0052 0.08
Panel B
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its Patent grants and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industiy and Its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing Ann, its Industiy and its close and distant Industry competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industiy and its close 
and distant industiy competitors for seven window Intervals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Finn % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difference
Announcing Positive Finn's Positive Between Firm's Between Firm's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARflrm Close Industiy CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitors and Industry and
Window CAARtndrstry CAARdosa Competitors CAARdstart
[-5 to 5) 0.0191 75 .0148*** 88 0.33 0.0137 0.39 .0154* 0.29
[-3 to 0J 0.0181 79 0.0100 92 1.07 0.0093 1.11 0.0111 0.93
[-2 to 2] 0.0116 80 .0052** 80 0.90 0.0071 0.60 0.0059 0.81
1-2 to 0) 0.0199 89 0.0112 94 1.00 0.0081 1.37 0.0131 0.78
[-1 toO] 0.0115 83 0.0052 92 1.84 0.0050 1.85 0.0057 1.69
[-1 to 1] 0.0093 78 0.0047 94 1.36 0.0051 1.16 0.0047 1.35
(0 to 5] 0.0067 81 .0047** 83 0.34 0.0050 0.31 0.0046 0.38
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 fs the fiist announcement date associated with a Patent grant as reported In the Official Gazette of the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant Industiy competitors:
a. The Technological Strength of a firm equals the product of the average number of patents granted In the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average Citation Ratio Index.
b. The Citation Ratio Index measures the importance of a patent based on how often patents are cited In other patents.
c. Determine the Industry average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along with the individual firm's TSRs.
d. A firm with a TSR above the Industiy average is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a TSR below the industiy average as being distant competitors.
e. A  Ann with a TSR below the industiy average Is said to be close to all other 'below' firms while It will consider 
those firms with a TSR above the Industiy average as being distant competitors.
(3) •***• (•**•, '*■) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal returns for Electrical Industiy
Panel A
Daily average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the Arm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's Industiy and Its close and distant Industiy competitor, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, Its Industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industiy and its close and distant 
industiy competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day-0) of a Patent giant; 1987 -1992.
Daily Average Abnoimal Returns. AARs l%!
Industiy Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-DlfTerence Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dilference


















-5 0.0038 86 0.0036 100 0.06 0.0048 -0.30 0.0021 Q.46
-4 0.0053 86 0.0026 100 0.94 0.0021 1.09 0.0038 0.51
-3 -0.0299 14 -.008*** 0 -1.05 -.01** -0.96 -.011** -0.91
-2 0.0082 100 .0111** 100 -1.28 0.0114 -1.18 0.0135 -1.99*
-1 -0.003 43 -.0038*** 43 0.24 -.002** -0.29 -.0039** 0.27
0 0.0063 86 0.0051 100 0.27 0.0050 0.29 0.0054 0.21
1 0.0019 71 0.0028 100 -0.30 0.0035 -0.46 0.0044 -0.75
2 -0.009 0 -.009*** 0 0.00 -.01** 0.41 -.012** 1.06
3 0.009 100 0.0093 100 -0.10 0.0099 -0.28 0.0108 -0.52
4 -0.0075 29 -.008*** 0 0.17 -.006** -0.46 -.008** 0.15
5 0.0031 86 0.0036 100 -0.16 
Panel B
0.0035 -0.13 0.0042 -0.34
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the film announcing Its Patent Grants and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industiy and Its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, its Industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitor, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industiy and Its close 
and distant industiy competitor for seven window intervals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industiy Competitor: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Dilference Announcing Z-Difference
Announcing Positive Firm's Positive Between Firm's Between Firm's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARflrm Close Industiy CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitor and Industiy and
Window CAARndustry CAARdose Competitor CAARd slant
[-5 to 5] 0.0106 64 .0105*** 68 0.01 .0105** 0.01 .0091** 0.21
(-3 to 01 0.0055 61 0.0039 61 0.37 0.0055 0.00 0.003 0.55
[-2 to 2] 0.0059 60 0.0056 69 0.05 0.0067 -0.13 0.0062 -0.05
[-2 to 0] 0.0149 76 0.0129 81 0.38 0.0146 0.06 0.0134 0.28
[-1 to 0] 0.0032 65 .0015* 72 0.27 0.0037 -0.08 0.0003 0.45
[-1 to 1] 0.0051 67 0.0041 81 0.18 0.0052 -0.02 0.0047 0.07
[0 to 5] 0.0031 62 .0044** 67 -0.24 0.0048 -0.31 0.0055 -0.45
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 Is the f ir t  announcement date associated with a Patent grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant Industry competitor:
a. The Technological Strength of a firm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 year 
and the 5-year average Citation Ratio Index.
b. The Citation Ratio Index measures the Importance of a patent based on how often patents are cited in other patents.
c. Determine the Industiy average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along with the individual film's TSRs.
d. A firm with a TSR above the Industiy average is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while It will consider 
those firms with a TSR below the Industiy average as being distant competitor.
e. A firm with a TSR below the Industiy average is said to be close to all other 'belov/ firms while It will consider 
those Anns with a TSR above the industiy average as being distant competitor.
(3) •***• f" ',  "•) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Electronics Industry
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the Arm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing Ann's Industiy and As close and distant industiy competAors, the percentage of posAive AARs 
for the announcing Arm, As Industiy and As close and distant Industiy competAors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing Arm and the announcing Aim's Industiy and As close and distant 
Industiy competAois for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day>0) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%)
Industry CompetAois: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-DAference Announcing Z-Differenc<
Announcing PosAive Finn's PosAive Between Firm's Between Finn's Between
Its Patent AARs Industiy AARs AARflrm Close Industiy AARflnm Distant AARllrm
Day ActivAy and CompetAors and Industiy and
AARrndLBliy AARdosa CompetAors AARdstant
-5 -0.001 43 -.001 * " 43 0.62 -.00 1 * " 1.29 -.001* " -0.19
-4 .0005* 86 0.0004 86 -0.39 .0007" -0.32 0.0004 0.60
-3 0.0000 43 -.0000 43 0.20 -.0000 1.77 -.0000 2 .22"
-2 .001" 86 0.0009 86 0.18 0.0009 -0.35 0.0011 0.38
-1 -.002" * 14 -.001 * " 14 -0.49 -.0 01" -1.25 -.001” * 0.00
0 -0.001 43 -.001* " 43 -0.31 -0.001 -1.98* -.001* " -1.58
1 .0006" 86 0.0005 86 -0.63 .001* " -1.36 0.0006 -0.20
2 0.000 71 -.0000 71 0.60 -.0000 -0.24 -.0000 -0.51
3 .0011" * 86 0.0007 86 0.41 0.0007 0.83 0.0003 -0.17
4 -.001" 29 -.001* " 29 0.48 -.00 1 *** 0.3 -.001* " 0.87
5 -0.001 57 -.001" 57 0.87
{_Oq 2 .22" -.001* 0.52
Panel B
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the Arm announcing As Patent Grants and for the
samples of the announcing Arm's industry and As close and distant Industiy competAors, the percentage of 
posAive CAARs for the announcing Aim, As industiy and As close and distant industry competAors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing Arm and the announcing Ann's industiy and As close 
and distant industiy competAors for seven window intervals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry ComnetAors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference
Announcing PosAive Finn's PosAive Between Firm's Between Firm's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARflrm Close Industry CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
ActivAy and CompetAors and Industiy and
Window CAARlndjstry CAARdosa CompetAors CAARdstart
[-5 to 5] -0.002 59 -.003"* 59 0.40 -0 .002 0.26 -.003*” 0.59
[-3 to 0] -0.001 47 -.001” * 47 -0.15 -0.001 -1.07 -.001" 0.50
[-2 to 21 -0.001 60 -.001" 60 -0.16 -.0000 -1.68 -.0000 -0.48
[-2 to 01 -0.001 48 -.001*” 48 -0.41 -0.001 -1 .8* -.001* " -0.37
[-1 to 0] -.002*” 29 -.002" * 29 -0.81 -.002* " -2 .01" -.002.” * -0.64
[-1 to 1] -0 .002 48 -.001* " 48 -1.56 -0.001 -3.03*” -.001" * -0.74
[0 to 5] -0.001 62 -.001" * 62 0.04 -0.001 -0.07 -.002*” -0.62
Notes for Panels A and 6 :
(1) Day 0 Is the Arst announcement date associated wAh a Patent grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competAors:
a. The Technological Strength of a Arm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average CAation Ratio Index.
b. The CAation Ratio Index measures the Importance of a patent based on how offen patents are cAed In other patents.
c. Determine the Industiy average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along wAh the Individual Ann's TSRs.
d. A Ann wAh a TSR above the Industry average is said to be close to all other 'above' Anns while A will consider 
those Anns wffh a TSR below the Industiy average as being distant competAors.
e. A Arm wAh a TSR below the industiy average is said to be close to all other 'below1 Arms while A will consider 
those Amis with a TSR above the industry average as being distant competAors.
(3) •***• (•**•, '*3 denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal returns for Food Industry 134
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's Industiy and Its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, its industiy and its close and distant Industiy competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing fern's Industiy and Its close and distant 
Industry competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day*0) of a Patent giant; 1987 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs f%l
Industry Comnetltors: Technical Strenath Based
Film % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difference


















-5 0.0006 83 0.0009 100 -1.06 0.0007 0.07 0.0004 -1.30
-4 0.0001 83 -.000 83 0.63 -.000 1.48 -0.001 1.38
-3 -.000 33 -.000** 67 0.60 -0.001 -0.08 -0.001 -0.44
-2 0.0000 50 0.0006 100 -1.72 0.0005 -1.72 0.0001 -1.27
-1 0.0003 83 0.0001 67 0.05 0.0003 -0.07 -.000 0.27
0 .0011** 83 0.0007 100 0.09 0.0006 -0.47 .0011*** -0.55
1 -0.001 33 -.000 50 -0.49 -.000 -1.33 -.000 -1.00
2 -0.001 50 -.001** 33 -0.12 -.000 0.19 -.000 0.19
3 .0005** 67 0.001 50 0.00 0.0008 -0.42 .0012*** -0.28
4 0.0003 50 -.000 67 -0.41 0.0000 -1.36 -.000 -0.50
5 0.0009 83 .0009* 83 -0.63 
Panel B
.0008** -0.71 .0011* -1.03
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant industiy competltois, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, its industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing film and the announcing firm's industry and Its close 
and distant industiy competitors for seven window Internals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry Comnetltors: Technical Strenath Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difference
Announcing Positive Firm's Positive Between Firm's Between Finn's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARflrm Close Industiy CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitors and Industiy and
Window CAARlndusVy CAARdose Competitors CAARdstart
[-5 to 51 0.0015 63 .0028** 73 -1.03 0.0018 -1.69 .0022** -1.55
[-3 to 0] 0.0007 62 0.0008 84 -0.87 0.0008 -1.22 0.0006 -1.04
[-2 to 2) -0.0006 60 .0007** 70 -1.28 0.0005 -0.97 0.0007 -0.75
[-2 to 0) .0011** 72 0.0013 89 -1.02 0.0014 -0.99 .0011** -0.67
[-1 to 0] .0015*** 83 0.0007 84 0.28 0.0009 -0.25 .001** -0.15
[-110 1] 0.0008 66 0.0007 72 -0.25 0.0004 -0.42 0.0008 -0.59
[0 to 5] 0.0012 61 0.0019 64 -0.40 0.0013 -1.07 .0028** -0.59
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with a Patent grant as reported In the Official Gazette of the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competltois:
a. The Technological Strength of a firm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average Citation Ratio Index.
b. The Citation Ratio Index measures the importance of a patent based on how often patents are cited in other patents.
c. Determine the Industiy average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along with the individual firm's TSRs.
d. A firm with a TSR above the industiy average Is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while It will consider 
those firms with a TSR below the industiy average as being distant competitors.
e. A firm with a TSR below the industiy average is said to be close to all other 'below' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a TSR above the Industiy average as being distant competitors.
(3) •***• ('**',"") denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Fuel Industry
Panel A
Daily average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its Patent grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm’s Industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, Its industiy and Its close and distant industry competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant 
Industry competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(dayO) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs f%1
Industry Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-DUference Announcing Z-Dilference


















-5 0.009 86 0.0054 100 0.66 .0202" -1.00 0.0060 0.53
-4 0.0005 71 0.0013 71 -0.21 0.0018 -0.32 0.0025 -0.59
-3 -0.0051 29 -0.0046 29 -0.13 -0.0046 -0.13 -0.0027 -0.62
-2 0.0105 100 0.0066 100 0.87 0.0051 1.22 0.0065 0.85
-1 0.0069 100 0.0024 100 1.61 0.0045 0.77 0.0028 1.36
0 -0.0014 43 0.0007 86 0.36 0.0030 -0.75 0.0018 -0.54
1 0.0015 86 0.0006 100 0.37 -0.0028 1.39 -0.0004 0.72
2 -0.0012 57 -0.0005 86 -0.28 -.0025* 0.47 -0.0025 0.47
3 0.0121 100 0.0098 100 0.55 0.0093 0.73 -0.0096 0.55
4 -0.0212 71 0.0038 100 -1.00 0.0062 -1.00 0.0083 -1.00
5 0.0042 57 0.0023 71 0.36 
Panel B
0.0060 -0.35 0.0038 0.08
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its Patent Grants and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant Industiy competltois, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, its Industiy and Its close and distant industry competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and its close 
and distant industiy competitors for seven window Internals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %




[-2 to 21 




Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with a Patent grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competitors:
a. The Technologica! Strength of a firm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average Citation Ratio Index.
b. The Citation Ratio Index measures the Importance of a patent based on how often patents are cited in other patents.
c. Determine the Industiy average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along with the individual firm's TSRs.
d. A firm with a TSR above 1 he Industiy average is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a TSR below the industry average as being distant competitors.
e. A firm with a TSR below the industiy average Is said to be close to all other 'below' firms while It will consider 
those firms with a TSR above the industry average as being distant competitors.
(3) •*•*• (•**•, '*•) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference
Vnnouncing Positive Firm's Positive Between Finn's Between Finn's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industry CAARs CAARflrm Close Industiy CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitors and Industiy and
CAARindustry CAARdose Competltois CAARdstart
0.0037 73 0.0252 86 0.87 0.0315 0.44 0.0293 0.53
0.009 76 0.0056 76 0.76 0.0077 0.29 0.0069 0.40
0.0119 77 0.0071 94 1.27 0.0073 1.27 0.0074 1.11
0.0137 81 0.0256 95 0.69 0.0125 0.26 0.0104 0.65
0.0029 72 0.0028 93 0.02 0.0070 -0.58 0.0028 0.01
0.0028 76 0.0013 95 0.30 0.0054 -0.52 0.0034 -0.12
0.0191 69 0.0138 91 0.59 0.0189 0.02 0.0163 0.31
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Healthcare Industiy 136
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's Industiy and Its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, Its industiy and its close and distant industry competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industry and Its close and distant 
industiy competitors for the event period -S trading days to +5 trading days around the Initial announcement 
(day*0) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Daily Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%1
Industrv Comoetltors: Technical Strenath Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Dilference


















-5 .001* 86 0.0005 100 0.27 0.0008 0.20 .0006* 0.49
-4 0.0002 71 0.0004 86 -0.76 0.0003 -0.47 .0004" -0.93
-3 -0.001 57 -.001" 71 -0.60 -.000 -0.43 -0.001 -0.30
-2 0.0005 86 0.0008 100 -1.15 .0009** -0.39 .0008*** 0.12
-1 -.000 57 -.000*** 57 -0.02 -.000 0.93 -0.001 0.70
0 0.0000 71 0.0002 86 -0.41 0.0001 0.15 -.000 -0.15
1 0.0006 100 0.0007 86 0.27 0.0004 0.48 .0004* -0.39
2 -.001* 29 -.001*** 29 0.21 -0.001 -0.48 -.000 0.93
3 .0005* 86 0.0007 100 -0.08 0.0007 0.50 .0005*** 0.05
4 -.001" 57 -.001*** 14 0.44 -.000 -.00 -.001* 1.75
5 0.001 100 0.0006 86 0.36 
Panel B
.0009*** -0.03 .0012*** 1.02
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its Patent Grants and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, its Industiy and its close and distant industiy competltois, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and its close 
and distant Industiy competitors for seven window inteivals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industnr Comnetltors: Technical Strenath Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Dilference
Announcing Positive Finn's Positive Between Firm's Between Finn's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARflrm Close Industiy CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitors and Industiy and
Window CAARlndustry CAARdose Competltois CAARdstart
[-5 to 5) 0.0014 73 .0017*** 74 -0.10 .0026" 0.23 .0017"* 1.23
[-3 to 01 -.000 68 .0001*** 79 -0.66 0.0004 0.06 -.000 0.08
[-2 to 2) 0.0002 69 .0008*** 72 -0.61 0.0005 0.34 0.0001 0.54
[-2 to 0] 0.0002 71 .0007" 81 -0.47 .0007" 0.33 0.0002 0.29
[-1 to 0] -.000 64 -.000*** 72 -0.27 -.000 0.56 -0.001 0.35
[-110 11 0.0003 76 .0006" 76 -0.16 0.0002 0.46 -.000 0.22
[0 to 5] 0.0007 74 .0009" 67 0.49 0.0012 0.39 .0010" 2.56"
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 Is the first announcement date associated with a Patent grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competitois:
a. The Technological Strength of a firm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average Citation Ratio Index.
b. The Citation Ratio Index measures the importance of a patent based on how often patents are cited in other patents.
c. Determine the Industiy average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along with the individual firm's TSRs.
d. A firm with a TSR above the Industiy average Is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a TSR below the industiy average as being distant competitors.
e. A firm with a TSR below the Industiy average is said to bo close to all other 'below' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a TSR above the industiy average as being distant competitors.
(3) '***' (’**', ’*7 denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Industrials Industry
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's industry and Its close and distant Industry competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, Its industiy and Its close and distant Industiy competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing Arm and the announcing firm's industry and its close and distant 
Industry competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day»0) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%>
Industry Competitors: Technical Strenath Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difference


















-5 0.0009 86 -.0000 71 0.98 0.0001 0.67 -.000 1.08
-4 -.001** 57 -.001 14 0.07
ioo
-0.05 -.001* -0.05
-3 -.000 57 -.0000 71 0.09 -.000 -0.44 0.0000 0.08
-2 0.0001 29 0.0001 71 -0.34 0.0000 -0.35 -.000 -0.42
-1 -.000 29 -.000** 71 -0.13 -.000 -0.09 -.000 -0.10
0 -.000 57 -.000** 43 0.46 -.001* 0.76 -.000 -0.08
1 -.001 71 0.0003 57 -0.15 -.000 -0.14 0.0002 -0.45
2 -.000 29 0.0004 71 -1.33 0.0007 -1.32 0.0004 -0.88
3 0.0007 71 0.0004 86 -0.07 .0005** -0.07 0.0006 0.03
4 -.000 43 -.0000 57 -1.26 -.001 -1.2 -.000 -1.40
5 0.0002 71 -.001 57 0.83 
Panel B
-.001** 0.81 -.001 0.10
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industry and its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, Its Industiy and Its close and distant Industiy competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industry and Its close 
and distant Industiy competitors for seven window internals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Dlfference
Announcing Positive Firm's Positive Between Finn's Between Firm's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARflrm Close Industry CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitors and Industiy and
Window CAARlndustry CAARdose Competitors CAARdstart
[-5 to 5] -.001 54 -.001 61 -0.46 -.002 -0.40 -.002 -0.73
[-3 to 0] .0000 43 -.001 64 -0.16 -.001 -0.13 -.001 -0.35
[-2 to 2] -.001 43 0.0002 63 -0.54 -.000 -0.54 -.000 -0.63
[-2 to 0] -.0000 38 -.001 62 -0.07 -.001 -0.04 -.001 -0.23
[-1 to 0] -.0000 43 -.001 57 0.1 -.001 0.07 -.001 -0.15
(-1to1l -.001 52 -.00 57 -0.15 -.001 0.01 -.000 •0.48
[0 to 51 0.0000 57 -.00 62 -0.65 -.001 -0.49 0.0001 -0.90
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with a Patent grant as reported In the Official Gazette of the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competitors:
a. The Technological Strength of a firm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average Citation Ratio Index.
b. The Citation Ratio Index measures the Importance of a patent based on how often patents are cited in other patents.
c. Determine the Industry average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along with the individual firm’s TSRs.
d. A firm with a TSR above the industry average Is said to be close to alt other 'aboye' firms while It will consider 
those firms with a TSR below the Industiy average as being distant competitors.
e. A firm with a TSR below the Industry average is said to be close to all other 'bekm* firms while It will consider 
those firms with a TSR above the Industry average as being distant competitors.
(3) '***• (•**•, •*•) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Machinery Industry
Panel A
Daily average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, Its industiy and its close and distant Industry competltois, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant 
industiy competitors for the event period -5 trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day-0) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs (%1
Industry Compelltois: Technical Strenoth Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-Difference


















-5 0.0005 71 0.0004 86 -0.02 0.0003 -0.26 0.0007 -0.63
-4 0.0000 71 0.0000 57 0.78 0.0000 0.76 0.0000 •0.05
-3 0.0000 71 -.001” 57 -0.64 0.0000 -0.30 -0.001 0.47
-2 .0016*** 100 0.0008 100 -0.14 0.0009 0.31 0.0007 -0.39
-1 0.0002 71 0.0006 71 -0.39 0.0006 0.72 .0006" 0.02
0 -.001* 43 0.0000 71 0.03 0.0000 0.49 0.0000 0.42
1 0.0000 71 0.0000 71 0.31 0.0000 0.22 0.0000 1.36
2 0.0000 57 0.0000 71 0.02 0.0000 0.88 0.0000 -0.50
3 0.0013 100 0.0007 86 1.38 0.0004 0.81 0.0008 0.70
4 0.0003 71 0.0007 100 -1.46 .001” -1.98* .0011" -3.98*"
5 -0.001 43 -0.001 43 0.24 
Panel B
-0.001 -0.45 0.0000 -1.26
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its Patent Grants and for the 
samples of the announcing firm's industry and Its close and distant Industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, Its industiy and its close and distant industiy competitois, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and Its close 
and distant industiy competitors for seven window internals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference
Announcing Positive Firm’s Positive Between Firm's Between Firm's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARflrm Close Industiy CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and Competitors and Industry and
Window CAARlndustry CAARdose Competitors CAARdstart
[-5 to 5] 0.0014 70 .0012” 74 -0.19 0.0013 0.32 0.0018 -1.16
[-3 to 0] 0.0006 71 0.0007 75 -0.18 0.0009 0.53 0.0002 0.33
[-2 to 2] 0.0004 68 0.0008 77 -0.72 0.0007 0.85 0.0002 -0.02
[-2 to 0] 0.0008 71 0.0014 81 -0.74 0.0014 0.3 0.0009 -0.31
[-1 to 01 -0.0008 57 0.0006 71 -1.26 0.0005 0.36 0.0002 -0.13
[-1 to 11 -0.0008 62 0.0004 71 -0.72 0.0002 0.34 0.0006 0.73
[0 to 5] -0.0004 64 0.0003 74 0.22 0.0001 -0.18 0.0005 -1.00
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 Is the first announcement date associated with a Patent grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant Industiy competitors:
a. The Technological Strength of a firm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average Citation Ratio Index.
b. The Citation Ratio Index measures the importance of a patent based on how often patents are cited in other patents.
c. Determine the Industiy average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along with the individual firm's TSRs.
d. A firm with a TSR above the industry average is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while It will consider 
those films with a TSR below the industiy average as being distant competitors.
e. A firm with a TSR below the industiy average is said to be close to all other 'below' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a TSR above the Industiy average as being distant competitors.
(3) ’*” ■ C**1, '*■) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Metals Industry 139
Panel A
Dally average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's Industry and its close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, Its Industry and its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's Industiy and Its close and distant 
industry competitors for the event period -S trading days to +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day-0) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Daily Average Abnormal Returns. AARs f %)
Industry Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Dilference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Dlfference


















-5 0.0002 43 -.001* 43 -0.05 -.000 -0.50 -0.001 -0.22
-4 0.0003 57 0.0000 43 0.40 0.0001 0.10 0.0001 -0.11
-3 0.0009 57 -.000 86 0.86 -0.001 1.41 -0.001 0.94
-2 0.0011 57 0.0007 86 0.72 0.0007 0.30 0.0008 0.60
-1 0.0011 86 -.000 71 1.04 0.0003 1.26 -.000 1.21
0 0.0001 71 -.000 71 -0.81 0.0000 -0.70 -0.001 0.38
1 0.001 71 0.0007 100 -0.09 .0017* 0.36 0.001 0.88
2 -.000 57 -.000 86 -0.34 -.000 0.42 0.0000 -0.09
3 0.0006 71 0.0002 86 -0.22 0.001 -0.89 .0007* -1.22
4 -.001 29 -.000 43 -0.83 -.000 -1.07 -0.001 -1.21
5 -.001 43 -.000 57 0.17 
Panel B
-.000 0.22 -0.001 0.54
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the 
samples of the announcing film's industry and Its close and distant Industry competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing firm, its industiy and Its close and distant industiy competitors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and Its close 
and distant industry competitors for seven window internals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference Announcing Z-Difference
Announcing Positive Firm's Positive Between Firm's Between Finn's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industry CAARs CAARflrm Close Industiy CAARfrm Distant CAARfirm
Activity and Competitors and Industry and
Window CAARlndusiry CAARdose Competitors CAARd start
r-5 to 5] 0.0035 58 -.000 70 0.96 0.0014 0.74 -0.001 1.08
[-3 to 0] 0.0032 67 0.0001 79 1.30 -.000 1.43 -0.001 1.73
(-2 to 2) 0.0031 68 0.0009 83 1.09 0.0027 1.28 0.0009 1.72
(-2 to 0J 0.0023 71 0.0003 76 1.13 0.001 1.17 -.000 1.54
(-1 to 0] 0.0012 79 -.000 71 0.83 0.0003 1.15 -0.001 1.38
[-110 11 0.0022 76 0.0003 81 0.95 0.002 1.24 0.0000 1.62
[0 to 5J -.000 57 -.000 74 -1.54 0.0019 -1.48 -.000 -1.13
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day 0 Is the fiist announcement date associated with a Patent grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industiy competitors:
a. The Technological Strength of a firm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average Citation Ratio Index.
b. The Citation Ratio Index measures the importance of a patent based on how often patents are cited in other patents.
c. Determine the Industiy average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along with the individual firm's TSRs.
d. A firm with a TSR above the Industiy average is said to be close to all other 'above' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a TSR below the industry average as being distant competitors.
e. A firm with a TSR below the industiy average is said to be close to all other 'below' firms while it will consider 
those firms with a TSR above the industry average as being distant competitors.
(3) ■**** (■**•, '*■) denotes significance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level.
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Appendix: Abnormal Returns for Telecommunication Industry 140
Panel A
Daily average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of the firm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the samples 
of the announcing firm's Industiy and its close and distant Industry competitors, the percentage of positive AARs 
for the announcing firm, its industiy and Its close and distant Industry competitors, the Z-values for the mean 
difference of AARs between the announcing firm and the announcing firm's industiy and its close and distant 
Industry competitors for the event period -5 trading days fo +5 trading days around the initial announcement 
(day»0) of a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Dally Average Abnormal Returns. AARs f%)
Industry Competitors: Technical Strength Based
Firm % Announcing % Z-DAference Announcing Z-Dlfference Announcing Z-DAference


















-5 0.0006 57 0.0008 86 -0.12 0.0014 -0.25 .0011" 0.01
-4 -0.001 29 -0.001 43 0.2 .0000" 0.27 -0.001 0.22
-3 0.0000 43 -.000" 57 -0.46 -.001" -0.19 -.001*" -0.51
-2 0.0005 71 0.0007 100 -1.66 .001" -1.20 .0009*" -1.59
-1 0.0000 71 0.0005 86 -0.33 .0003" -0.27 0.0005 -0.09
0 0.0003 86 0.0006 100 -0.36 0.0012 -0.36 .0009*" -0.31
1 0.0001 86 .0000" 29 0.12 0.0000 0.22 0.0000 -0.18
2 0.0000 43 .0000"* 57 -0.29 0.0000 -0.20 -0.001 -0.43
3 0.0011 86 0.0011 71 0.53 0.0016 0.10 .0014"* 0.77
4 0.0000 57 0.0001 71 -0.23 0.0001 -0.40 0.0000 -0.07
5 0.0007 86 0.0007 100 0.34 
Panel B
0.0008 0.50 .0009*” 0.20
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the sample of the Arm announcing Its Patent Grants and for the 
samples of the announcing Ann's industry and As close and distant industiy competitors, the percentage of 
positive CAARs for the announcing Ami, Its industry and As close and distant industiy competAors, the Z-values 
for the mean difference of CAARs between the announcing Ami and the announcing Ami's Industiy and As close 
and distant industiy competAors for seven window internals around the two-day announcement period (-1,0) of 
a Patent grant; 1987 -1992.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. CAARs. %
Industry CompetAors: Technical Strength Based







Announcing PosAive Firm’s PosAive Between Firm's Between Finn's Between
Its Patent CAARs Industiy CAARs CAARfitm Close Industry CAARflrm Distant CAARflrm
Activity and CompetAors and Industiy and
Window CAARjrtdjstry CAARdose CompetAors CAARd start
(-5 to 51 0.0021 65 .0023* 73 -0.08 0.0047 -0.01 .0036*" -0.13
[-3 to 01 0.0005 68 0.0013 86 -1.28 0.0017 -1.11 .0015* -1.25
[-2 to 21 0.0006 71 .0008* 74 -0.9 0.0021 -0.58 .0016" -1.07
[-2 to 01 0.0006 76 0.0018 95 -0.99 .0025*" -0.87 .0024*" -0.93
[-1 to 0] 0.0001 79 0.0011 93 -0.42 0.0015 -0.38 .0014" -0.3
f-1 to 11 0.0002 81 0.0006 72 -0.28 0.0013 -0.08 .0013" -0.39
[0 to 51 0.002 74 0.0014 71 0.19 0.0033 0.23 .0025"* 0.16
Notes for Panels A and B:
(1) Day o is the Arst announcement date associated wAh a Patent grant as reported in the Official Gazette of the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(2) Process for determining close and distant industry competAors:
a. The Technological Strength of a Arm equals the product of the average number of patents granted in the last 5 years 
and the 5-year average CAatlon Ratio Index.
b. The CAatlon Ratio Index measures the Importance of a patent based on how often patents are cAed in other patents.
c. Determine the Industiy average Technological Strength Ratio (TSR) along wAh the individual Arm's TSRs.
d. A Arm with a TSR above the industiy average is said to be close to all other 'above' Arms while A will consider 
those Arms wAh a TSR below the Industiy average as being distant competAors.
e. A firm wAh a TSR below the industiy average Is said to be close to all other 'beKw/ Amis while A will consider 
those Arms with a TSR above the Industry average as being distant competAors.
(3) •***■ (•**•, •*•) denotes slgnAicance when less than or equal to the 0.01 (0.05,0.10) level.
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of Management Science Annual Meeting (1986).
PRESENTATIONS AT PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS
“The Relationship Between Exchange Rates and the Current Account: An Empirical 
Study of the Asset-Market Model,” presented at the CSU Fifith Annual Faculty 
Research Conference, September 1995.
"Trading Volume, Price Change, and Price Variability in Futures Markets,": Co-authored 
with M. Najand, presented at the 1992 Eastern Finance Association Meeting.
"Corporate Spinoff: Management Tool for Divestiture,": presented at the 1986 Institute 
of Management Science Annual Meeting.
OTHER SCHOLARLY ACTIVITIES
Discussant of "Using the Pecking-Order Hypothesis to Explain the Capital Structure 
Decision in Great Britain," at the 2nd Annual European Financial Management 
Conference (May 1993).
Discussant of “The Impact of Domestic and Foreign Divestments on Shareholder 
Wealth," at the 1st Annual European Financial Management Conference (May 1992). 
BUSINESS EXPERIENCE
Beverly Enterprises, Va. Beach, Va„
Advanced Accountant, 1982-1985.
ITT Corporation-Gwaltney, Smithfield, Va.
Cost Accountant, 1980-1962.
Eppinger and Russell Co., Inc., Chesapeake, Va.
Accounting Supervisor, 1978-1980.
Laventhol and Horwath, CPA, Norfolk, Va.
Staff Accountant, 1976-1978.
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